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In the architecture, engineering and construction (AEC) industry projects are often temporary in 
nature and are often characterised as PBO project-based organisations. Each project chooses a 
number of strategies which makes up a project development model. Traditionally models have 
focused on transactional contracting between actors in the value chain which opens up the way, 
for sub-optimisation and risk aversion as the common challenges. In such circumstances, each 
actor has a different perception of the aim and the success of the project, and so try to find ways 
to take the lowest risk and gain the most profit coupled with optimising their own interests. 
Based on the highlighted problem the study aims to investigate of the research is to examine 
Integrated project delivery (IPD) in Norwegian construction projects. Sharing of risk and 
opportunities aiming at better collaboration and project achievement. 
The thesis aims at testing the differences between IPD and alternative implementation models. 
Hence this thesis attempts to answer the following propositions: 
• Proposition one states that IPD provides less scope for sub-optimisation and 
opportunistic behaviour between companies in the value chain. 
• Proposition two states that IPD provides better conditions for unified solutions 
(swapping) than traditional contracts. 
• Proposition three states that IPD safeguards quality and customer value in a better 
way than alternative implementation models while maintaining constructability. 
• Proposition four states that IPD, in combination with TVD, provides better 
framework conditions for continuous improvement and innovation compared to a 
Design Build model. 
Furthermore, this case study answers the propositions by collecting data composed mainly of the 
documents, survey and interviews which were analysed using the framework method. 
Based on analysed content the findings show that IPD provides helps to alleviate the characteristic 
problems in the AEC industry and how this have changed using IPD. These problems come from 
a lack of quality, lack of collaboration, opportunism, lack of customer value and a lack of 
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1. Introduction  
In the architecture, engineering and construction (AEC) industry projects are often temporary in 
nature and can be characterised as PBO project-based organisations. Each project chooses a number 
of strategies which makes up a project development model. Traditionally models have focused on 
transactional contracting between actors in the value chain which opens up the way, for sub-
optimisation and risk aversion as the common challenges (Kalsaas, Bølviken, & Klakegg, 2017). 
In such circumstances, each actor has a different perception of the aim and the success of the 
project, and so try to find ways to take the lowest risk and gain the most profit coupled with 
optimising their own interests. It is this mentality that leads to sub-optimisation in projects. In 
addition, there is the challenge of implementing a strategy in the building arena in Norway since it 
is locally rooted and therefore there is decentralised decision making. This means decisions often 
come from a head office which has little control, and its project teams, in turn, have little contact 
with central leadership (Sward & Bygballe, 2017). The projects often work on their own 
disconnected from the main organisation. 
The main problem is: Do IPD construction projects in a Norwegian context benefit from sharing 
risk and do they benefit from opportunities that lead to better cooperation and better safeguarding 






1.1. Background  
This section gives important background information about the subject, especially for those 
unfamiliar with the subject and incudes a review of the area being researched and relevant history 
on the issue.  
The need for change in the construction industry 
In the late twentieth century, a number of countries had concerns about inefficiency and low 
productivity in their respective construction industries. During the 1990s many governments 
published reports on building and construction in an effort to bring about change in their 
construction sector.  
However, Japan's construction industry was improving, and this was attracting interest. Both 
manufacturing and construction in Japan were going through a phase of increased productivity. 
The Japanese Federation of Construction Contractors reported an increase in construction 
employment in every year from 1987 to 1993 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
1996, p. 9). The United States set up a number of agencies to study Japanese techniques. At 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the International Motor Vehicle Program received 
government funding and set up an investigative research team who published a book, The Machine 
that Changed the World by Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990, pp. 3-4), which described motor 
manufacturing in Japan (described as “lean production”), especially the Toyota Production System 
(TPS) (pp. 4-82).  
The manufacturing sector began to improve in the U.S. and in other countries under the influence 
of this new approach. However, construction did not benefit at first from lean techniques 
(construction being a more complex industry). In 1992, L. Koskela attempted to apply the new 
production philosophy to construction, writing  
“leadership is needed to realize a fundamental shift of philosophy focus on actionable and 
measurable improvement...new organization formed with self-directed teams 
implementation (of lean) requires a substantial amount of learning” (pp. 27-28). 
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In 1999, G. Howell gave a simplified description of the lean ethos – “meeting customer needs while 
using less of everything” (p. 2), and he reached the conclusion that there are incompatibility issues 
with lean within the traditional contract system –  
“we expect new forms of commercial contract to emerge that gives incentive for reliable 
work flow and optimization at the deliverable-to-the-client level” (p. 8). 
Lean has not been adopted in construction in Japan because 
 “some of the concepts of lean construction have already been woven into the Japanese 
construction industry” (Inokuma, Aoki, Shimura, Nagayama, & Koizumi, 2014, p. 25). 
In the UK, a complete change from fragmentation to an integrated process was suggested by the 
Egan Report. Sir John Egan drew on his experience in automative manufacturing in steering the 
Construction Task Force in its studies and deliberations. The report identified “integrated process” 
as one of the keys to improving construction –  
“The rationale behind the development of an integrated process is that the efficiency of 
project delivery is presently constrained by the largely separated processes through which 
they are largely planned, designed and constructed. These processes reflect the fragmented 
structure of the industry and sustain a contractual and confrontational culture” (1998, p. 
19)  
Following on from the Egan Report, the National Audit Office report, entitled “Modernising 
Construction”, said:  
“clients, advisers, contractors, sub-contractors and suppliers of materials must be 
integrated to manage risk and apply value management and engineering techniques to 
improve buildability and drive waste out of the process....construction design should not be 
a separate process but be integrated with the whole construction process” (Great Britain, 
2001, pp. 4-10). 
In appendix 4 of the report, the practice of partnering is praised since collaboration between 
organisations brings benefits in the form of savings and efficiency, and yet, on the other hand, 
partnering is criticised as a weak form of integration existing between organisations rather than 
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people, and the stronger partner tends to dominate to the disadvantage of the weaker partner  (pp. 
61-66).  
The attempts to improve construction by means of lean techniques continued into the twenty-first 
century, with the publication of a research report by the U.S. Construction Industry Institute entitled 
Application of Lean Manufacturing Principles to Construction. The emphasis in this research report 
was on the elimination of waste and also striving to meet or exceed customer requirements, and 
finally pointing out that lean principles are more than practical steps - they are a system of thinking 
and behaviour (Diekmann, Krewedl, Balonick, Stewart, & Won, 2004, pp. 32-52).  
Inception of Integrated Project Delivery 
According to Lahdenperä (2012) Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) has been an emerging method 
from North America that originated from Japan, labelled as “gentlemanly principles”, see Figure 
1. This corroborates well with Lean and the Toyota Production Systems (TPS) where adversarial 










                                                 
1 Further information can be found in cases of Jaguar and Nippondenso and the Sutter Health project (Ali, Smith, & 
Saker, 1997; Lichtig, 2005). 
Figure 1: Integrated Project delivery (IPD) emergence, propagation and 
interaction with project partnering and alliancing. Source Lahdenperä (2012) 
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A further step was taken towards a defined integrated process with the “lean summit” at Sutter 
Health. Sutter Health was a medical care provider wanting to commission structural seismic 
upgrades to its buildings after an earthquake caused significant damage to healthcare facilities in 
Southern California (H. Ashcraft, 2013; Lichtig, 2005) and, for this purpose, they were interested 
in lean construction. In 2004, Sutter Health held a summit to discuss lean construction and the 
organisation's five “big ideas”. These could be summarized as - collaboration; relationships; 
networks of commitments; optimisation; and, the pairing of learning with action (Lichtig, 2005, 
pp. 106-108). Concurrently, a few IPD projects had started taking place, since some, who could 
see the advantage of integration as an idea, had decided to put it into practice, such as Westbrook 
in Florida. Westbrook Corporation started using IPD with relational contracting to integrate the 
principal parties in a collaborative contract (Matthews & Howell, 2005, pp. 46-48).  
In 2007, the American Institute of Architects California Council published an IPD working 
definition which emphasized integration, waste reduction and optimisation of efficiency. This was 
supplemented by essential principles and work flow arrangements necessary for a workable IPD 
(2007b, pp. 1-9). The AIACC later collaborated with the national AIA to produce an IPD guide 
with the aim of educating interested parties in the principles of IPD and how to set one up. Also 
those wanting to use traditional delivery methods would be able to adopt some IPD principles 
within a traditional framework (2007a, pp. 1-12). 
The working definition and the guide gave impetus to IPD adoption, but, in practice, there were 
difficulties. Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber found there was opposition from within the industry 
from traditionalists and it was difficult to build trust. There was difficulty in integrating all relevant 
personnel from the start and there were problems with organizing training for all relevant 
personnel. In addition, there were financial hurdles (compensation, sharing costs, overruns, profit 
pooling) and legal barriers especially in the public sector (laws not allowing relational contracting, 
and local regulations to be complied with) (2011, pp. 32-52). In 2014, the working definition was 
changed. The original working definition and guide allowed for users to choose some principles 
and leave others out. However, in 2014, it was decided it was necessary to clarify the mandatory 
nature of some IPD provisions:  
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“We believe this is a necessary clarification to distinguish IPD from other delivery models 
that offer some of these improvements, but do not use the full system to achieve full 
integration” (American Institute of Architects, 2014, pp. 4-15). 
The mandatory principles covered the relationship between the owner and the key designers and 
the key builders. This meant continuous involvement from start to finish; shared risk; shared 
reward; joint project control; limited liability; and, a multi-party agreement or equal interlocking 
agreements. Without those principles, projects could not really be described as IPD. 
Situation in Norway 
Norway's construction productivity has been showing increases in percentage terms for most years 
but recently there have been signs of a possible downturn (OECD, 2017). Klakegg (2017) states 
that “investment in the building industry has accounted for 268 million kroner in 2015 and is 
expected to increase to 291 million in 2016 this is equal to 1.7% increase and this is an expected 
0.5-2% increase for years to come. The building arena accounts for around 5th of the total value 
created in Norway on land mass in 2013 (without the rental industry). This has been an increase of 
1.4% over 10 years from 2003-2013. The building industry is an important industry in all districts 
and towns. In addition, there is also an increase in employment of over 43% over the last 10 years. 
These statistics reveal how important the building arena is for society (p. 418). 
However it can be argued that over the long term - since 1992 - its productivity has, in fact, 
decreased. The deep-rooted problems of the architecture, engineering and construction sector - 
problems that are connected, as in other countries, with the traditional way of doing things - have 
been further accentuated by increasing complexity and changes.  
“The AEC industry can be said to be in a transition phase towards new shores” (Munthe-
Kaas, Hjelmbrekke, Lohne, & Laedre, 2015, p. 578). 
In England and Norway public projects do not only have a tendency for being late and over budget 
but also that benefits do not materialise. In Norway this has led to development and the growth that 
we know today as external quality assurance of big public projects by the finance department. This 
process has established more value for money. This has led to more focus on project owner 
investment and benefit for users. Lean Construction (LC) focus of projects gives value creation for 
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the customer. This is also in line with wider development. It is generally accepted that projects are 
not planned and executed for their own good but for the value for society, project owners and 
users/customers. This can be seen as traits in the area of project development.  
In public projects this has led to more focus on the early phases in projects, more definition of the 
right goals and the right tools. This has led to an important characteristic in the building and 
construction projects in the use of Building Information Modelling (BIM) and other digital models 
for integration of the partners in projects. In addition, more focus is on the bigger picture in terms 
of the project delivery model and strategy for value creation with less resources, reduced levels of 
conflict and without waste and minimal use of energy, time and material which will be high on the 
agenda in the future. In the area of project development this has caused a new dimension: How do 
we plan and control to create maximum value? (Kalsaas et al., 2017, p. 26) 
Examples of its adoption could be seen in new practices in Statsbygg who initiated partnering in 
2001 and has continued with the collaborative partnering system up to now. As a major public 
client, Statsbygg attempted to be a role model for the industry. Partnering is Statsbygg's way of 
facilitating lean with more efficiency and value and less waste in the projects where they have 
involvement (Haugseth, Lohne, Jensen, & Lædre, 2014, pp. 1343-1344).  
However further developments were slow. Rodewohl carried out research into the use of lean 
technology in the building industry in Norway in 2014, and he found some use of lean tools (to a 
limited extent) and definitely an absence of an integrated approach. He concluded that the tendering 
system was a barrier to further progress towards a comprehensive lean process and IPD. He 
suggested that the ability of a contractor to carry out a project in a new way could be added to the 
tendering criteria2 (Rodewohl, 2014). An attempt to circumvent this problem was attempted by 
Statsbygg by mandating (when they drew up contracts for a new project) that lean construction 
must be used for the purpose of the project. Eventually the project had some elements of lean, but 
the necessary collaboration was not there (Haarr & Drevland, 2016, pp. 3-11). It seems as if 
adopting lean and IPD fully has not taken off to the extent it has in some other countries, notably 
the United States. 
                                                 
2 This is because the tendering process favours the lowest bidder and Rodewohl thought this added requirement would 
be a way of getting round the rules in order to recruit lean contractors. 
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1.2. Characteristics and challenges in the AEC industry  
The characteristics and challenges in the AEC-industry (architecture, engineering, construction) 
have been paramount with past projects repeating the same problems and encountering the same 
challenges. Recently the AEC industry, both in Norway and Internationally, has faced a major 
challenge in an underperforming industry to increase productivity in order to become more efficient 
and increase its profits (Bråthen, 2015).   
Moum (2016) points out that key actors in the AEC industry characterised it as “dysfunctional and 
fragmented” not just because of its competitive nature but because of the conflicts and 
disagreements that arise from challenges in: 
“competitive tendering, barriers in communication, lack of trust and transparency, 
increased complexity, lack of implementation and adaption to new technology, short term 
goals focus and emphasis on lowest bid criteria and a lack of good role models who push 
for innovation.” (p. 377) 
This poses great challenges in Norway and also internationally. Each supply chain participant tends 
to sub-optimise in order to maximise their own interests thus resulting in adversarial relationships 
(American Institute of Architects, 2007a; H. Ashcraft, 2013; Matthews & Howell, 2005; Moum, 
2016). Further it is also pointed out that sub-optimising often leads to shifting of risk or blame from 
one party to another.  
Much of this abysmal performance can be explained by the very structure of traditional project 
delivery. 
It does not help that this is further accentuated by new challenges. Moum, talking of Norway said: 
 “societal challenges, increased globalisation and international market competition, 
changing markets, new legal requirements, and ever demanding user and client’s needs” 
(p. 377).  
The dispersed nature of the AEC industry is also problematic because projects are often temporary 
and unique in nature. Thus, every project has a unique project delivery model for the projects 
lifecycle and faces unique complexities in organising, coordinating and managing a project within 
time, cost and quality.   
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Another challenge according to Moum is the “mix of uncertainty, uniqueness, interdependencies 
and unpredictable cause-effect relations” (p. 378) that create complex chaotic and often complex 
situations. These situations often have interdependencies, requiring participant output before 
another participant can go ahead. As a result, these problems can only be coordinated by mutual 
adjustment. This applies as much in the United States as in Norway.  
There seems to be an agreement among both practitioners and scholars there is a need for more 
knowledge about ways to increase efficiency through procurement, organisation, digitalisation, 
execution and the maintenance of building projects. Many initiatives have started in order to test 
out new ways of working3.  
There are some underlying and hidden challenges that affect the construction industry of which a 
majority cannot be seen, but mostly felt. These will be explained further. 
1.3. The concept of Wicked Problems 
Designers/planners are often faced with Ill-defined problems. These problems can be either tame 
or wicked problems. The difference is talked about in (Rittel & Webber, 1973) who states that 
problems are either from the social or the natural sciences. He suggests that the problems from the 
natural science are “tame problems” that are “definable and separable and have solutions that are 
findable” and “are those associated with engineers and scientists”. However, “wicked problems” 
are not easily defined as the definition changes every time you address it. They have “no solution” 
as each solution has a causal link to another and can be a symptom of another problem. Wicked 
problems “at best, are only resolved-over and over again” unless one terminates the problem by 
accepting a best fit.  These problems are normally associated with planners. (pp. 136-144).  
In design, we often see “tame” problems as those being for example unclear customer requirements 
or a poorly defined scope, ie they can be solved or there is a solution, and they are normally 
associated with the creation of a tangible object. They usually involve solving the problem “in a 
finite time period by applying standard techniques” (Camillus, 2008, p. 1). Whereas wicked 
problems are more objective and “usually rely on political judgement for resolution” (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973, p. 136).  
                                                 
3 Industry workshops with Nye Veier (2018) and with the research project Meerc (More Efficient and Environmental 
friendly Road Construction) 
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1.4. Coordination problems-Coordination theory & Reciprocal Interdependency 
Coordination theory is referred to as “a body of principles about how activities can be coordinated”. 
In other words, how “actors can work together harmoniously" (Malone & Crowston, 1990, p. 3). 
Whereas (Crowston, Rubleske, & Howison, 2006) define in more detail Coordination theory as the 
“dependencies between tasks the different group members are carrying out and the coordination 
mechanisms the group uses to coordinate its work and then considers alternative mechanisms.”  (p. 
120).  
Malone and Crowston (1994) state that coordination and interdependency between people and 
resources. Resource coordination is based on how task and actor dependency can be coordinated, 
for example a task might need a required specialist whereas resource dependency, requires that 
multiple tasks need the same resources, in terms of money, storage space etc (p. 92) 4. Thompson 
(1967) further adds that coordination is a problem where three interdependencies exist: “pooled, 
sequential and reciprocal”. Pooled is not dependant on other elements to contribute to the overall 
puzzle as opposed to sequential interdependency. Whereas reciprocal interdependency, is the most 
difficult problem to manage as it contains both pooled and sequential interdependency, and each 
unit output can affect everyone else. As a result, these problems can only be coordinated by “mutual 
adjustment”.  
1.5. Complex problems -Cynefin framework 
The Cynefin framework is a concept that is used to help managers, and others reach decisions 
because of the common characteristics that projects face in engineering management, complex 
problems.  Moum explains that through a “mix of uncertainty, uniqueness, interdependencies and 
unpredictable cause-effect relations” that they create complex chaotic and often complex situations 
(p. 378). The Cynefin framework is a decision-making tool that identifies the decision-making 
process and categorises problems as occurring within five areas or dimensions “based on the 
relationship between cause and effect”: simple, complicated, complex, chaotic and disorder (Kurtz 
& Snowden, 2003, p. 468).  
                                                 
4 Based on the Theory of Coordination (Crowston 1994). 
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2. Theoretical Framework (Applicable Theories) 
The purpose of this section is to give the reader an awareness of the state of theory and the 
relationships that were required in order to reach the research propositions. Projects often face 
challenges in complex and uncertain environments and therefore, it is critical to have knowledge 
of the theories and a good understanding of the factors that affect their performance. Therefore, the 
theories chosen, rely exclusively on the theories applicable to the challenges in the general theory 
of management. In addition, the theories were selected for their appropriateness, ease of application 
and explanatory power in examining and analysing the phenomenon. This study examines the 
theoretical framework with its central tenents being within the lean construction triangle, which 
will be discussed and is specifically aimed at contracts, project management and learning in 
organisations. The theoretical framework will, at the end of the thesis, be examined in relation to 
the results from the study. 
 
The challenges in project management are many, from the background discussed above, as it seems 
that there are many trade-offs that are required in order achieve the optimal project.  
The Lean Construction Institute states that in order to deal with the challenges in the construction 
industry, it is necessary to have an effective organisation covering all three sides of the lean 








Figure 2: Shows the Lean Construction Triangle. Source: Ballard (2012, p. 7) adapted from (Howell, 2011) 
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In order to do this, it is necessary to examine the unseen drivers in effective organisational 
management - effective teamwork, removal of opportunism, evoking trust and enhancing 
coordination. The theoretical framework sets the scene for investigating integrated project delivery. 
In order to examine the underlining factors for complex and uncertain projects to reach optimality, 
the Lean Construction Institute recommends three focus areas, shown in the lean construction 
triangle.  
The interests of the client need to be aligned through the commercial terms and the financial 
interests of others in the supply chain, this can be in the form of contracts. Secondly the organisation 
is integrated by having “downstream players participate in upstream processes, and vice-versa”, 
this can be through the use of project delivery models and thirdly the operating system, can be 
thought of as production in how teams, are structured to use the best “available methods and tools, 
both managerial and technological to apply” and follow the ideals and principles of lean. 
Consequently, the lean construction triangle is a framework that can be applied in order to 
understand organizations and their structures and will be used as the basis for this thesis. 
2.1. Relational coordination 
There are many problems within the AEC industry, from the cross examination of the literature 
mentioned earlier (Ghassemi & Becerik-Gerber, 2011; Lichtig, 2005; Moum, 2016).  Many authors 
have suggested that in order to solve these problems a cooperative way of working is required. 
Halldorsson, Kotzab, Mikkola, and Skjøtt-Larsen (2007, p. 287) suggests that:  
“The performance of a firm depends not only on how efficiently it cooperates with its direct 
partners, but also on how well these partners cooperate with their own business partners”.  
One theory that can be used to measure this efficiency is from Mary Parker Follett relational 
coordination theory (Gittell, 2011, p. 401), who argues that relational coordination theory can be 
used to identify elements of “effective work organisations” which have high levels of coordination 
between “uncertainty, interdependence, and time constraints”.  
As a result “Effective organisation of work” involves an awareness of all participants, to others in 
the work process (Gittell, 2000a, p. 517).  











The seven areas of relational coordination theory, as shown in Figure 3, can be used to measure the 
strength and quality of a team’s performance by capturing the dynamics of how work is 
coordinated. This is done by examining both relationships and communication. The quality of team 
performance is measured through shared goals, knowledge, mutual respect in relation to the 
communication between team members. Evidence of which has been shown in several of Jody 
Hoffer Gittell works, see Gittell et al. (2000) and Gittell (2000b). 
 
2.2. Trust 
Trust is an important feature of Relationship-Based Procurement (RBP). Walker and Lloyd-Walker 
(2014) define RBP as a concept which “refers to developing a project delivery mechanism that 
holds collaboration and joint problem solving as central features”. In order to achieve trust in a 
project, participants need to have the “ability to build trust and commitment” in addition to 
investing time and energy (Lloyd-Walker & Walker, 2015, p. 57). Managers’ perceived 
trustworthiness when it comes to cost, is dependent on whether they are perceived to be treating 
other parties ethically and reasonably when it comes to cost distribution. When used right, trust can 
be used to remove costs.  
According to Lloyd-Walker & Walker (2015, p. 57), people make a rational decision to trust and 
is dependent on their willingness to be vulnerable and take a risk. They further state that trust is 
Figure 3: shows the seven areas of relational coordination theory. Retrieved March 10, 2018 
from: http://rcanalytic.com/rctheory/  
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affected by a sequence of events. First, a person considering trusting someone has a residual 
inclination which is driven by ability (the other person’s motivation and capacity), benevolence 
(feelings they have towards that person) and integrity (matching rhetoric with actions) (p. 58). 
Commitment is the mediating factor, which is classified into: continuance (“need-to”), normative 
(obligation) and affective (“want-to”) commitment (p. 58). When a situation requires trust, a person 
deciding whether to trust need to know the risks involved, how vulnerable it makes them and other 
participants’ trustworthiness. The next sequence is analyzing the behavior and relationships with 
the people being trusted, where the person’s ability to perceive the outcomes determines the value 
of their observations. If their observations are deemed positive, this could lead to deepening of trust 
and future inclination to accept greater risks. They further state that institutional trust is linked to 
their reputation and value, which is usually stable (pp. 59-60). 
According to Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie (2006, p. 1002), define distrust as “confident 
negative expectation regarding another’s conduct”, and trust is defined in the same wording, but 
with a “positive expectation”.  They also argue that trust and distrust ranges from high to low, 
where trust is so complex that trust and distrust are independent of each other and can occur 
simultaneously. Meaning that one can both trust and distrust another person at the same time, but 
in different aspects. Smyth (2006, p. 102) describes calculative trust, which refers to self-interested 
trust and socially oriented trust. The former behavior, although having little (or no) trust, there is 
“mutual self-interest to trust each other”. The latter behavior “is a deeper level of trust that is giving 
in character” and dependent on awareness of the other party’s trustworthiness.  
Lloyd-Walker & Walker (2015, p. 60) state that in order to have trust in a project team, they need 
to have shared values and assumptions that support benevolence, integrity and ability (trust 
attributes). Each member of a team will be a part of different sub-cultures and have different 
worldviews. They further state that all these sub-cultures create a system that changes and interacts. 
Change can happen more quickly in observable artifacts than shared values and common 
assumptions (p. 61). Culture influence people in different ways, which depends on their perception 
on fairness and justice, which determine their behavior and reactions (p. 62). 
2.3. Collaboration 
According to Lloyd-Walker & Walker (2015, p. 63) collaboration is defined as “together (co) 
working (labour), and this is implied as being directed to the same end”. This is similar to 
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cooperation, which, however, does not necessarily imply working towards the same goal. Teams 
working together to deliver the same project have a relationship. They take responsibility for 
different aspects of the project, might have different priorities along the way, but have the same 
goal; to deliver the project. When goal congruity are low to medium, there is project cooperation. 
If this is medium to high, there is collaboration. When teams have high to very high alignment of 
objectives it is called coalescing. They further state that in order to solve problems together, 
collaboration networks are sometimes formed, where they share and create knowledge.  
After comparing several different definitions of collaboration and cooperation, Schöttle, 
Haghsheno, & Gehbauer (2014, p. 1273) conclude that “collaboration is temporary and if the goal 
is achieved, the collaboration ends”. They further state that trust and high transparency are 
important factors in collaboration. They also conclude that cooperation lie somewhere between 
collaboration and autonomy. In order to have either collaboration or cooperation, participants need 
to understand that they need each other in order to achieve their goals. Collaboration is strongly 
impacted by so called “soft characteristics” like trust, commitment, information exchange and 
communication (pp. 1273-1274). They further state that this shows that participants need to go 
through a development process in order to achieve collaboration. According (Schrage, 1995) as 
recounted by Schöttle, Haghsheno, & Gehbauer (2014, p. 1278), collaboration is not needed in “all 
professional situations”. Which professional relationship require collaboration should be identified 
when establishing project teams (2014, p. 1278). 
 
2.4. Opportunism- Principal Agent Theory, Transaction Cost theory & Game Theory 
Current studies on the principal and agent problem have been diverse in various areas as economics, 
finance, healthcare and many more, since relationships exist in the form of contracts between 
actors.  
Initially the principal agent problem originated from Ronald Coase on his paper “The nature of the 
Firm” in (1937). By the 1970’ s other authors in the same period brought the work of the principal 
agent problem to focus however a debate exists between who was the first to create the principal 
and agent theory. This debate concerns (Ross, 1973) who covered incentives structures in 
motivating agents and Mitnick 1973 who covered behavioural problems. It was not until the late 
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1980’s that Eisenhardt cited mostly Mitnick work (Mitnick, 2006). Other authors like Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), have contributed by describing the agency relationship as a contract in which to 
examine other variables that impact of the costs on both the principal and the agent.  
The principal agent problem theory is based on Eisenhardt (1989) which states that a problem arises 
when an “agent” does work on behalf of another party the “principal”. A relationship is created 
between the parties and problems arise through risk aversion, opportunistic behaviour and 
information asymmetry between the two parties. The relationship is a challenge because people 
have different and often conflicting risk preferences, desires and goals, more focused on self-
interest and are limited by bounded rationality. Information asymmetry can be challenging to the 
principal when the agent can be deceptive by hold back, lie or even shift blame in order to enter 
into or while in a contract.  
However, when examining recent works on the principal agent theory in construction it is wide-
ranging. An example of these works is Schieg (2008) who discusses information asymmetry in 
construction project management as having three problems: adverse selection, moral hazard and 
holdups. In adverse selection whereby, contractors conceal qualities or qualifications which could 
lead to an undesired partner. An almost different problem is moral hazard where information 
asymmetry or an imbalance of information occurs in favour of the contractor, who indulges in r isk 
taking on behalf of the principal, because the client cannot supervise or deduce stringent quality in 
the work. While Holdups problems occur when a client invests heavily in a future transaction with 
a contractor who can act uncooperatively, and a one-sided relationship occurs whereby the client 
is held up to excessive demands.  
Examples of these issues can be seen in recent empirical studies like Steinle, Schiele, and Ernst 
(2014) who tested the principal agent theory, in buyer supplier relationships by examining 
information asymmetry as an issue that explains moral hazard: why suppliers behave differently 
than expected. The conclusions gave strong indications, adding to theory, that regardless of the 
length of the relationship or the number of meeting involved “both hidden action and hidden 
intention can lead to moral hazard” (p. 136) .  
Another theory that examines opportunism is Transaction Cost Theory which examines the 
transaction costs in contracting. Transaction theory also originated from Ronald Coase work in 
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(1937) and it was not until 1970’s that interest arose and influenced Williamson who took the focus 
from activities of the firm to the level of the transaction (Klaes, 2000).  
Williamson (1979) examined the cost associated with the exchange of goods and services when 
dealing with an external party and found that people’s opportunistic behaviour and their bounded 
rationality increase the transaction costs. Rationality in people minds is limited based on their 
capacity to understand and encompass everything. Dahlman (1979) adds that transaction costs can 
be further categorised into three categories; the cost of searching and finding information, the cost 
of bargaining and decision making and the cost of policing and informing as these are also a part 
of the optimisation issue. (Dahlman, 1979, p. 148)  
Another aspect Williamson adds is the further impact on the costs by the frequency of the 
transaction, the uniqueness of the asset and the uncertainty of the relationship (p. 254).  
Transaction Cost theory has often been used in empirical studies, examples can be in Li, Arditi, 
and Wang (2012) who identified and categorized the factors that affect transaction costs in 
construction project management in public companies. It was shown that that owners transaction 
cost was a factor that could also contribute to the transaction costs. 
Other similar studies like Unsal and Taylor (2011) tested opportunistic behaviour over time and its 
impact in an artificial procurement market which showed that participants opportunistic behaviour 
was the driving force in minimising costs and maximising profit.  
Another theory when examining opportunism, is game theory, as it closely resembles an exchange 
relationship. The theory shows how through the prisoner dilemma, that even the most rational of 
decision makers, when rewarded for cooperative and non-cooperative actions, still choses to take 
a payoff that maximises their interests, even though the cooperative payoff is a better choice as it 
lowers the reward but results in a win, win situation for both parties. However these actions are 
continually taken (Hill, 1990). 
While on the other hand some empirical studies like Huang, Yin, and Tserng (2012) describe 
control mechanisms, such as incentives as an important aspect in minimising opportunism in 
contracting within projects. Other authors such as Schieg (2008) suggest that the problems of 
opportunism, may be solved using six mechanisms (p. 49) whereby incentives is just one method: 
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• bureaucratic control; 
• information systems; 
• incentives, bonuses; 
• corporate culture; 
• reputation; 
• trust.  
 
Whereas a literature review on the complementary theories in supply chain management suggest 
several mechanisms that would mitigate the risks of opportunism such as long-term contracts, 
penalty clauses, equity sharing, and joint investments (2007). 
While we understand opportunistic behaviour as being interconnected with the cost associated with 
the exchange of goods and services when dealing with an external party, it can be argued that these 
theories are most useful in explaining both the contracting structure, project management issues 
and irrational behavioural in supply chains.  
Other supplementary theories include aspects that are apparent in supply chain relations, like 
branches of game theory, Contract theory, Stewardship theory however, these studies are beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
2.5. Understanding Interaction and Networks- AARI Schedule of Analysis  
A way of understanding network development and the analysis of business relationships in 
organisations is to examine the AARI Schedule of Analysis, see Figure 4. Originally the 
dimensions of the relationships and networks in organisations was proposed by Snehota and 
Hakansson (1995) based on three levels of analysis: Actors, Activities, Resources (AAR) yet it was 
not until 2002 that Welch and Wilkinson suggested mental models (ideas) also occur within the 
interactions between organisations and networks (Holmlund, 2012).  











The AARI Schedule of Analysis shown, in Figure 4, that at the company level activities link as the 
connection among operations between firms transpires, as a result mutual adjustment occurs 
between parties. Resource ties develop as companies exchange and access each other’s resources. 
Actors bond individually and collectively and respond to each other professionally and socially. In 
addition, ideas are formed, within a schema, from perceptions from individuals and organizations. 
A relationship is formed, and ideas are shared and shaped through interaction, which are adapted 
over time. As other parties affect the exchange a network is created, and a pattern of co adapted 
ideas occurs(Holmlund, 2012; Welch & Wilkinson, 2002). “A network provides favourable settings 
for learning” (Welch & Wilkinson, 2002, p. 29).   
 
2.6. Conceptual analysis of human behaviour in organisations: Illeris Learning theory  
Learning is often discussed in most textbooks at an individual level (Illeris, 2018; Malloch, Cairns, 
Evans, & O'Connor, 2010). One of the most well-known is Illeris, who discusses human learning, 
yet it was not until early 2000 that he expanded on the works of Jørgensen and Warring and Bottrup 
on learning in the workplace (Kalsaas, 2012, p. 91). In his book “Learning in working life”, he uses 
a double perspective, to create an understanding of learning in the working place.  
Figure 4: The AARI scheme of analysis. Adapted from Welch and Wilkinson, 
(2002) based on Snehota and Hakansson (1995). 
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Organisational learning according to Illeris is a combination of both internal and external 
interaction processes which all play a role in determining how systematic learning occurs in the 










The model of workplace learning consists of two triangles, whereby the first triangle depicts the 
basic process and dimensions of individual learning. On an individual level, a specific learner 
learns from three dimensions simultaneously, that are always involved and integrated: capacity of 
the learner to manage the learning content, the incentive to learn and their interaction with the 
workplace. In the content dimension the capacity of the learner to manage the content, will depend 
on their: knowledge, understanding and skills level. The learning dynamic is where the learner has 
to manage their motivations and emotions. Learning is always composed based on the interaction 
on the individual level between social, the content and dynamic dimensions.  
Illeris points out that a learner builds on his/her knowledge through four types of learning in an 
individual’s learning process. These are: cumulative learning which is a “type of automation” 
involving recall; assimilative learning occurs by adding new information onto what one already 
knows; accommodative learning ensues when the learner has to adapt their current understanding 
to accommodate new information, which can often be “demanding and painful” but results in a 
renewed understanding whereas transcendent learning emerges when the learner is required to 
Figure 5: Illeris’s learning in the workplace. Adapted from (Illeris, 2004, p. 438) 
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transform their behaviour or personality, through a crisis situation, in order to get further (Illeris, 
2018, pp. 12-14). 
The second triangle is based on three simultaneous dimensions a learner interacts within the 
workplace. The first dimension concerns the technical-organisational learning environment 
whereby learning depends on six characteristics: division of work tasks, diversity in the work 
content, opportunity for self-governance, opportunity to use one’s qualifications, possibility for 
social interaction and the stress and workload on the employee. 
The second dimension, the social learning environment is based on how social grouping and 
processes, in the work community, cultural community and the political communities in the 
workplace and society affect the learner. The third dimension is again based on the individuals 
learning process in relation to the workplace, mentioned earlier (Malloch et al., 2010, pp. 36-37). 
In addition to the learning dimensions of the two triangles there also includes two areas, where the 
two triangles meet, these according to Illeris, are called working practice and work identity. In the 
learning triangle a learner’s individual experience is summed up by who I am and how I am 
experienced by others that their work identity become apparent (Kalsaas, 2012, p. 92). In the 
workplace environment triangle, workplace practice occurs in how much the learner practises the 
tools and artefacts, personal and social relations, positions, power conditions etc. 
The central overlap between working practice and working identity, shading in the figure, is where 
workplace learning occurs, and it is here that competence development arises(Malloch et al., 2010, 
pp. 36-37). It is important to note that the combination of both separate triangles are logically 
separate but inter-related, meaning that the workers identity influences the workplace and the 
workplace practice forms the individual working identity (Illeris, 2004, p. 439; Malloch et al., 2010, 
pp. 36-37). However if this overlap does not occur a learner might first try to modify their work 
practice or their work identity by trying to do things better or differently before deciding to work 




3. Theoretical Framework (Appliciable literature) 
This section aims at giving the reader awareness of the applicable literature, which covers anything 
previously reported that was deemed relevant to the subject studied. This literature aims at 
explaining the context surrounding the case study and the relationships that are required in order 
to examine the proposed case study. In addition the literature helps to understand what research 
has been conducted and what has influenced the thesis.  
3.1. Choice of Project delivery models in AEC 
Every construction project needs to set up a delivery model for how the project will be conducted. 
According to Klakegg (2017), every project manager needs to consider their business model, 
situation and goals in order to find the delivery model that will give the best results based on low 
costs and resource efforts. He further states that there is no fitting description of the term project 
delivery model, thus mentioning the elements he thinks should be included to encompass this term; 
organizational structure, specification form, structure (task structure and project delivery process), 
contracting strategy (form of contract, risk distribution and resolution mechanisms), form of 
agreement and form of settlement (pp. 442-444).  
Project delivery process 
According to Lædre (2006, p. 52), when choosing project delivery process the owner chooses how 
involved they want to be during the duration of the project. Their ability to influence the project 
depends on how long they choose to participate in the project. The longer they patriciate the more 
influence they have on project details. Project delivery method states whom the participating parties 
are contractually bound to, how responsibility is distributed between parties and how the project is 
organized. 
Lloyd-Walker & Walker (2015, pp. 17-24) divide project delivery process/method, within 
construction, into three wide categories; traditional (where design and construction is segregated), 
integrated design and delivery procurement arrangements (where planning and control is 
emphasized) and Integrated project teams (where collaboration and coordination is emphasized). 
The traditional approach has divided design and construction processes, while the other two 
categories integrate them into the project (p. 17).  
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In the traditional approach, this thesis will focus on the project delivery method Design Bid Build. 
From the second category this thesis will focus on Design Build, (Lloyd-Walker & Walker, 2015, 
p. 17). While, Integrated Project delivery, (Project) Partnering, Project Alliances fall into the third 
category. 
Design Bid Build 
In a Design Bid Build (DBB) the owner coordinates design and construction (anskaffelser.no). On 
behalf of the owner, the architect and contractor develop the project through drawings, descriptions 
and competition rules. Lloyd-Walker & Walker (2015, p. 17) state that projects using this type of 
method should have a design “complete enough to enable a bidding process to establish the 
cheapest and/or the quickest tender cost”. Additionally, it assumes that the delivery process will 
not excessively alter the cost of design variations. According to Mahdi & Alreshaid (2005, p. 565), 
a DBB is often referred to as the “traditional” option because of its popularity among project 
delivery options. In this delivery method, there are three main parties: owner, general 
contractor/builder and designer.  
According to Lloyd-Walker & Walker (2015, p. 17), generally, there is a high level of detailed 
design specification when project delivery organizations are called in for bids. Tenders usually 
have fixed price and time, because of rigid contracts terms. Mahdi & Alreshaid (2005, p. 565) state 
that the contractor is chosen through a competitive bid, followed by quality assurance/inspection 
or “even complete construction management services”. The designer is chosen from a quality-
based selection. The architect acts as the owner’s representative through administration of 
construction contract in addition to being responsible (to the owner) for the project design. 
Contractor is responsible for properly constructing the design (given by architect) and procedures 
and methods of the construction. Both parties are responsible directly to the owner, which gives an 
independent relationship between contractor and architect, as shown Figure 6. Whenever any of 
those two parties discover errors made by the other party, they report them directly to the owner. 
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Lloyd-Walker & Walker (2015, p. 17) state that contract variations lead to a lot of negotiation and 






The owner’s responsibilities are defining project requirements, providing standards and contractual 
terms, which are to be followed, and financing (Mahdi & Alreshaid, 2005, p. 565). A designer 
might be hired for planning, conceptual design and design services if the owners do not wish to do 
these themselves. The American Institute of Architects (2007a, p. 49) states that many issues are 
not discovered until the project is in the construction phase, as a result of little input from 
contractors during the design phase.  
Mahdi & Alreshaid (2005, p. 565) state that this method is quite time consuming during the design 
and construction phases. In addition to the “somewhat adversarial nature of the relationship 
between the architect and contractor”, this has led to the development of many variations of this 
method. The architect estimates construction costs for the project during the design phase, while 
the formal pricing takes place after the completion of documents, and the project tender has been 
issued. Whenever bids come in over the cost estimate this could lead to consideration of cost 
savings or other methods. However, if the tender process shows that cost estimates are far lower 
than tenders (bids), then the owner needs to make sure the architect redesigns and re-price before 
value engineering and contract awarding take place.  
According to Lloyd-Walker & Walker (2015, p. 17), this method’s success is dependent on:  
“High levels of design specificity at the time of tender, low uncertainty about events 
requiring substantive subsequent design change, contractors that are highly effective in 
carrying out the work as planned and contractors having a sound relationship with the 
project owner representative to be able to foster mutual adjustment on side-issues.”  
Figure 6: Design Bid Build relationships (American Institute of Architects, 2007a, p. 49) 
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However, according to Kalsaas, Hannås, Frislie, and Skaar (2018, p. 4), delivering high levels of 
design specificity at the time of tender might be challenging because contractors are “different 
enough with respect to equipment and working methods that it is impossible to design solutions 
that are equally constructible for everyone”. Therefore, consultants often want to deliver as low 
levels of design specificity as possible before the tender. 
Criticisms of this method includes the design not being defined sufficiently when the bid phase 
starts, which results in “poor value for money”, contractor and project owner representative waste 
their time, and poor basis for choosing contractors (Lloyd-Walker & Walker, 2015, p. 17). In 
addition, they often use open tender systems where they are unable to check contractors’ records 
of accomplishment. It is often said that the bidder who wins the tender is the one who has ”forgotten 
or left out the most” (pp. 17-18). 
DBB and IPD 
DBB and IPD are difficult to merge because the contractor’s involvement in the project comes at 
a much later stage than an IPD requires. This delivery system is therefore thought to be the least 
suited delivery system to integrate with IPD. In order to achieve an IPD the owner and architect 
would have to bid the project at the earliest stage possible and make their intent to work toward an 
IPD known when accepting bids (American Institute of Architects, 2007a, p. 49).   
Design build/Design and construct 
In a Design build (DB), the owner provides a functional description of the project and hands over 
the project responsibility to another party, the main contractor (anskaffelser.no). This means that 
the owner only has to sign one contract (with the main contractor/design-build entity), while the 
contractor has to contract designers/consultants and sub-contractors/constructor. The project 
requires a main contractor who can manage the project execution well. The owner has little impact 
on the project after it has been handed over to the contractor, therefore, qualification and awarding 
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criteria for the competition basis is crucial. Figure 7 shows the contractual and functional 






American Institute of Architects (2007a) suggest that the reason owners choose this form of project 
delivery system is to transfer coordination and responsibility over to one actor, thus achieving a 
high level of coordination and reduction of project based risk. According to Lædre (2006, p. 53), 
whenever a design-build is chosen, the main contractor comes in at an earlier stage compared to 
other project delivery methods. Owner might consider somewhat compensating contractors who 
does not win the bid, if the project requires them to spend many resources on the tender.  
There are three varieties of Design-build (in a Norwegian context); functionally described, owner 
developed project and a reversed Design build. For the first variety, the owner only describes 
functions and standard (and potentially special) requirements, which is planned after the contractor 
has been assigned to the project. The second variety has an additional preliminary or draft project, 
which is a part of the competition basis. Here, the owner clarifies how much may be altered or 
waived. The functionally described DB makes up the base for the reversed DB, with an additional 
upper limit for construction costs (anskaffelser.no).      
According to Lloyd-Walker & Walker (2015, p. 19), the advantages of this method is ”closer 
cooperation and (hopefully) collaboration between” contractors and design team, through possible 
dispute cost reduction. This project delivery method requires less from the owner than a Design-
bid-build and provides an earlier overview of costs (anskaffelser.no). One of the disadvantages of 
DB (for the owner) is that any changes the owner wants to implement after the contractor has taken 
over responsibility of the project will come at an additional cost. Then, the owner themselves, has 
to validate the basis for the contractor’s alteration prices. Getting the early stages of the project 
Figure 7: Design Build relationships (Construction Industry Institute, 2003) 
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correct is crucial for the owner. This is the time where they have the most impact on the project, 
which means they have to avoid ambiguous descriptions of functions, form and quality of the 
desired outcome of the project. As a result, the owner may limit the need for change after the project 
has been signed over to the contractor, which is crucial to keep project costs down  
(anskaffelser.no). In Norway, Norwegian Standard (NS) 8407 describes general design build 
contractual terms.    
Design-build and IPD 
IPD principles can be implemented easily in a design-build because the contractor and designer are 
contracted at the same stage, which increases the chances for project collaboration between these 
actors. The owner may also choose their level of involvement in the project, and is a part of the 
Design-Build team. However, owners usually choose this form of delivery system to decrease their 
level of involvement, which is in contrast to IPD principles. This can lead to minimized innovation 
and improvement opportunities for the project. In order to integrate IPD, the owner should shift 
their focus from cost reduction to project improvements (American Institute of Architects, 2007a, 
pp. 47-48). 
Construction management at risk 
American Institute of Architects (2007a, p. 46) refer to the term “construction management” as “a 
generic phrase applied to a variety of project delivery scenarios in which specific Construction 
Management services are called for in addition to the general services a constructor traditionally 
provides”. They further state that this delivery system is referred to as Construction Manager at 
Risk when Construction manager–Constructor (CMc) and Construction manager-Adviser (CMa) 
roles, which differs in responsibilities, are conducted by the same person. This person will then 
take on responsibility and liability of a general contractor. If these roles are not assumed by one 
person, Lædre (2006, p. 54) states that the owner is still responsible for cost, time and quality.  
According to Mahdi & Alreshaid (2005, p. 566), Construction management at risk (CMR) is  a 
project delivery method which is characterized by an owner selecting a construction manager (CM) 
at an early stage in the design phase, to fill the role as a general contractor, while an architect (or 
engineer) will be assigned to design the project. Konchar & Sanvido (1998, p. 2) states that in 
addition to performing construction management services, the contractor manages construction 
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work  for a guaranteed price. He also has significant input on the design phase where his 
responsibility includes “evaluating cost, schedule, implications of alternative designs and systems 
and materials during and after the design of the facility” (Mahdi & Alreshaid, 2005, p. 566). Figure 




This project delivery system and design-bid-build are very similar because they both have an 
assigned general contractor in charge of the project and the same contractual relationship between 
architect and owner, and contractor and owner (American Institute of Architects, 2007a, p. 46). 
Mahdi & Alreshaid (2005, p. 566) state that when the design is finished, the CM holds the risk for 
finishing the project at a negotiated or fixed price (by hiring trade sub-contractors to do the 
construction work). The difference between design-bid-build and CMR is that in the latter system 
the owner hires a construction manager to manage the construction phase. Here, the delivery 
process may be expedited by overlapping design and construction phases through architect and 
construction manager coordination. In addition, the construction manager can guarantee a 
maximum project price. According to American Institute of Architects (2007a, p. 46), CMc and 
Design-build both have early cost commitment, while they differ in that the owner contracts the 
architect who is responsible for design.  
CM and IPD 
According to American Institute of Architects (2007a, p. 46), this delivery system works well with 
an IPD. An important aspect of an IPD is to “bring all relevant parties into the delivery process 
early” to influence performance through decisions, which a construction manager fulfills by 
coming into the project at an early stage (p. 46). They further claim that where a bid-delivery 
method is required in a project, the CMc delivery model is the best fit for an IPD. One of the 
challenges of implementing IPD is the separate contracts in the CMc delivery model, which lead 
Figure 8: Construction Manager at Risk contractual and functional relationships (Construction Industry Institute, 2003) 
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to different goals and processes to achieve these goals. In order to fully integrate an IPD in the CM 
delivery model, the owner has to either require the actors to adapt certain conditions or agreement 
to make them a joint team or negotiate with them. 
3.2. What is a IPD 
Integrated Project Delivery (IPD), is also known as “Gjennomføringsmodell” in Norwegian and is 
according to the American Institute of Architects (2014) defined as:  
“a project delivery approach that integrates people, systems, business structures and 
practices into a process that collaboratively harnesses the talents and insights of all 
participants to optimize project results, increase value to the owner, reduce waste and 
maximize efficiency through all phases of design, fabrication and construction” (American 
Institute of Architects, 2007a, 2014)5 
Integration, stated in the definition above, according to the American Institute of Architects (2014) 
is based on the development of a virtual project organization whereby it is committed to “best for 
project” decision making, and this commitment is supported by alignment of the firm’s business 
interests through shared risk and reward (p. 4). This definition was the only one given or stated 
throughout the literature.  
It should contain at a minimum, all of the following elements: 
“• Continuous involvement of owner and key designers and builders from early design 
through project completion  
• Business interests aligned through shared risk/reward, including financial gain at risk 
that is dependent upon project outcomes  
• Joint project control by owner and key designers and builders  
• A multi-party agreement or equal interlocking agreements  
                                                 




• Limited liability among owner and key designers and builders” 
3.3. IPD key players 
A IPD project team consists of Primary and Key supporting members. The primary members , 
shown in Figure 9, are those with substantial involvement and responsibilities in the project, such 
as the owner, architect and contractor, whereas the key supporting participants have distinct 








The choice of primary and key supporting members will depend on the type of project and not all 
subcontractors are key supporting members for example a structural engineer on a bridge building 
project would have substantial responsibilities and would be considered a Primary member 
however on a road building project with perhaps one small tunnel the structural engineer might be 
considered a supporting member(American Institute of Architects, 2007a, p. 12). Rather, the key 
participants are those “whose work affects the schedule and performance of others” by releases 
work to others, prime examples are “mechanical, electrical, and plumbing contractors” who benefit 
by having tighter integration in the project. (Cleves & DalGallo, 2012, p. 32). In an IPD the key 
supporting members might have a contract with one of the primary team members or to a primary 
entity, whatever the case, he/she must agree to be bound to the contracted conditions among the 
primary participants member (American Institute of Architects, 2007a).  
Figure 9 shows the Integrated project delivery and its primary participants. 
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Many authors have stated that it is important to choose team members that have integrity, character 
and competency and are trustworthy (American Institute of Architects, 2007a; Cleves & DalGallo, 
2012; Matthews & Howell, 2005).  
(H. Ashcraft, 2013) states that IPD projects require champions who measure project processes and 
behaviours against IPD ideals. In part, these people are those within the team who are willing to 
call out when the process is not occurring properly(p. 6) 
3.4. Principles of Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) 
The principles of Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) have been widely known in recent years 
throughout the AEC industry as those stated in the American Institute of Architects guide book  
(2007a)  
What factors or elements constitute a IPD is not clear, see Table 2. Much confusion has come from 
“proliferation of projects using IPD principles” using “incomplete models of integration, often 
called “IPD-ish,” that prompted a updated definition from the American Institute of Architects 
(2014). This confusion can also be seen in Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011) empirical paper 
“Transitioning to IPD: Potential Barriers & Lessons Learned” whereby a table shows the 
differences between nine IPD projects. However, this table is not really explained further in the 
text and there is no explanation as to why all nine organisations listed in the table are IPD projects.  
Further H. Ashcraft (2013) states that IPD is simple in concept, but it becomes complex when 
applied to specific organisations (p. 8) and it is this complexity that has caused some confusion as 
to what constitutes a IPD.  For example respondents in H. Ashcraft (2013) noted that  
 
“Even now, there are pretenders" There are many in our industry who raise their hand and 
want to do IPD, but who have not spent any time or effort to understand what IPD really 
is.” “It is interesting how many people say they are doing an IPD and when you dig into 
their experience, it is not even close.” “Vendors that claimed to have "always been doing 
IPD were seen as lacking understanding or being disingenuous.” (p. 9) 
This section focuses on the differences between, and similarities of, IPD. For the sake of clarity, 
an examination of the key characteristics of IPD projects is presented in Table 2 based on the initial 
review of the primary sources.  From table 1 two fundamental principles are often reiterated:  
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• Shared risk and reward  
• Liability waivers among key participants 
 
Though, Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011) empirical findings show that only five out of the 
nine projects had “shared risk/reward” while only one project had used a “liability waiver” (p. 36).  
Other characteristics like multiparty contract is defined as a key characteristic by almost all 
references. It is the National Association of State Facilities (2010) taken from (Lahdenperä, 2012) 
that states that “Key participants bound together as equals” as the closest factor.  
Nevertheless when examining empirical studies by Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011) it is 
deemed important for the successful implementation of an integrated project delivery (p. 36) 
however these traits are shown in only five out of the nine projects examined. Yet this is further 
defined as a definite in American Institute of Architects (2014) paper who see a multiparty contract 
as a core principle however they add “or equal interlocking agreements”. This vague terminology 
can also be seen in Matthews and Howell (2005) paper which describes multiparty contracts as a 
team member agreement that involves a “pact” whereby a single contract binds the IPD team to 
the client (p. 49).  
The definition of a pact is often referred to “a formal agreement between two people or groups of 
people”.  
This is again further shown in Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011) examination wherby one IPD 
project has all the necessary plan, design and construction services in house which is why no 
sharing of risk or reward or multiparty contracts were signed. The implication of these arguments 
is that multiparty contract is an important characteristic however there is some confusion, as to 
whether it can involve just two parties or many contracts that interlock.  
Another key characteristic that is a core principle of IPD is:  
“Continuous involvement of owner and key designers and builders from early design through to 
project completion” (American Institute of Architects, 2014). 
However this is an updated definition from an older version of  the American Institute of Architects 
(2007a), whereby it states that a project requires “Early involvement of key participants”. This is 
also reiterated as a recurring theme in the literature (H. W. Ashcraft, 2014; Ghassemi & Becerik-
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Gerber, 2011; Lahdenperä, 2012; Matthews & Howell, 2005). This characteristic is mentioned in 
latest version of the American Institute of Architects (2014) but it is defined as a “key construct” 
that enables parties to contribute and optimize a IPD project by increasing buildability and thus 
reducing costs (p. 11).   
However, Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011) empirical findings recommend that at a minimum 
there is owner involvement and tight collaboration between the core players, from early 
collaboration to final delivery. Nevertheless, this was shown only seven of the nine projects had 
“early involvement and collaborative decision”  
The last  key characteristic stated by American Institute of Architects (2014) is Joint project control 
by owner and key designers and builders. 
Here the definition is slightly unclear as others have stated that it requires; “Jointly developed and 
validated project goals“ (H. W. Ashcraft, 2014) & Cohen (2010) from Lahdenperä (2012), 
“developed project target criteria” National Association of State Facilities (2010) from 
Lahdenperä (2012) or “Jointly developed project goals” (American Institute of Architects, 2007a; 
Ghassemi & Becerik-Gerber, 2011).  
It is important to mention other characteristics that have not been mentioned, such as; “Fiscal 
transparency between key participants”, “Intensified design”, and “Collaborative decision-
making” from National Association State Facilities (2010) taken from Lahdenperä (2012) and  
“Collaborative innovation and decision making”, Mutual respect and trust, Early goal definition, 
Open communication, Appropriate technology and Organisation and leadership (American 
Institute of Architects, 2007a). 
 
Table 2 shows that the defining principles of IPD are to create a climate of trust and collaboration 
for implementing the projects goals. Such a relationship requires honest and open communication 
and only then can the parties respect each other and establish a trustful relationship. Other key 
elements include sharing, commitment, predictability, ownership, reliability and empowerment. It 
is important that all parties are meeting their obligations, looking out for other party’s interests as 
well as their own and acting honestly and with integrity without hidden agenda this behaviour 
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empowers the team to trust and collaborate towards continuous improvement. Basically team 
members who are trustworthy (Matthews & Howell, 2005, p. 50).  
This table is shows the fundamental characteristics from the latest version of the AiA guide (2014) 
and the primary behaviour are derived from the literature. Trust and collaboration is the basis for 
all five principles. It also further suggested that principles should be used in order to reduce waste 
and optimise efficiency 
  
Table 1: Summary of the most recent principles from the AiA organisation (2014). Deciphered for the underlining primary 
behaviours. 
IPD principles Primary desired behaviour 
1. Continuous involvement of owner and key 
participants from early design to project 
handover 
Re-enforces trust, joint ownership, joint collaboration and 
integration.   
Allows for mutual respect and continued mutual 
adjustment by all parties. 
2. A multi-party agreement or equal interlocking 
agreements.  
Basis for creating a relationship of trust between the 
parties. It creates a binding agreement for joint 
collaboration and integration.  
Bonds participants and re-enforces equality between the 
key participants. 
3. Shared risk and reward that are dependent on 
project outcomes. 
Obligated shared pains and gains. Important in creating 
trust and aligning individual and or team’s interests with 
the projects goals. Gives participants a sense of joint 
ownership 
Bonds participants by having a common goal and 
Incentives teamwork and focus on the projects goals 
4. Joint project control and decision making (key 
participants)  
Empowers the team to jointly manage the project. 
Important in creating trust  
5. Limited liability among key participants Important incentive that creates trust. Removes 
accountability and creates a safe environment in which 
participants can be innovate and flexible to accommodate 
to change.  
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Table 2: This is an overview of all the literature that discusses what a true IPD really is. 
Integrated Project Delivery 
Cohen (2010) taken from 
Lahdenperä (2012) 
National Association of 
State Facilities (2010) taken from 
Lahdenperä (2012) 
Empirical studies from 9 projects by Ghassemi and Becerik-
Gerber (2011). Characteristics coded from AIA 2007 
(American Institute of Architects, 2007a) 
Members of the Design and 
construction industry, AIA (2014) 










• Early Involvement of key 
participants 
• Shared risk and reward 
• Multi-party contract 
• Collaborative decision-
making and control 
• Liability waivers among 
key participants 
• Jointly developed and 




• Mutual respect and trust 
among participants 
• Collaborative innovation 
• Intensified early planning 
• Open communication 
within the project team 
• Building information 
modelling (BIM)  
• Lean principles  
• Co-location of teams (‘big 
room’) 
• Transparent financials 
(open books) 
• Key participants bound together as 
equals 
• Shared financial risk and reward 
based on project outcome 
• Liability waivers between key 
participants 
• Fiscal transparency between key 
participants 
• Early involvement of key 
participants 
• Intensified design 
• Jointly developed project target 
criteria 
• Collaborative decision-making 
 
Behavioural principles 
• Mutual respect and trust among 
participants 
• Willingness to collaborate  
• Intensified early planning 
• Open communication  
• Building information modelling 
(BIM)  
• Lean principles  
• Co-location of teams (‘big room’) 
• Transparent financials (open books) 
 
Catalysts for IPD 
• Multi-party agreement 
• Building information modelling 
• Lean design and construction 
• Co-location of team 
• Multi-party contract 
• Early involvement of key participants 
• Collaborative decision making and control 
• Shared risks and rewards 
• Liability waivers among key participants 
• Jointly developed project goals 
 
Characteristics from findings 
• Tight collaboration between the owner, architect, 
engineer and builders from early design to project 
handover 
• Contracts that create integrated project delivery 
• Mutual trust inspired by bonding 
• Integrated team players already within an organisation. 
(Owner can provide planning, design, construction, 
space management, and maintenance services) 
• Procurement-Owner selection or RFQ and then RFP 
• Selection criteria: Prior experience in planning and 
design, team players, subcontractors who are already 
integrated, use of IT, open minded, familiar with IPD, 
conform to open book, and experience of working 
together  
• Use of lean tools (‘Target Value Design’ and ‘Last 
Planner’) 
• Signing of an additional joining agreement 
(commitment and understanding of IPD) 
• Lumpsum agreements or Cost reimbursable contracts 
• Co-location of teams (‘big room’) 
• BIM as a tool to integrate different disciplines 
• Owner establishes project goals (scope, quality, budget, 
schedule and project approval) 
• Continuous involvement of 
owner and key designers and 
builders from early design 
through to project completion 
• Business interests aligned 
through shared risk/reward, 
including financial gain at risk 
that is dependent upon project 
outcomes 
• Joint project control by owner 
and key designers and builders  
• A multi-party agreement or 
equal interlocking agreements  
• Limited liability among owner 
and key designers and builders 
 
Desired Conditions 




• Trust  
• Respect  
• Joint Ownership 
• Integration 
 
Catalysts for IPD 
• Transparency 
• Safe environment  
• Share risk and reward 
• Good technology 
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3.5. Tools and methods for optimising the IPD process  
According to the American Institute of Architects (2014) IPD projects utilise tools and methods in 
order to “achieve maximum results” (p. 4), it is these tools that incentivise the minimisation of 
waste and optimisation of efficiency. This is further collaborated by most of the literature where 
early involvement is specified (H. W. Ashcraft, 2014; Ghassemi & Becerik-Gerber, 2011; 
Lahdenperä, 2012; Matthews & Howell, 2005), however, it is categorised as a main principle. This 
can also be seen in Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011) empirical analysis whereby various 
technologies and methods are highlighted as necessary tools to facilitate trust among the 
participants. It is also important to note that H. W. Ashcraft (2014) does highlight that projects 
need to focus on “effective use of technology, prefabrication, integration of lean principles, and 
enhanced attention to sustainability” however these tools are not as effective without deep 
collaboration and integration (p. 22). Yet M. Fischer, Khanzode, Reed, and Ashcraft (2017) and 
Cleves and DalGallo (2012) tend to add lean as an important method tool in maximising efficiency 
which is in line with Modig (2012) who suggests that values, principles, methods and tools are not 
lean but are merely ways of realising a lean operational strategy. 
This section will explain further the tools and methods that are often utilised in IPD projects and 
their benefits to optimize efficiency and reduce waste.  
Early involvement 
Early involvement involves “moving design decisions upstream as far as possible” as illustrated 
in the MacLeamy Curve6 in Figure 10. This concept is based on allowing decisions to be made 
earlier, “to where they are more effective and less costly. This is perhaps where the “opportunity 
to influence positive outcomes is maximised and the cost of changes minimised” (American 
Institute of Architects, 2007a, p. 21). It reduces the chances for rework especially when 
traditionally information is transferred from design to construction (H. W. Ashcraft, 2014).  
                                                 
6 Introduced in the Construction Users Roundtable’s “Collaboration, Integrated Information, and the Project Lifecycle 
in Building Design and Construction and Operation” (WP-1202, August, 2004)” taken from American Institute of 
Architects (2007a, p. 21) 













Target Value Design (TVD) & Value engineering 
Target Value Design (TVD) is a process, see Figure 11, of designing to a financial target, using a 










Figure 10: The MacLeamy Curve illustrates the concept of early involvement whereby design decisions are 
taken early in the project. Source:(American Institute of Architects, 2007a) 
Figure 11 Target Value Design Process. Source (Zimina, Ballard, & Pasquire, 2012)   
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Zimina et al. (2012) state that the TVD process is based on creating value within budget 
constraints. It is necessary to look at the budget first and then at the values incorporated in the 
project goals. Designing has to be in step with the details of the estimate and the aim is customer 
value. In addition, the processes have to be decided as well as design. There are budget constraints, 
scheduling and constructability that need to be considered. The TVD team should follow 
constructability guidelines. The team need to work together to look at the issues involved, to solve 
problems, to reach decisions jointly, and then design according to those decisions.  
“The aim is to define value (desired features and functions of the facility), and cons traints, first of 
all financial, what the client is able and willing to pay to get this value It is here that the team need 
to consider the whole design rather than make narrow choices for an individual design. The narrow 
choices are often associated with alternative delivery models, see Table 3 
In order to consider the whole design, it is necessary to have specialists involved throughout, for 
example the mechanical contractor needs to be involved before even anything mechanical come s 
into play. Many will be involved pre-project, and there needs to be collaboration which needs to 
be on-going with the client throughout the project. Conditions of satisfaction remain flexible and 
can be reviewed by the whole team at any time as design and construction proceeds. In addition, 
Table 3 Comparison of Target Value Design (TVD) and Alternative delivery approaches. Source (Zimina et al., 2012, p. 391) 
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the TVD team needs to meet regularly in small groups as this is conducive to learning, innovation 
and continuous improvement. TVD has built-in value engineering (p. 389).  
The process of value engineering occurs “at the beginning and throughout the project” and there 
is nothing stopping team members from holding back ideas. However IPD “relies on careful 
participant selection” (Matthews & Howell, 2005). This same observation has been mentioned by 
others also involved in case study research. “Selecting the right people for the project is crucial for 
success” (Zimina, Ballard, & Pasquire 2012), providing a base for collaboration. Competitive 
tendering should be avoided. Instead selection should be based on interviews, experience and 





3.6. Relational vs Transactional Contracts 
Matthews and Howell (2005) state that there are two types of contracts, transactional and 
relational. When describing transactional contracts, Macneil (1977, p. 900) states that “a system 
of discrete transactions and its corresponding classical contract law provides for flexibility and 
change through the market outside the transactions, rather than within them”.  While a system of 
relational contacts “remains theoretically structured on the discrete and classical models, but 
involves significant changes” (p. 900). These contracts are more complex and lasts longer than 
discrete transactions. Therefore, if these contracts are too rigid, they become dysfunctional. A high 
degree of flexibility is often needed in planning these types of contracts. 
  
According to Matthews and Howell (2005, p. 60), transactional contracts only “foresee a single 
outcome” where the parties involved agree on the outcome value and how much money will be 
spent on the project. These contracts cannot be used for uncertain and complex projects where all 
contingencies are foreseen, risks have been allocated, opportunistic behaviour is limited and 
project efficiency is instilled. These situations are more suited for relational contracts because they 
“foresee many possible outcomes” while parties are bound to “maintain their relationship even as 
they pursue other objectives” (2005, pp. 60-61). 
 
Relational contracts go beyond traditional contracting which are mostly concerned with the 
transfer of goods and services between parties whereas a relational contracts involve multi -party 
contracting whereby more than two people are bound together by one or through equal interlocking 
agreements (American Institute of Architects, 2014, p. 4) This section will primary focus on the 
different types of relational contracts. 
 
Multi-party agreements 
According to the AIA Californian Counsel (2007a, p. 32), “the primary project participants execute 
a single contract specifying their respective roles, rights, obligations and liabilities” in multi-party 
contracts. Each party’s contributions and interests are known to everyone. Trust is required as 
compensations come from project success. They further state that success is dependent on the 
participants’ commitment to work together as a team. Integrated teams are creative and flexible, 
thus making Multi-Party agreements well suited to handle uncertain or complex projects. They 
also state that these type of agreements require team building, thorough planning and negotiation, 
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which needs to take place at an early stage of the project and may be costly. Previous experience 
with working with the other participants and this type of project is crucial in order to limit the cost 
of this process. They further state that although this type of agreement varies depending on project 
needs and participants, there are three shared, key attributes (p. 32);  
- Parties are bound together by a single agreement or an umbrella agreement 
- The agreement creates a temporary, virtual or formal, organization complete with 
management and decision making processes 
- Processes are tailored to support the team environment 
- Decisions are arrived though consensus and seek “best for project” outcomes  
- Some portion of comparison is tied to project, not individual, success 
- Roles are assigned to the person or entity best capable of performing 
The following sections focus on three multi-party agreements: Project Partnering, Project 
Alliances and Single Purpose Entities.   
Project Partnering 
Bennett and Jayes (1995, p. 2) define Project Partnering as “a management approach used by two 
or more organizations to achieve specific business objectives by maximizing the effectiveness of 
each participant’s resources”. According to MacDonald (2011, p. 31), this method has been 
developed for complex projects to avoid or minimize conflict through “unifying all the parties as 
stakeholders in a project into a team”.  There is no contract, only a code of conduct. Instead, the 
parties create a working agreement to make sure all parties benefit from the agreement. This 
approach has its origins from the construction industry in Japan, where Lean manufacturing 
concepts and total quality management are central elements. However, Partnering is generally 
viewed as an American approach, which is widely used in Australia, the UK and in public sector 
procurement in the US (Gunn, 2002, p. 3; MacDonald, 2011, p. 33). 
Lloyd-Walker and Walker (2015, p. 25) state that continuous improvement, trust, collaboration 
and teamwork are important aspect of Partnering. According to Gunn (2002, p. 5), key elements 
in the partnering culture are “genuine commitment, equitable sharing of risk and benefits and  
developing of trust and understanding”. MacDonald (2011, p. 32) adds that dedication to a 
common goal is important. Project Partnering can be used in both short-term and long-term 
commitments. The purpose of these arrangements is to maximize each participant’s resources to 
achieve the project objectives. He further adds that each everyone needs to understand the other 
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parties’ values and expectations. A long-term relationship may be referred to as a Strategic 
Alliance. 
Lloyd-Walker and Walker (2015, p. 26) describe criticisms of Partnering which includes that 
participants need to show “strong relationship-building skills” and the agreement might remain 
aspirational. In order for this collaboration to work, all participants need to invest energy and 
support in addition to changing their mindset from focusing on what benefits their company to the 
benefit of the project in a market where aggressive leadership is common. This method is also 
dependent on a “governance system that supports is ideals”. Partnering should not be applied in 
projects where the objectives are stable because this method requires more energy and resources 
than a traditional method, to achieve the same result.  
Project Alliances 
Davis and Walker (2009, p. 484) state that project alliances “rely on virtual organisations 
generating new knowledge that enabling teams to solve interrelated problems in a complex time 
constrained environment”. According to the American Institute of Architects (2007a, p. 33) the 
owner guarantees for non-owner parties’ direct costs, while project outcome defines profit, bonus 
and overhead payment.. This means that the owner has an unlimited risk, while the other parties 
only risk their bonus, profit and overhead. Thus indicating that the parties involved will either fail 
or succeed together However, in larger projects the owner might limit their risk somewhat through 
various economic risks or “methods of controlling market risk” (p. 39). MacDonald (2011, p. 34) 
states that they create a “commercial framework” which ensure “best for project decisions that are 
consistent with and create an environment of exceptional performance and enhanced reward for 
all participants” 
American Institute of Architects (2007a, pp. 38-39) state that parties must waiver all claims, except 
for willful default, which only happens if a party leaves the project. This means that they do not 
need a mechanism for dispute resolution. All significant decisions are made together and upper-
level decisions need to be unanimous, without dispute resolutions, which forces negotiation 
between parties. This model was developed for the oil and gas industry in the North Sea, but have 
since been used in different contexts in Australia, United Kingdom and the United States of 
America (American Institute of Architects, 2007a, pp. 33-34). 
According to American Institute of Architects (2007a, p. 35), risk control and project success are 
obtained through incentives, while compensation is used in order to minimize risk of failure or 
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poor outcome. Non-owner parties share small cost overruns and potential gains, while the owner 
is responsible for major overruns. In order to receive any potential rewards it is important for the 
parties involved to accurately quantify and describe anticipated project outcomes, how and when 
these are measured, in addition to creating a key, which describes how profit is distributed among 
the parties. MacDonald (2011, p. 33) state that capability, systems and approaches are considered 
when choosing participants, in addition to subjective criteria. He further states that price is not 
normally considered in the selection process. He further states that a key difference between 
alliancing and partnering is that alliance have formal contracts, while acting in the best interest of 
the project is voluntary in partnering.   
Criticism of Project Alliances include that it requires skillsets and attributes from the team member 
and participants, which can be hard to find. Thus, structural hindrance prevent organizations from 
choosing this method.   
All parties come together in a single purpose entity 
American Institute of Architects (2007a, p. 33) defines a Single Purpose Entity (SPE) as a 
“temporary, but formal, legal structure created to realize a specific project” and can be a 
“corporation, limited liability company, limited partnership or other legal form”. Creativity, 
financial contribution, experience and individual skills are equity interests for key participants. 
Because this is a new legal independent entity, they must make sure they are properly insured and 
make additional considerations for management and taxation. Decisions finally rests on a board of 
directors or control, where the members of these teams in addition to their authority vary 
depending on the project (p. 34). 
Project outcomes are the responsibility of SPE. Lender’s investment is secured by project value 
when financing the project. The only financial risk at stake for equity participants is their equity 
contributions if the project faces a loss. Participants are responsible for the cost overrun risk in 
their respective scopes of work. For participants, liability is often modified by contracts, but is 
supposed to be unlimited towards other participants and SPE (American Institute of Architects, 
2007a, p. 40).  
Tools for dispute resolution is needed as a result of the parties ability to sue each other, and should 
therefore be an integrated part of the agreements. Board of Control usually make decisions of the 
SPE conformed to the type of legal entity chosen for the project. When disputes occur between 
any of the parties involved in the project, “they should be resolved through an escalating program 
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of direct negotiation, facilitated negotiation and then binding resolution by arbitration or litigation” 
(American Institute of Architects, 2007a, p. 41).  
3.7. IPD contract (vs Design Build (DB) contract) 
This following section will give an overview of common contracting models, its focus is 
specifically aimed at comparing Design Bid Build (DBB), Design Build (DB), which are 
traditionally the procurement models used in the construction industry, and Integrated project 
delivery (IPD), see Table 4. In addition, it examines the risks of using a Norwegian IPD contract 
used at the Tønsberg project in Norway) versus a standard Norwegian DB (NS8405) contract.  
Table 4: Comparison between Design Bid Build (DB, Design Build (DB) and Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) 
 Traditional -Single party contracting Multiparty contracting 






- Transactional contracts 
 
- Transactional contracts 
 



























- Separate (and not always 
consistent) contracts 
- Setup out detailing how to sue 
and claim for compensation 
- Separate (and not always 
consistent) contracts 
- Setup out detailing how to 
sue and claim for 
compensation 
- Interlocking contracts 
- Legally: direct and bind 
team activity  
- Eliminate or reduce the 













- Risk is primarily allocated: 
Owner caries the risk for design 
and construction. Others 
manage risk, transferring as 
much as possible. 
- Reward: payment based on 
lumpsum, instalments, per 
delivery ect  
 
- Risk is primarily allocated: 
Builder carries risk for 
construction. Others 
manage risk, transferring as 
much as possible. 
- Owner carries risk for 
quality and pays for 
additional extras 
- Reward: Lumpsum 
payment for construction 
- Risk is primarily shared. 
- Owner caries the risk of 
overspend but only 
basic cost 
- Reward: Pooled profit; 
distribution is based on 
team success in 
achieving project goal 



















- Joint decision making  
- Major project decisions 
are taken by Primary 
group members. 









- Linear information 
- “Silo/bunker” mentality 
- Sequential: Design, then 
Tender, then Build 
- Linear information 
- “Silo/bunker” mentality 
-  Design and build done 
concurrently 
- Cross sharing of 
information 
- “Best for project” 
mentality 
- Design and build done 
concurrently 
The differences in these models are apparent yet when compared to an IPD they are disparate.  
May authors have commented on the differences between the traditional types of contracting, 
which can be seen to involve transactional contracts as opposed to relational contracting in an 
IPD7. Transactional contracting still relies on a hierarchical chain of decision making, where silo 
mentally is rewarded. The contracts are not always consistent with each other and often are worded 
in such a way that changes in a contract are deemed compensatable. It is here that IPD is so 
different. Through interlocking agreements, joint decision making and shared risk and reward the 
organisational structure becomes flat and, eliminates and reduces the ability sue each other. It 
rewards success of the team by adopting best for project mentality. Ultimately the risk is carried 
by the owner, who is obliged to pay basic cost, only after the profit pool is used up in the project.  
A clear difference between DBB and DB is that the risks are reduced. In a DB it is the builder who 
takes the risk for the design and the construction. He is often paid a lump sum agreement, but it is 
here that the owner is at risk of not knowing what kind of quality is, or has been, or will be used 
in the construction. In a DBB the owner runs the risk for the whole project and the sequential 
nature of the process where the owner contracts in a team to help him with the design then sets out 
a tender for the build at which point he involves a construction firm. However, one common feature 
of both DB and DBB is that both use a very hierarchical structure of command and control. This 
is also a difference in IPD whereby, joint decision making allows for the organisation to have a 
flatter structure which results in information being shared. In a DB and a DBB sharing of 
information is not rewarded, the rewards often come from not sharing information. (American 
Institute of Architects, 2007a, 2014; Cleves & DalGallo, 2012; M. Fischer et al., 2017)   
There are many different variants of project delivery models, which often confuses the issue of 
isolating the differences, such as the way risk is shared via the number of contracts, the tools and 
methods that owner choses to use to optimise the project, mentioned earlier, the project 
requirements to the degree of specialisation required in the project and many more. In addition, 
                                                 
7 Relational contracts, mentioned early, are also models like Project Partnering (PP) and Project 
Alliancing (PA).  However these models can include just two parties.  
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there are also many different types of tools and methods that are and can be used to optimise the 
project.  
Risk in a Norwegian Integrated Project Delivery Agreement ("IPD Agreement") versus the 
Norwegian Design Build (DB) contract. 
Risk in contracts is an important aspect in the choice of project delivery model and entering into 
contracts is an important part of business therefore it is important to understand and avoid every 
potential risk. As a result, this subsection will examine the differences in the risks involved in the 
use of the negotiated draft of the Norwegian Integrated Project Delivery Agreement ("IPD 
Agreement") versus the Norwegian Design Build (DB) contract, often referred to as a NS8405 
contract used by the hospital in Vestfold ("SiV") as this is applicable to the case in this thesis 
because of its propriety.  
Jon Gresseth (2016) a lawyer who assessed the differences between the contracts, argues that the 
risk picture between an NS 8405 contract and an IPD agreement in the project is not very different. 
He states that the risks are summarised as: 
“The overall risk picture between an NS 8405 contract and an IPD agreement is not really 
very much different. Therefore, we cannot see that using an IPD agreement - on a general 
basis – should cause greater risk of exceedances than using an NS 8405 contract. The risk 
of overruns will, in our experience, be linked to other and more project-specific conditions.  
If we look at the BH risk of covering the advisor and the contractor's costs exceed the 
agreed contract amount, so the two models look basically quite different.  
In an IPD agreement, there exists no limitation of the BH obligation to cover contract 
parties’ costs, even if these exceed both Target Cost and Owners Cost. 
In an NS 8405 contract, often the contract amount is a fixed price. 
However, the price is no more fixed than that the contractor may claim additional 
compensation due to a series of events for example of omissions or changes to the design 
material, imposed changes, delayed decisions and deliveries from the BH or the BH 
advisers, delays or errors with sub-contractors, etc. 
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Regarding the risks associated with changes, the differences in the contracts are not 
special big. As we see it, there is probably less room for requesting changes in an IPD 
agreement than an NS 8405 contract. 
Risks related to deficiencies, ground conditions and design errors are essentially similar 
in the two contract models. 
The risk associated with delays to the contractor can be said to be somewhat larger in one 
IPD agreement, as there are no daily fines. On the other hand, the financial consequences 
of the BH own delay is less in an IPD- agreement than in an NS contract.  
Regarding the differences in the notification rules, we do not consider this to be any 
difference in risk associated with possible overruns of the contract sum.” 
A more detailed explanation can be found in Appendix 11. 
3.8. Effects of IPD 
This involvement of Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) can leads to a shift or change in an 
organisation and can influence the organisational culture. This section hopes to examine what the 
effects the introduction of IPD has on its participants. 
Owners becomes more involved 
Embarking on an IPD changes the participation of the owner. Traditionally the owner would leave 
it to the experts but, in an IPD, the owner takes an active part. In addition, participants take on an 
“ownership” mentality. In Ashcraft's group discussion with owners, Wendy Cohen explained that 
everyone felt a sense of achievement at the end, “it really brings together pride of ownership by 
the entire team” however she did not know if this was an accidental by-product or planned outcome 
of IPD (H. Ashcraft, 2013, p. 16).  
Less arguments between actors in the value chain 
One defining principle of the IPD is the IPD agreement and its interconnected rules. The direction 
taken by the initial agreement affects the success of the project. This agreement has been known 
to cause less legal disputes and according to The American Institute of Architects, “At the date of 
publication, no IPD has gone into litigation” (2014, p. 5). In addition the nine case studies 
described by Ghassemi, & Becerik-Gerber were all successful and none of them “suffered from 
the issues commonly observed in the AEC industry” (2011, p. 47) 
 48 
 
IPD projects are set up in such a way that affects the behaviour of its participants. Based on 
interviews with professionals involved in IPD, Suttie concluded that IPD influence on 
organisational culture included “influencing employee behaviour and attitudes” (Suttie, 2013, p. 
274) where there is no need for each participant to fight their own individual corner.  
The impetus for adversarial disputes is no longer present. Without the presence of any conflict in 
attitudes, the participants are ready to reach a state of mutual understanding. With cognisance of 
other team members' perspective, come reciprocal tolerance and respect. The mandates of the 
contract (or contracts) has its negative elements in that it has to provide for the worst possible 
scenarios, but it has its positive side in that it sets the scene for a culture of teamwork and 
collaboration. 
Change in incentives 
According to H. W. Ashcraft (2014) incentives are integral part of IPD and are used to incentivise 
project goals and assure goal alignment.  
Generally, for most projects in the construction industry the agreed outcome is often based on 
either: a bonus or payment for reaching milestones with a reduction for underachievement, or a 
bonus attached to the project process, for example future maintenance or on time project handover. 
Otherwise it can be based on “quality, sustainability, functionality, lifecycle costs, owner 
satisfaction” or whatever is agreed upon.  
Fundamentally IPD “tie profit to the project and not to individual outcomes” (p. 24). By having 
profit tied to project goals, instead of individual outcomes, “the team is incentivised to collaborate 
in pursuit of common objectives” which “disincentivises selfish behaviour”(American Institute of 
Architects, 2014). H. W. Ashcraft (2014) exemplifies an IPD project with two main motivators: 
Innovation and execution incentives. The innovation incentive incentivises creativity during the 
design phase whereas the execution incentive motives participants, during execution phase of the 
construction, to bring the project under budget. On the other hand, he suggests that other incentives 
can be added according to the needs of the project and its participants. However, at a higher level 
of analysis the American Institute of Architects (2014) suggest that IPD incentivise the 
minimisation of waste (p. 4). 
Reducing the barriers and creating direct relationships 
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In addition, Ashcraft's discussion with owners, Digby Christian found out that relational contracts, 
such as IPD, included those in the value chain and as a result it was: “much easier. You get direct 
relationships” (H. Ashcraft, 2013, p. 12). It is these relationships that Koskela suggests that helps 
with the hierarchical nature which is a barrier to free flow of information and continuous 
improvement. He suggested “exchange of information across organization borders” and “team 
building”(Koskela, 1992, pp. 48-49). 
Increasing collaboration and coordination 
In IPD, collaboration and coordination can be found by the solution of fusing the core 
organisations into a single organisation - integrated to work together and share ideas (American 
Institute of Architects, 2014). In an IPD, the constructors are present from the outset. They are part 
of the team and the team are not just focused on their own speciality. Knowledge and expertise are 
no longer hoarded (Ghassemi & Becerik-Gerber, 2011).. A “burning platform” is created that forces 
people to change, where a sense of urgency requires people to get rid of their “preconceived 
notions, adopt new processes, and jump into trusting each other”. (H. Ashcraft, 2013, p. 12)  
The group make progress together, as they are aware of risks and rewards, not just their own but 
for others. They talk honestly together, no longer individually focused on sectional tasks, and 
willing to see each other's point of view. They not only become accepting of other people's 
standpoint, but also flexible with an objective outlook, and they are able to collectively focus on 
what the customer actually wants and the ways in which the customer can be supplied with the 
best value. The result is “economic, social, environmental and user value” (Martin Fischer, Reed, 
Khanzode, & Ashcraft, 2014, p. 1320). It is no longer about completing unilateral contributions at 
the least cost. Thus, in moving from the traditional system to IPD, the thinking of participants 
changes from short term objectives alone to the bigger picture - optimisation and improvement of 
the whole product.  
Adding value 
With IPD, the focus is on providing value while remaining within budget. Cost is the first thing to 
be decided before starting on the design and the participants are co-located so that the constructor 
also has input. Thus, a design is drawn up within budget, and to give the participants a reason to 
keep within budget they have a maximum budget spend. Updated by software, the team know 
continuously whether they are within budget according to the amount allocated for that particular 
level in the schedule, and they know the amount remaining for covering their costs in the whole 
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project. There are also incentives for meeting or exceeding project goals. Value depends on the 
goals of the owner at the outset. Incentives will be connected to these original goals. If these 
included quality and sustainability, then these will form targets for the team. The owners Ashcraft 
spoke to, as related in his paper describing his group discussion with owners, were quality oriented, 
wanting improved value in their projects. Michael Bade talks of “quality and creativity of results” 
and David Tam says “we accomplished a high quality product” (p. 13) 
Learning 
Suttie, in her interviews with professionals, found that IPD projects made their greatest impact on 
organisations through lean and "the increase in understanding and knowledge" gained by co-
locating with those from other disciplines (Suttie, 2013, p. 267). In the case of the majority of IPD 
builds, learning begins before the start of the project. It is only if the personnel have previous IPD 
experience that training required could possibly be only minimal. Some personnel require more 
IPD education and training than others. Those whose previous experience was in traditional 
construction need to understand the IPD system and features. However, not just training in IPD 
because they will also need to learn about lean techniques and lean philosophy. If they are used to 
paper-based documentation, a lot of training will be required in the technologies they will be using 
- lean tools, completely new to them, such as BIM and Last Planner (Forbes & Ahmed, 2010) 
However, with IPD, learning is a daily occurrence, start to finish. All those involved will find 
encouragement to put initial training into practice and further expand their knowledge by applying 
their minds to job flow, job processes, problem solving and individual learning development. 
Learning and continuous improvement are part of lean philosophy. The key participants are at the 
centre where they collaborate interactively, develop better understanding, and they work together 
to overcome challenges throughout. 
Discoveries and innovation 
From knowledge and understanding comes innovation. During Suttie's interviews with IPD 
participants, she was informed that some were embarking on changes as a result of IPD 
participation, and one said that they would have to “challenge the way we've done things in the 
past” (Suttie, 2013, pp. 272-273) Lean philosophy and IPD practices together encourage a situation 
where discoveries and innovation are likely to occur. It is part of lean manufacturing and lean 
construction for an organisation to provide a “big room” for the display of information and the 
working out of ideas (Ghassemi & Becerik-Gerber, 2011, p. 43). Discoveries and innovation might 
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occur serendipitously in such environment - just accidentally occur to someone. They could also 
happen synergistically - by the merging of ideas from different disciplines. Lean continuous 
improvement applies to people, products, processes and tools, so it is important for an organisation 
to make provision and encourage discussion and problem solving. The resulting ideas, discoveries 
and innovations will be valuable to the project, increasing value and efficiency. According to lean 
philosophy, increasing knowledge and making changes should be a continuous process, with the 
goal of the elimination of waste. The effect put into continuous improvement is not in itself a waste 
because you have to “you have to lower the river to reveal the rocks” (Ballard, 2009)  
 
3.9. Criticisms of IPD 
While IPD has emerged as a fruitful approach, see (M. Fischer et al., 2017; Matthews & Howell, 
2005) it also has been accompanied by various criticisms. The criticisms relate to its 
appropriateness in being used on any project. Cleves and DalGallo (2012) suggest that IPD is; 
 
“not right for every owner, nor will every project, contractor, or architect succeed with 
IPD. Not all are wired to collaborate, and many do not have the intellectual curiosity that 
is necessary to succeed using this unfamiliar and rigorous approach. IPD is somewhat the 
uncharted wilderness for most project teams and only those truly driven to explore and 
understand can master it.” (Cleves & DalGallo, 2012, p. 27). 
 
IPD “is not for everyone or the solution for every project” as not all projects can use this type of 
model because of: “the type of owner and facility, available project financing, and the duration of 
the project”. IPD “come with increased upfront costs” as an IPD project requires an “increased 
time commitment and more leadership from the owner” in addition to having the “capacity and 
desire to participate at this level”, this is not for the passive owner (Cleves & DalGallo, 2012, p. 
16).  
Financing will also affect the goals of the project, for example a private building company might 
have a project goal to construct as quickly as possible for the best possible price, because getting 
to market early will often turn a profit, whereas a public institution has an outside guarantee for 
the project, in this case public funding, here the owner is seeking best value, because they are not 
selling the project and are mostly interested in better quality for the budget (Cleves & DalGallo, 
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2012, p. 48). However, some critics believe that IPD are best suited to repetitive and large complex 
projects because of the significant initial time investment to establish IPD standards and 
procedures (Cleves & DalGallo, 2012; Cohen, 2010).  
 
Other criticisms claim that IPD allows for opportunistic pricing, which can occur as team members 
will be:  
“tempted to pad the project cost and contingency because they are sharing in the incentive 
or risk of the project outcome, which will cheapen the design, or reduce scope, which would 
be an unintended result” (Cleves & DalGallo, 2012, p. 52). 
Opportunistic pricing occurs as a result of not obtaining a fine balance in eliminating “low hanging 
fruit” meaning that if the risk is too high then fear taking over  and trust diminishing likewise if 
risk is set too low then “earning an incentive is easy” euphoria and overconfident behaviour occurs 
resulting in team members becoming sub-optimistic in nature. 
In addition, a 2015 paper on contracts explains why there have been difficulties in starting to use 
IPD in Norway because: 
“on public projects that include public funding, a competitive tendering process may be 
required by the public contract regulations. All countries that are members of the World 
Trade Organisation have to follow the Agreement on Public Procurement. In Norway, this 
specifically states that all public contracts shall undergo an open competitive tendering 
process that secure transparency and fairness in the process” (Kristensen, Laedre, 
Svalestuen, & Lohne 2015 p 600).  
He adds further that IPD is not suited to the system in Norway because IPD construction projects 
require quality which but might not be the cheapest tender. Also, for an IPD to be feasible, all 
parties need to be inclined to that type of construction. Furthermore, IPD requires relational 
contracts or equal interlocking agreements which might turn out to be impossible. 
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4. Reflection on the theoretical framework 
4.1. Propositions 
Combining the theory with the review of the literature we arrived at the following propositions for 
the case study compared to traditional contracts (DBB & DB): 
 
According to the Eisenhardt (1989) a problem arises when an “agent” does work on behalf of 
another party, the “principle whereby actors are often guided by opportunistic behaviour, risk 
aversion and information asymmetry”. This is normally guided by each organisation’s self-interest 
or benefit. In the case of IPD, a completely different dynamic occurs between the owner and the 
actors in the value chain when the owner is more integrated and involved in all phases during 
construction. The contracts co-align the interests of the agents and principal, in that all key-players 
are bound through shared risk and reward and thereby opportunistic behaviour between the parties 
is reduced and as a result the owner in principal becomes an agent and the agents become 
principals. The shift occurs from individual self-interest to group interest.  
 
The outcome here is that the actors in the project, since they want to earn a profit on the project as 
a whole, are able to accomplish this through closely collaborating together so that solutions and 
problems can be resolved quicker and easier. In addition, IPD aligns the participants interests to 
achieve value while keeping costs down in the project. 
 
The key mechanism here is the attitudes of the people involved. Other mechanisms or conditions 
are the normative and owner’s pressure, in tandem with the threats and pressure from the social 
environment and the organisation to fulfil the IPD contract. This can be stated formally as:  
 
Proposition one IPD provides less scope for sub-optimisation and opportunistic behaviour 
between companies in the value chain.  
 
IPD contracts are different and, in their stipulation of the contractual obligations of the parties, the 
result is a new set of game rules being established unlike the power struggles often ensuing in 




Furthermore, a change of power occurs. In a DB the contractor will assume position as owner and 
is used to carrying the risk of the project but in a IPD this power and risk is shared between all 
primary members.  
 
The argument here is that IPD changes the game rules so that all parties’ interests are focused on 
the projects goals. 
 
Collaboration in IPD can be seen through co-location activity whereby you can collaborate as a 
whole which becomes easier to get an answer to a solution rather than waste time sending 
correspondence while waiting for an answer. Solutions are developed through the instant exchange 
of ideas to problems in order to achieve the project’s goals. 
 
Risk and reward is also a condition that improves collaboration by aligning the primary and the 
agents to the project's goal. This occurs when the actors are dependent on the project outcomes 
and discuss solutions in order to ensure success and thus retain their rewards. 
 
In addition, joint decision-making incentivises people to have a sense of ownership in the project. 
This allows for people to voice concerns, problem solve and jointly debate, and this leads to 
solutions. Furthermore, traditional contracts limit collaboration because of their transactional 
nature. The contract is set out detailing what, how much and when the transaction will take place. 
It enlists a set of rules for compensation and inflicts penalties for non-compliance. Better 
conditions for collaboration occur when an IPD contract, or a relational contract, details how the 
parties will collaborate throughout the project. 
 
It is the process of IPD that creates the conditions for equal partnership, collaboration and unified 
solutions. Unified solutions occur when the parties take set-out-solutions in the implementation 
phase and swap them for better solutions and one party takes the extra cost in their own budget, 
for the benefit of the whole project. It is this change in group thinking that gives rise to:  
 
Proposition two IPD provides better conditions for unified solutions (swapping) than traditional 
contracts. 
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The outcome here is that the conditions in the IPD ensure that the project becomes cheaper without 
reducing quality (getting worse). It also removes waste that may be hidden in the (embedded) 
budget structure.  
 
The mechanism here is that new opportunities are discovered only when the understanding of the 
project has matured enough through working with the details and when there are no structural 
restrictions. 
 
Alternative implementation models such as the DB model have often sketched together with a 
simple functional description that details the owner requirements for the build. Once a contract is 
signed a different dynamic occurs between the DB contractor and the owner as the DB contractor 
is responsible for the majority of the design and construction and the owner is no longer present, 
The DB contractor has control and influence on solutions, methods and products. He does not have 
sufficient incentive to safeguard the owners needs for constructability and costs, since the owner 
has no more involvement. 
 
This type of model creates a different set of interests between the principal and the agent whose 
focus is on lowering costs, by looking for “shortcuts” and “equivalent or lower quality” that will 
help reduce construction time, save on costs thereby maximising profits. This gives rise to  
 
Proposition three proposes that an IPD safeguards quality and customer value in a better way 
than alternative implementation models while maintaining constructability.  
 
The outcome here is: The participants are motivated to work together towards the project's success. 
Furthermore, the collaborative nature of IPD incentivises the participants to work out shared 
solutions. This ensures that constructability will be equal to or better than buildability obtainable 
from alternative project delivery models. This is as a result of the integration of principal and 
agents throughout the design and construction which leads to efficiency and improvement and 
provides overall value to the customer. 
The mechanism here is again the IPD process which includes the owner’s involvement, the 
perceived balance of risk and reward that is shared between all actors, goal alignment with the 
owner’s desire and collaboration which ensures constructability which occurs through the 
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allowance to make changes during and throughout the project. Other mechanisms can also be seen 
as provisions in the contract, putting value as prominence (a priority of the contract). 
 
Customer value is defined as: a building that the hospital must have that is favourable for the 
operation of what it is intended for. It concerns the daily work of the healthcare staff. Secondly, 
the technical operations must work well with limited resources, including temperature, air quality 
control etc.  
 
The owner wants reliability and value. The participants are motivated by the collaborative nature 
of the project, the aligned goals, and the shared risk and reward, to work together towards its 
success, and the successful outcome of the project includes the safeguarding of quality and 
customer value. 
Furthermore, since the principal knows what the agent is actually doing, it is likely to curb 
opportunism, especially in terms of moral hazard, because the agent will realise deceiving the 
principal will only reduce their share of the profits. 
 
In the case of IPD contracts, all actors are inherently responsible for the design, whereby the key 
players including the owner come together to determine through their collective knowledge and 
experience how to maximise efficiency, minimise waste, and complete the construction project on 
or ahead of schedule using tools such as target value design, early involvement, co-location, etc. 
Here continuous improvement is the goal of the project or, in other words, to be better than it was 
originally intended. The project’s key players can suggest changes that can be used to speed up 
construction, which would not normally occur in a DB model. Furthermore, since the owner is 
involved in the IPD process, during the design and construction, he is also able to safeguard his 
interests in a combination of cost, quality and sustainability. In addition, the owner’s involvement 
also has the advantage that the actors in the project perceive what product the customer wants 
versus the possible alternatives. Which lays the foundation for: 
 
Proposition four: IPD, in combination with TVD, provides better framework conditions for 
continuous improvement and innovation compared to a Design Build model (DB). 
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Structure: IPD is a structure which contains organisational structures where knowledge is shared 
across disciplines. Associated with IPD are other structures such as contracts and tools to help 
optimise the project such as lean philosophy and Target Value Design. TVD sets high goals in 
order to reach for innovation and together with learning and reflection the project team 
continuously improve. 
 
The sharing of interdisciplinary knowledge leads to learning and innovation which results in 
continuous improvement. The interaction of Target Value Design and project goals results in 
increased value within cost limits. 
 
Mechanism: New possibilities are discovered when the costs are used as a driver for design instead 
of treating cost as an outcome of wasteful redesign iterations. Learning coupled with reflection 
allows for continuous improvement. In addition, learning and knowledge development are 
essential to fuel innovation.   
 
As already shown, in IPD, there is a different distribution of power and control. Similarly, 
proposition 4 is derived from the differing attributes of IPD and Design-Build. The framework 
conditions are described by the American Institute of Architects (2014) arise from optimising the 
whole project: trust, respect, joint ownership and integration. 
 
In IPD, the projects participants are brought together as equal partners. The different organisations 
are brought together collaboratively, whereby there is found collective knowledge. Because of the 
collaborative nature of IPD, these sources of knowledge come together and through the mechanism 
of learning produce continuous improvement and innovation. 
 
Target Value Design drives up value and drives down cost. The TVD team, working with this lean 
tool aim to innovate in a way which keeps costs low without compromising the build’s 
functionality nor its quality. Target Value Design is employed from project start up and does not 
just involve the TVD team but also designers, the contractor’s team and subcontractors. The aim 
is to provide the value required by the IPD within the constraints of cost and method. The software 
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informs the team of the financial situation continuously, and so, through successive iterations, the 
team make changes and savings in pursuit of continuous improvement. 
 
The use of early involvement, in IPD, creates a different set of rules for the architects and engineers 
who are more focused on designing and then redesigning the working drawings to reflect the 
contractor’s ideas whereas constructors have a strong focus on the costs and schedule, especially 
in detailed design and so normally the architects and engineers are not able to fully cooperate or 
design without feeling constrained. 
Work is organised in such a way that, it allows for a flatter structure, whereby trades are allowed 
to make joint decisions, come up with innovative ideas, challenge processes and suggest new ways 
to experiment. Early involvement is based on increased involvement and cooperation between 
trades. It is here that there is considerable scope for social interaction as many disciplines are 
exposed to new experiences and opportunities for learning. In addition, new knowledge is formed 
through the iterative process of repeatedly translating the owner’s wishes and goals into his 
intended design. Furthermore, a sense of urgency arises when design decisions are moved 
upstream as far as possible and participants have to get rid of their preconceived notions, adopt 
new processes, and jump into trusting each other. This can be seen as transcendent learning 
whereby it transforms individual learner’s behaviour and personality, through crisis situations, in 
order to get further.   
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5. Method 
This method chapter aims at establishing the research strategy and the plan of action in order to 
resolve the applicable research questions or propositions. For the purpose of the current research 
the most appropriate research design has been determined as critical realism. It is a philosophical 
approach in ontology concerning what exists. Critical realism distinguishes between the interfaces 
of our experiences by differentiating between the real (what we don’t see but experience), 
empirical (what we experience) and the actual world (what happens, observed or undetected)  
(Sayer, 1992). Epistemological is a philosophical approach in the study of knowledge and the way 
of enquiring our justified belief. This thesis’s stance is based on abstraction. A variety of 
techniques will be involved in the analysis and validation of a case study. The design will be 
explained in more detail and the organisation of the gathering, categorisation and utilisation of 
data will be described in the following sections, see also Table 5 which shows an overview of the 
research design. 
Table 5 Overview of the Research Design 
Research Design Ontology Critical Realism 
 Epistemology Between positivism and constructionism 
Inference (Reasoning/Logic): Abstraction 
 Methodology Case study research 
 Methods and 
Techniques  




Literature Assessed scientific articles, thesis’s, conference proceedings, 
website on project, memorandum, contracts, government reports 
and legislation (over 1000 read with over 100 used in thesis) 
 Interview Interview guide was created whereby qualitative data was 
collected through semi structured interviews (Thirteen 
informants) Interview data: Content analysis using an adaption 
to the framework analysis method and coded into Excel. 
 Survey Created in Survey-xact and collected via emails, paper and 
online via web (………informants) Survey data: Survey-xact 
analysis system 
 Observation Observation of two meetings. Design meeting (fourteen subjects 
of observation). Production meeting (thirteen subjects of 





5.1. Research design 
This chapter gives a description of the theoretical perspectives as well as the methodology used in 
the thesis. This chapter follows Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2015, p. 47), illustration of 
a tree trunk, showing the relationship between the rings, of how research projects are conducted 
and communicated, which underpins every research project. This analogy is used as a guide to the 
setup of the method section. First, from the core, the two innermost rings, ontology and 
epistemology, and discuss them under the term research paradigms. At this point we will examine 
the different research philosophies and the different inferences, the logic in moving from the 
research question to the conclusion. Next the methodology section, in other words the strategy 
used to answer the research question, is explained, lastly the methods and techniques section for 
data collection is proposed. Finally, this section critically assesses the quality of the research 
design. 
 
Figure 12: Representation of how research is conducted and communicated. Source: Easterby-Smith et al. (2015, p. 47) 
Research Ontology and Epistemology 
Over the years there have been several debates about how to conduct research which has led to 
many philosophical debates about research paradigms (Kuhn, 2012) in other words the 
philosophical approach or model in how the researcher conducts a study (Johnston & Smith, 2010, 
p. 46). 
In ontology, at one end of the scale there is realism and at the other end is nominalism. In realism 
your epistemology (how you will investigate), your point of departure is based on positivism. This 
is more attuned to the natural sciences, where you deduce from theory and use hypothesises to test 
out and confirm theories. At the other end of the scale, nominalism, its epistemology is based on 
strong constructionism, which involves, induction from observations, which helps to create 
generalizations that explains the observations and is more attuned to the social sciences (Johnston 
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& Smith, 2010, p. 54). This thesis’s ontology is critical realism and its epistemology lies between 
the realms of positivism and constructionism. The main idea behind critical realism is 8:  
 
a. Theoretically informed empirical studies (Theory should underpin the study) 
b. Empirical studies should inform the theory (Findings/results should inform theory) 
 
The reason for this standpoint is based on Johnston & Smith description which involving 
understanding the “underlining causal relationships”. This argument suits this research and our 
objectives to try to explain why but also what the underlying causes of the events are beyond our 
perception (2010, p. 28). 
 
Inference are the steps in reasoning that you take from the research question to the conclusion. It 
is your theoretical perspective to understanding what approach we can use to get out knowledge. 
Blaikie (2007, p. 8) states that this reasoning or research strategy is one of the most important steps 
that a researcher must decide on. He proposes four distinct research strategies: inductive, 
deductive, retroductive and abductive. Each one has a very “distinctive way of answering the 
research question”. Inductive and deductive are the opposites of each other where one involves 
generating theories whereas the other involves testing out theories, which correlates to positivism 
and constructionism mentioned earlier. In contrast to both of these is retroductive and abductive.   
Koskela (2017) goes back to Aristotle and Plato where he explains how abduction is about 
explanation, namely discovering the causes behind observed phenomena. He suggests that it is 
both a method of induction and deduction which begins with “a specific case, via observations, 
and seeks for explanation through induction which is then applied to other particular cases by 
deduction” (p. 171). Bergene (2007) claims that “critical realists often employ abductive 
inference” and it is this explanation that bodes well with this thesis’s choice in abduction. 
Abductive reasoning focus goes beyond just documenting, modelling, creating or testing out 
theory of the event, it tries to abstract the concepts, mechanisms, meaning and motives of the actors 




                                                 




This section describes the methodology used and the reasoning for this approach. Here the different 
research methods will be discussed, to illustrate the strategy or plan that will be used to solve the 
research question.  
The Oxford dictionary defines research as “the systematic investigation into and study of materials 
and sources in order to establish facts and reach new conclusions” (2017) . Systematic investigation 
requires a research design. Yin (1994) suggests that “every empirical study has an implicit if not 
explicit, research design” (p. 18). The research design methodology should be carried out by using 
“logic that links the data to be collected and the conclusions to be drawn to the initial questions of 
a study”. Dubois and Gadde (2002) argue that you can systematically combine the abductive 
approach to case research and it is from this argument that this thesis choses case study research 
Yin, a significant author in case study research (1994, p. 9) states that each methodology has its 
own charteristics in which there are large overlaps. The goal is to avoid using a subservient 
methodology but to use the most advantagous method. Therefore he recommends that one 
examines three conditions for the choice of methodology: 
a. Form of research question 
b. The extent of control a researcher has over the events  
c. Degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events 
 
As a result, this thesis takes the standpoint from Yin (1994) and uses case study research 
methodology for many reasons: First it lies within the branch of social science which is used to 
“understand complex social phenomena” (p. 4) and can provide a valuable understanding of real 
life, which we intend to study. Secondly, it is an often-used methodology in critical realism which 
is common method in the AEC industry9. Thirdly it suits this type of “what” question which is 
actually a “how” and "why” type research question, which we intend to study. Fourthly it suits 
abstraction methodology, as its focus is on contemporary events which can be examined 
comprehensively and “likely to involve important contextual conditions”(p. 16) then used to 
inform the theory. Fifthly the researcher requires, no control over the events.  
It is important to explain development and change in organisations. As a result, relational 
coordination theory, can be used to identify elements of “effective work organisations” which have 
                                                 
9 Verbalised by Bo Terje Kalsaas at a Masters Meeting 17.10.2017, University in Agder 
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high levels of coordination between “uncertainty, interdependence, and time constraints”. 
“Effective organisation of work” involves an awareness of all participants to, others in the work 
process (Gittell, 2000a, p. 517). The areas that are found to be lacking, can be used as feedback in 
“identify areas of improvement and assessing progress over time” (Gittell, 2000a, p. 536). As a 
result, the aim of this paper is to test for relational dynamics between the coordination between 
participants in order to assess its impact on quality, efficiency, learning and innovation. 
Case studies can be a lot of work and multiple studies might not allow for efficient study of the 
case study due to time limitations, so this thesis examined just a single case study. The choice of 
case study was chosen because our supervisor had prior contact with an IPD project in Tønsberg, 
Norway. 
Research Method 
This section examines what methods or tools and techniques that were used to collect the data 
based on the research methodology. Data is often collected either qualitative or quantitative and 
the majority of the data collected was more qualitatively. 
Yin (1994, p. 103) states that collecting case study evidence can come from many sources such as  
interviews, documentation, archival records, observation, and physical artifacts. Yet no single 
source is more advantageous than the others, in fact a good case study relies on multiple sources 
of evidence. In this regard this thesis focused on simultaneously gathering multiple sources of 
evidence as it would help to give an insight into the real-life situation, the processes, mechanisms 
and an overall in-depth understanding of the case.  
The data collection methods chosen were based on the research methodology-case study, what 
would best answer our research questions, to understand other mechanisms that might be in force, 
which might be unobservable under site conditions and what methods could help validate our 
findings. An example of this is incentives, they are important for understanding mechanisms and 
behaviours, which cannot be seen, as they are abstract. As a result, the main documentation for the 
thesis was measured indirectly, through observations, surveys and interviews.  
(Johnston & Smith, 2010, p. 139) suggest that when planning interviews you must consider 
carfully, if they are going to be sucesssful, between three types: structured, semi structured or 
unstructured. However, critics of positivism often argue that interviews are formed by researcher 
bias (p. 54).  As a result, it was decided that this thesis would use semi structured interviews to 
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allow the participators to openly express themselves while themes or topics would help guide them. 
This approach was a good way of validating the researcher’s questions and at the same time trying 
not to influence the subject’s answers.  
Systematic Combining 
Dubois and Gadde (2002) suggest that abduction and case study research can be systematically 
combined in relation to induction and deduction. Sayer (1992) suggests that the “problems of 
evaluating causal explanations are not widely understood” that it is important to analyse between 
two areas abstract and concrete in order to distinguish between the interfaces of our experiences  
by differentiating between the real (what we don’t see but experience), empirical (what we 
experience) and the actual world (what happens, observed or undetected). 
This process, shown in Figure 13, shows a step by step process, not done chronologically but 










The model shows that from the real world a problem is induced, in other words observed, which 
allows for the relevance of the problem, then by examining, the theory the mechanisms and 
structures can be identified in abstract research. It is here that by combining the theory with the 
case study that the propositions emerge. Then the case is examined to deduce the conditions and 
contextual analysis, from the events that occur and it is here that you identify the key mechanism, 
from concrete research. The findings are then used via abduction to validate the theory.  
Figure 13 The thesis research design (Based on Kalsaas, 20181) 
   
65 
5.2. Data collection and analysis 
Data collection and analysis are conducted following the guidelines of abstraction. However, it is 
important to note that the steps listed in the research design are done simultaneously over the 
course of the master thesis. Data is collected qualitatively through literature, interviews and 
observations and quantitatively through a survey.  
Literature study 
Here it was induced from the real world that there is a need to understand IPD in the AEC industry. 
This need applies not just to private but to the public sector. A clear example is Nye Veier interest 
in understanding how different project development models can increase efficiency in road 
building. 
At the start of the literature review a preliminary research question was posed with the aim of 
gaining an insight into the efficiency in the Architecture and Engineering and Construction 
Industry (AEC) using Integrated Project Delivery (IPD), while examining how IPD is realized 
throughout a project and to identify the key mechanisms that underpin what an IPD really is and 
its applicability for future implementation in the AEC industry. Hence the research question was 
• “What are the possibilities and limitations of Integrated Project Delivery Models (IPD)?”  
 
This then lead to sub questions which were further investigated: 
o How and why is IPD implemented? 
o What constitutes an IPD?  
o What are the key driving mechanisms of IPD? 
o What are the perceived effects of IPD compared to other project delivery models? 
The aim of this literature review is to examine extensively what has been written in the field of 
IPD by examining empirical, theoretical as well as conjectural contributions to literature.  
Review of the literature 
Here there was a lot of literature to review, so a qualitative data analysis was conducted. This 
involved examining the theories and concepts that might be applicable. At the same time an 
extensive examination of the literature was studied whereby coding of key terms drawn from a 
literature review allowed for identification of common themes. The headings drawn from this 
coding system collected the attributes deemed to be most important for the thesis. 
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The whole analysis involved qualitative data coding. First by identifying literature and labelling 
by usefulness, then by reading more in-depth and highlighting text by theme then more in-depth 
coding was conducted from the highlighted literature to refine the sections highlighted into highly 
refined topics. Next the topics were re-examined to interpret any underlining mechanisms or 
theories/themes that emerged. Finally, the literature reviewed was examined and propositions were 
determined.  
Literature analyses 
Literature was first analysed by the most citations and what was deemed relevant was studied in 
depth. The analysis of these results was then used follow other authors who had been not just the 
main contributors but had significant issues that were deemed important. The focus was to go back 
and find the original source, verify that what the readers had said was correct and read literature 
that would perhaps be inciteful 
Over one thousand items of literature, for example articles, books, reports, guide books ect were 
examined, of those only perhaps one hundred items of literature were used in the thesis . Access 
was also given to documentation in the case study. Some items were deemed important but on 
further examination were on topics outside of the area of research. The review tried to voice all 
concerns from those with an original statement, however those statements that were repeated or 
reiterated, original authors were cited. It must be noted that a lot of recent literature quotes from 
the original authors and as a result have been omitted from this review due to lack of contribution 
however no item read is wasted but added to the readers knowledge of what is written on the 
subject.  
At the start of the review, the focus was on searching for the most cited or peer reviewed literature, 
with the hope of finding the most influential and latest contributing authors to the literature  
however literature is published every day and it is very unlikely that all of the most recent 
publications have been read.  
We were also rigorous in the quality of the articles by using only highly acknowledged journals 
and literature related to the industry. 
Interviews 
Interviews are a data collection method that are qualitative, meaning that it is non-statistical in 
nature. Interviews were chosen as a good source of information because it could be used in critical 
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realism in order to gain an understanding of the underlying reasons and motivations of the events 
(causal mechanisms), to provide insights into the setting out of the project in other words the 
context and could be used to generate ideas for discussion, uncover thought and opinion, in order 
to quantify the propositions by the way of evaluating the phenomena critically (Sayer, 1992).  
The interview process could not start without notification of the research study to Norwegian 
Center for Research Data (NSD) as there were new laws pertaining to personal information in 
research. A report was submitted 30 days prior to the collection of data.  
The interview process  
The interview process was designed only after permission was granted from the case study that 
the research could be carried out and participants could be contacted. An ad-hoc sampling strategy 
was then used whereby interviewees were selected based on availability. The main focus was to 
get at least one interviews from each of the primary and supporting members. This involved asking 
via email for the possibility of an interview. In addition a snowball sampling strategy was also 
used whereby candidates and interviewees were approached and encouraged to recommended 
other participants from among those within the IPD who would have time to be interviewed. This 
strategy was useful in this case study especially with limited access and time restrictions. Next Yin 
(2013) recommends using unstructured or semi-structured interviews in case studies, whereby 
focusing on “guided conversations rather than structured queries” (Yin, 2013, p. 106). An 
interview guide was created and adapted continuously by the supervisor, to account for 
triangulation and adapt topics according to a person’s role in the organisation. The researchers felt 
that this type of questioning in interviews, would best suit the case study in order to identify 
important areas that required deeper inquiry but better suit the interviewees as they could talk more 
openly about what they felt was important for them. 
Interviews were conducted first by informing the users by email about the study and the purpose 
of the research, the data collection method and a section addressing issues surrounding 
confidentiality and data protection.  
Easterby-Smith et al. (2015) suggests that researchers should be aware of the quality of the 
research collected, the potential bias that can be introduced and what inference is drawn (pp. 215-
217). This is in line with critical realism whereby one should look also at the objects, the 
mechanisms and conditions that can hidden or unseen, which could affect the meaning and 
interpretation that people may attach to events in what they are saying (Sayer, 1992).  
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Internal factors that might affect the interview process 
Here there was a need to identify and understand the factors that could influence the interview 
process and perhaps determine the transferability, giving room for speculation about the settings 
in which the interviews were conducted.  
The interviews were based on a short interaction with participants and it is difficult to assess the 
background or participants motivations. However, some internal factors that could affect the 
process was the researchers effect on how the participants responded during the interview as 
interviewees could try to impress the researchers.  
Participants under interview can also be motivated to respond in a certain way. These motivations 
can result from their interactions with the workplace and from the interviewees personality traits. 
These factors can interfere with the way questions were answered in the interview as some people 
can be very negative and some just like to complain and use it as a coping mechanism. In addition, 
there might be a hidden agenda from the interviewee in trying to undermine others in the project 
or recruit the researcher towards their cause such as power struggle between groups based on their 
ego and desired position in the group. (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015, p. 215) 
External factors that might affect the interview process 
There are many unseen factors that are often unknown to the researcher under an interview that 
influence participant’s response to the questions. The location of the interview could be a source 
of influence. Spaces can impact peoples understanding of the interview situation, this includes 
things like comfortable chairs, low noise and distractions. In addition, some spaces may not be 
seen as a neutral space  (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015, p. 145). The researchers were aware of some 
of the factors and tried to reduce the influence of external influences, however based on an ad-hoc 
sampling strategy and time limitations the researchers had to make do with the meeting room 
facilities on site.  
All interview was held by three researchers. Observations, notes and recordings were taken. After 
each interview discussions were held together and with the supervisor to resolve unclear aspects, 
compare notes, discuss the theory, compare answers to earlier interviews (triangulation) and 
suggest new or alternative propositions. A draft report and a list of follow-up questions was 
delivered to all interviewees by email. However, it was the recordings that helped reduce the 
chances for misinterpretation, which were later reflected on 5-7 days later.  
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Participation and meeting schedules 
The researchers interviewed 13 participants in the case study of which all had a IPD contract or 
interlocking contracts. An overview of the schedule can be found in the appendix 10. In addition 
to the case study there we were also discussions and Nye Veier workshops whereby discussions 
were held on procurement and project development models. An overview of the participation 
schedule for Nye Veier workshops n can be found in appendix 10.  
 
Interview data analysis 
All the interviews data was analysed using a method for analysing qualitative research called the 
framework analysis method, which has been used since the 1980’s on large scale social policy 
research and is popular in medical and health research (Gale, Heath, Cameron, Rashid, & 
Redwood, 2013). This method was adapted and consisted of 4-5 steps: 
Procedure for analysis: 
1. Transcribe audio files (12 of 13 audio files in Norwegian, 1 audio file in English) 
2. Translate data into English 
3. Sort the data and inductively “open code” the data into themes, this involved coding 
sections that might be relevant from as many different perspectives as possible. 
Codes referred to applicable themes (e.g. learning, culture, goals, challenges).  
4. Once into themes, sort through the themes and put them into broader topics, see 
chapter on propositions. 
5. Write themes into the broader topics and collate overlapping comments.  
Survey creation 
The survey was created in a software program called SurveyXact. The questions were specific 
dependant on role and position in the project. For example, the owner would get very specific 
questions than the architect. The survey question used a combination of selection choices and 
likert-type scales. These scales are used to give the user a range of response choices, such as partly 
agree to completely agree. The questions were worded in such a way that they were appropriate, 
not subject to misinterpretation or have questions that could be taken out of context. However there 
are some factors that affect the survey as the questions may be subject to distortion from several 
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causes, such as people trying to be socially correct and avoiding extreme views, trying to be 
defensive and to avoid negative statements and could be misinterpreted.  
Survey analysis  
There were 14 responses from the survey. These results were combined with the 11 results from 
the interview in Microsoft Excel.  
It was determined that the most appropriate measure of the likert scales was to use a bar chart and 
calculate the percentages of the responses and then take the mean of all the responses and display 
the results in a spider diagram in Microsoft Excel. 
5.3. Quality of the research design  
There are several criteria that can be used to assess the quality of a research design. Four tests, 
according to Yin (1994; 2014) establish the quality of the research design based on: construct 
validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability, see Table 6. However, there is some 
debate about its use in qualitative inquiry. Qualitative researchers rejected the framework of 
validity and reliability as being applicable to all research. They argue that different standards for 
judging the quality of qualitative research should be applied to ensure “rigour”. Guba and Lincoln 
research from 1981 argues that traditional criteria for judging qualitative research such as 
reliability and validity should be substituted for the concept of “trustworthiness” containing four 
aspects: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Lincoln, Guba, & Guba, 
1985; Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002; R.K. Yin, 1994).  
Table 6 Criteria for quality assessment. 
Yin criteria  Guba and Lincoln criteria 
Construct validity Credibility  
Internal validity Transferability 
External validity Dependability 
Reliability Confirmability 
 
Based on these criteria the verification of the quality of the data of the research was evaluated.  
Ensuring Validity and Reliability  
Construct Validity  
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Construct validity is about establishing correct operational measures for the concept being studied. 
Yin suggests that construct validity can be strengthened by using triangulation whereby multiple 
sources of data is collected and compared. He suggests four types of triangulation in a case study: 
data, investigator, theory and methodological (R.K. Yin, 1994; 2014).  
As a result, the first tactic employed was to use data triangulation using multiple sources of data 
collection, such as a survey, interviews, observations and documentation in order to triangulate the 
answers from participants.  
Next investigator triangulation, here multiple and different evaluators were used in the interviews. 
In order to employ theory triangulation, the researchers examined different perspectives supporting 
the data by ensuring that interviewees were asked questions to verify data collected from previous 
interviews and observations. This was done continuously and resulted in new interview guides 
being created. Documentation collected was also triangulated from the interviews, surveys, 
observations and with the results. Employing methodological triangulation involved using 
multiple methods such as interviews and observations. The interviews were taped, and notes taken 
to help have a clearer understanding of the events. During transcription notes and recordings 
validated what was heard and noted at a specific point in time.  
Internal Validity 
The second test suggested by Yin is internal validity concerns the determination of causal 
relationships. The tactic here was to analyse the data collected for expected patterns, in light of the 
theory, and against the propositions. This is a learning process whereby one looks for patterns in 
the data, that an earlier event resulted from an earlier occurrence, from the interviews and 
observation data. This test helped to build an explanation about the case and also consider other 
possible explanations to not only develop ideas for further study but to revise the propositions. 
This test was also used in conjunction with finding patterns in the theory to match our proposition 
to strengthen validity in the case study. 
External Validity 
External validity concerns analytical generalization, where one generalises based on theory of the 
phenomenon. Yin states argues that statistical generalisation should not be used to calculate 
frequencies in the case study. This thesis uses analytical generalization by examining the case 
study, to try and understand, uncover and document the unseen and unobservable events in other 
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hidden underneath the surface, and applied to the theoretical propositions. As a result, the finding 
are transferable to other contexts. 
Reliability  
Yins final test is reliability, which deals with how reliable the data is. Examples of reliability could 
be seen throughout the study as the researchers made a habit of using the same interview protocol 
and recording of the interview guides and schedules in order to repeat the same procedures10. 
However, the remote sending of the survey hinders the reliability of the data as the researchers 
cannot guarantee that respondents filled out the questionnaire under the right conditions, even 
though great lengths were employed to ensure user participation. Furthermore only 14 participants 
responded to the survey which is a weakness of the study.   
It should be noted that due to the large amount of data capture in combination with the time 
restrictions placed on the thesis there was not enough time to treat the data.  
Ensuring trustworthiness  
Lincoln et al. (1985) suggests that in order to find an alternative to conventional criteria such as 
validity and reliability one should pose alternative trustworthiness criteria in order to ensure rigor 
in the process of inquiry. These are described below. 
Credibility 
Credibility concerns the confidence in the truth in the findings. Here Lincoln et al. (1985) suggests 
five major techniques: (1) prolonged engagement, persistent observation and triangulation, (2) 
peer debriefing (3) negative case analysis (4) referential adequacy and (5) member checks (pp. 
289-327). 
The first technique prolonged engagement and persistent observation was on the most part 
impossible, due to the location of the case study in relation to the researcher’s location and the 
time limitations of the master’s thesis however enough time was spent testing for misinformation 
and examining and understanding of the context and the contextual factors to identify the 
mechanisms that exist in the culture of the organisation. In addition, credibility was also ensured 
through triangulation of the interview guide and in the introduction of the survey. Furthermore, 
                                                 
10 Meeting schedule and interview guides can be found in the appendices. 
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unintended distortions which could occur from the researchers and or the respondents, such as 
retrospective (misunderstanding the interviewers questions) and selective distortions (just wanting 
to please the interviewer) were difficult to avoid. However, attempts were made to try and 
minimise distortions and “expose lies, fronts, and deceptions that may be practiced by informants” 
by reiterating questions and triangulating answers (p. 303). 
The second technique, peer debriefing is by working with someone who is unanimous or impartial 
after the study in order to collect valid information. It was not possible to work with someone 
unbiased due to the nature of the project however discussions were held afterwards with each 
researcher for alternative explanations and to identify the underlying mechanisms to events that 
would test out propositions.  
The third technique was negative case analysis, where one reviews the data and reports on negative 
cases, in order to revisit the hypothesis. Propositions were formulated and re-evaluated during the 
throughout the data collection. The fourth technique referential adequacy, is where one stores raw 
data in order to examine later. Credibility was ensured through the collection of audio tapes which 
could be compared later with notes and observations viewed earlier. The last technique member 
check ensures overall accuracy of the study. This was conducted as all data collected was sent 
back to interviewees in order to verify the accuracy of the data collected. 
Transferability 
Transferability refers to the degree to which the results can be transferred to other contexts. This 
has been discussed earlier, see external validity.  
Dependability  
Lincoln describes dependability as a way of showing consistency in the findings. This can be done 
by showing that the data is valid so is it reliable. Data that is credible is then dependable. This has 
been talked about earlier.  
Confirmability 
A major technique of establishing confirmability is using an audit trail. This is a trail of research 
records which was created that included raw data from each interview, notes and observations, 
paper survey answers, confidentiality agreements and documents and records collected from the 
case. Through these mediums the findings are displayed objectively. 
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5.4. Ethical considerations 
This section is concerned with the ethical considerations that have to be taken into consideration 
in research and that have been employed in carrying out the research involved in this thesis. Bell 
and Bryman (2007) discover that 50% research community that they consulted agreed on 11 
principles whereby the first six are about protecting the interests of the research subjects and the 
last four are to protect the integrity of the research community. 
The researchers protected the interests of the research by consciously promoting high ethical 
standards, ensuring first throughout all data collection techniques that research participants were 
fully informed in order to avoid deception about the nature of the research. This included declaring 
the researcher’s involvement with other companies like Nye Veier, to ensure honesty and 
transparency in communications about the research. 
Next the researchers protected the interests of the research subjects ensuring first throughout all 
data collection techniques that research participants had fully consented to participating in the 
research. Secondly that all participants were informed that all confidential information, such as 
correspondent’s answers would be kept confidential and anonymity would be protected. 
information was given to the participants at the end of the interviews, regarding communications 
by offering participants the chance to change or add to their transcriptions. This was done to 
promote honesty, transparency and reduce avoidance of any misleading or false reporting about 
the research findings.  
The finally ethical issue concerns the control and use of data obtained by the researcher. In order 
to ensure confidentiality, the research project was registered with NSD regarding the protection of 
data during research projects. As a result, all data was backed up on the universities external server 
(Microsoft Onedrive) and participants personal information was not stored but given a link key. 
Computer access was protected with a username and password and computer, portable devices, 
prints and recordings were always stored in a locked room. 
5.5. Research limitations 
Research often has a number of limitations depending on how the research is carried out (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2015). This section highlights the limitations that were faced in the thesis. 
Literature review 
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When examining the literature, there were many limitations in accessing the literature. There is a 
numerous amount of literature that was not read due to the time restrictions on the thesis, in 
addition, new books and articles often have limited access due to the admission given by the 
university, limited access to search for individual chapters and not been requested for by the 
library. 
The literature reviewed was cited only from those having the most citations and from peer 
reviewed journals. In addition, the literature required a great deal of time to check and find the 
main authors, even from the most peer reviewed articles, books and websites. The main aim was 
to go back or find the original source to verify the validity of the source in question. Furthermore, 
most journals had the highest level in the NSD database (Norwegian register for scientific articles, 
series and publishers). However one of the sources, The Internet Journal of Society for Social 
Management Systems (ISSN 2432-552X) was not published as a known source in the database, 
written by (Huang et al., 2012). Despite the weakness of the source, it was used anyway because 
of the lack of reliable sources covering recent empirical studies examining incentives in contracts. 
One source that was not used was the Mckinsey report (2017) called Reinventing Construction: A 
Route to Higher Productivity because it came from a company which was mainly interesting in 
marketing its services.  
In addition, there is a memorandum that comes from a law firm in Norway that has been used 
within the literature review. It was deemed a credible source due to its providence furthermore 
there are several master thesis’s which were deemed reliable and were cited.  
Data collection - Interviews,  
Data was collected by three researchers however a major limitation within the study was the 
location of the interviews in relation to the researchers. This weakness was overcome through the 
mixing of data collection methods, such as the use of a survey and observations. In addition, 
interviews often have many practical limitations that impede the collection of data such as 
interviewees not always able to open up regardless of the trained interviewer present or the 
limitation in getting consistent data as the interview guide evolved based on prior respondent’s 
answers and on triangulating the quality of the data.  
In some instances, several questions did not get the respondents to express an answer, but as 
respondents got comfortable, they lowered their guard and eventually answered the questions by 
expanding on them. This made the analysing of the data very difficult. In addition, perhaps due to 
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the semi structured nature of the interviews and due to triangulation, the questions were slightly 
reworded and there could be differences according to who you spoke to.  
The data was transcribed into word documents which took a long time because accents and poor 
audio reception.  
Data collection - Observations 
Observations that were undertaken, had a number of limitations mostly based on the lack of skill 
and knowledge level the two inexperienced researchers had in observing meetings. This 
unawareness limits the quality of the data being recorded as the researchers did not have and 
understanding what was being observed or what data was vital or trivial . However, the weakness 
was compensated through, the help of the experienced researcher in observing and triangulating 
the interviews. In addition, the hardest limitation was acquiring access to repeat observations of 
the same meeting in order to analyse the effectiveness organisation of work between the 
participants, mentioned earlier in section See relational coordination theory.  
Data collection – Survey 
The survey had huge limitations placed on it due to the lack of expert knowledge at the university 
who understood the software, SurveyXact. This limitation impacted largely the amount of time to 
design, disseminate and validate the content of the survey. In addition, the survey had an added 
element of complexity in it being created to examine several other projects, such as the Nye Veier 
project involvement mentioned earlier. This meant that the complexity of adapting the survey to 
the respondent’s role as well as differentiating the design for the different organisations limited 
the researchers time in sending out of the surveys as planned.  
Data-analysis 
The majority of limitations were due to time, for example the time to learn a new software, such 
as Nvivo. There were no specialists available and the researchers wanted to be sure that the 
software was fully understood in order to fully achieve a rigorous data analysis. In order to 
minimise this limitation, the researchers analysed the data side by side in excel. 
Based on this discussion it is evident that time is and was a factor that limited the thesis project. 
Further studies can attempt to learn the new software like Nvivo before starting a master thesis. 
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6. Case study background and context 
This section explains the background and the context for the case study. The case is described 
including the relevant parties involved. It further describes the organizational  structure and a 
timeline of events. 
6.1. Case description 
Background and goals 
The Hospital in Vestfold – Tønsberg has undergone a renewal of the main part of its building. The 
process started in 1989 and has been divided into seven stages. Stage 6 finished in the fall of 2015, 
and at that point 85 % of the building mass had been renewed. The Tønsberg Project (TP) is the 
seventh stage of this renewal, which started in 2015 and is planned to finish in 2021. This stage 
consists of two new buildings; psychiatry and somatic (approximately 45.000 m3 in total). 
Handover dates for these buildings are in 2019 and 2021, respectively (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2017a, 
pp. 5-7). The latter is connected to the existing infrastructure, while the former is a detached 
building. In addition, the project also includes demolition of existing hospital buildings, adaption 
to existing public infrastructure and energy installations (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2018).   
A pre-project was approved by the board for SiV on 23rd May 2014, followed by an approval from 
the board in Health South-East (Helse Sør-Øst) on 19th June 2016. Health South-East also 
approved a mandate on 10th March 2015. Contractor and consultant have been a part of establishing 
the pre-project and were contracted on an early stage in order to contribute with expertise to 
develop solutions. They have both committed to a completion cost and a progress plan 
(Tønsbergprosjektet, 2016, p. 6). The purpose of this phase was to establish a foundation to decide 
how to execute the Tønsberg project. After contractor and consultant had been contracted in June 
2016, they established a model and a cost estimate. This cost estimate turned out to be much higher 
than the cost frame for the project; which resulted in a quality assurance process to check whether 
the problem was with the new estimates or the original cost frame. The revised cost estimate was 
still 300 million NOK over the cost frame; which started a round of  cost-cutting measures, 
internally called Sprint 300 (p. 11).  
For this project, there are two groups of conditions; those decided by external and internal actors. 
The former conditions include health and safety requirements, the use of openBIM though all 
stages of the project, the “early-stage guide” from the Health Directory provides the basis for the 
project implementation and  making sure SiV meets the requirements to meet their patients’ needs. 
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The internal actors set conditions including the project budget, when the two buildings would be 
finished, the use of BREEAM NOR for environmental classification method (first aimed  at level 
Excellent, then reduced to Very Good) and the use of Lean, Last Planner, IPD, Integrated 
Concurrent Engineering (ICE), Target Value Design (TVD) and Choosing by Advantages (p. 12).  
Project result goals are to build faster, cheaper and better than similar (traditional) projects. 
Construction time is based on the average of similar projects (mainly hospital constructions in 
England). LEAN principals and prefabricated concrete construction, facade elements, modules for 
technical guides in corridors and bathrooms are elements used to reduce this time. They aim at 
reducing building costs by 10 % (compared to similar hospital projects) by using prefabrication 
and industrialized construction. During the detailed design phase, the team aims at discovering 
new ways to improve efficiency through these two methods in addition to Target Value Design. 
Choosing IPD as delivery model and early involvement from the contractor and sub-contractors 
has given the opportunity to a delivery model with a high level of maturity, while incentives help 
reduce costs. This in addition to standardization are central elements for cost reduction. The last 
result goal is to build better than similar projects by using IPD contract, industrialized construction 
methodology, aiming for zero injuries, having high environmental and energy requirements 
(Energy Label A and passive house). Digital collaboration and use of BIM is being used to support 
the design process and construction phase through colocation, digital processes and common data 
platform, 4D and 5D. LEAN principles guides the project performance in design, planning and 
construction process (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2016, pp. 16-19).   
The report for the preliminary project (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2016, p. 13), state that in order to 
achieve their goals they have chosen to establish common tools and references for everyone 
involved through an IPD contract, colocation and digital interaction. Furthermore, the contractor, 
Skanska, was found through a tendering process, which was designed to attract qualified 
companies. In addition, contractor and consultant group were chosen based on the right 
competence and capacity. IPD was chosen specifically in order to achieve the project goals of cost 
and time reduction. Activities in the preliminary project were conducted in order to support the 
project goals. To facilitate a good hospital care and efficient operation for SiV, TP has designed 
for a 60-year long lifetime for each building with flexible areas and structure to adapt to changing 
clinical needs. 
BuildingSmart International awarded Tønsberg project for having the best project in the category 
for Design Using Open Technology. TP have used open technology to encourage efficient 
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collaboration between the parties through a shared platform, where they have worked on an 
existing design software and developing a new software (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2017b).  
Basis for contract  
This project is the first to introduce an Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) model in a Norwegian 
context. The project organization consists of three parties; TP’s board, entrepreneur (Skanska) and 
a group of consultants (CURA). As consultants and main entrepreneur were selected for the 
project, they initially signed a Memorandum of Understanding (June 2016), as a document 
attachment to the contract, which showed a joint intention to use IPD as the delivery model for 
this project. Before IPD was chosen, the contractor signed a NS 8407, in addition to the 
Memorandum (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2015). They committed to conduct the project in accordance 
to specified costs. IPD was chosen in order to reach their goals to both reduce building costs and 
time, through close collaboration between the parties (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2016, p. 15). In addition 
to the three main parties, three technical sub-contractors have signed a mirrored IPD contract; 
Bravida, Haaland and Assemblin (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2018). Figure 14 shows how the different 
















When signing the Memorandum of understanding, the three parties (including main sub-
contractors) agreed to work towards implementing IPD in the project and creating a joint contract 
Figure 14: Multiparty agreement from Tønsberg Project (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2018, p. 22). 
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based on an IPD delivery model. In order to integrate IPD, representatives from the main parties, 
along with some of the main sub-contractors, traveled to California, USA, to learn how an IPD 
works and study an ongoing IPD project. With guidance from an American attorney with 
experience from IPD contacts, they set up an IPD contract customized to conform to Norwegian 
laws.  
Parties 
Project owner / Client 
Vestfold Hospital Trust (Sykehuset i Vestfold HF, SiV) is the project owner and client. Their 
executive body, Tønsberg project, is responsible for contract signing, planning and execution of 
the hospital construction (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2015).  
Main Contractor 
Skanska Norway Ltd is solving this task alongside Skanska Construction UK Ltd UK through a 
joint venture. Skanska is a world leading project development- and contracting company, with 
expertise within construction, development of commercial premises, residences and projects in 
public-private collaborations. They aim to become first choice when it comes to green projects 
based on their global environmental expertise. Today, they have 43.000 employees throughout 
Europe and USA (Skanska, 2017).  
Originally, a Design Build contract was assigned Skanska AS and Skanska UK, where the sub-
contractors Assemblin, Bravida and Haaland are a part of this contract. Estimated construction 
costs are 1.3 billion NOK (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2015).  
Designer/Consultant Group – CURA 
CURA is the name of the group of consultants for this project, which consists of; Multiconsult 
ASA, Hjellnes Consult AS, Erichsen & Horgen AS, LINK Arkitektur AS, Bølgeblikk Arkitekter 
AS and Henning Larsen Architects. CURA signed the contract in June 2016, which covers all 
consultant services in the project. This contract is worth approximately 200 million NOK. 
Together they deliver all consultancy services required in a complex public construction project, 
including engineering and architecture  (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2015). 
Economy 
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According to the preliminary project report  (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2016, pp. 20-21), Tønsberg 
Project has an estimated price of ca. 2.7 billion NOK. Figure 15 shows how project cost and risk 
have been allocated for the parties involved, including technical sub-contractors, according to the 
IPD contract and project structure. Cost estimate for this project was established in the preliminary 
project and is divided into responsibility and contract areas for execution. They further state that 
principals that are important for establishing this estimate include:  
- Joint agreement  with contractor, main sub-contractors and consultant group 
- All parties success depends on project result  
- Risk and reward is separated from all main actors 
- Cost reductions according to target price is split 50/50 between owner and parties  
- When exceeding target cost; first the IPD reserve is cut into, followed by profit, and then 











6.2. Organisational structure  
IPD was chosen as delivery model because it utilizes LEAN Construction as methodology, new 
technology (like BIM), and collaboration through relational contracts. Through this model, the 
different interest form client/owner, contractor and consultant group can be integrated in the same 
project. New technology also makes sure everyone can work on background material that is 
continually being updated. One of the main reasons for choosing an IPD are the incentives to work 
for a higher value for the hospital while focusing on lower costs. These relevant aspects of IPD are 
being utilized in TP  (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2016, p. 27): 
Figure 15 Cost and risk allocation according to IPD model (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2017a, p. 22) 
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- Relational contracts 
- Gathering around common goals  
- Early identification of shared risk 
- Early involvement of all key competences 
- Management is shared by all 
- Openness about costs 
- Use of Lean Construction methodology and tools 
- BIM- virtual design and construction 
- Colocation in Big Room 
 
Figure 16 shows how the project is organized; the project board leads the project while being 















IPD principals is a management group with participants from the three main parties; owner/client, 
consultant group and contractor. “The goal-oriented design, and eventually the construction, will 
Figure 16  Tønsberg project organizational chart (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2016, p. 27) 
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be carried out in an organization where the project is divided into cluster groups, assisted by core 
groups and consultancy groups” (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2016, p. 27). 
6.3. Timeline of events  
The timeline of events shows the milestones and project deliveries the project has gone through, 
at the time this thesis was written, see Figure 17. According to TP’s feasibility study report 
(Tønsbergprosjektet, 2016, p. 26), the feasibility study for this project was decided to be conducted 
by Health South-East in 2014. Here they decided to give the CEO the role of project owner while 
SiV became the legal owner. In accordance with the owner’s mandate, in March the following 
year, the project director, project organization and board started the project feasibility study. From 
there it took five months (March – July 2015) establishing the client organization, which consists 
of 20 people. These participants include “employees from SiV, project employees and employees 
































































































Figure 17 Timeline showing passed milestones and project deliveries 
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From December 2015 through January 2016, they worked on finding a contract strategy in addition 
to finding strategies in order to complete the project plan (like BIM, VDC, Big Room). The 
procurement process for consultant group, main contractor and sub-contractors started in the same 
period as they decided on what type of contract they wanted for the project. This process was 
finalized in June 2016. At this point, the contracted parties signed a Design Build contract with an 
incentive to go over to an IPD. SiV’s board approved detailed design and development in January 






Figure 18 shows the remaining milestones and deliveries the project is yet to complete. The first 
milestone for the project is in March 2019 when the Psychiatry building is to be handed over to 
the owner/client. After that the foundation work for the Somatic building will start in May 2019. 
The Somatic building is scheduled to be finished in March 2021, followed by demolition of two 
old hospital buildings before construction phase 7 will be completely done in July 2021 
(Tønsbergprosjektet, 2016, p. 29).  
 
6.4. Contracting process 
Tønsberg project started with defining the specification in the Sketch project (B3) in accordance 
with a Design Build. In this phase, they determined what and why they were going to build. Client 
organization was established during a time when this was not completely finished. The next stage, 
B4, was a decision point, based on the feasibility study containing the project delivery model, 
process, team etc, Hospital board approved the project and was given a go ahead, see Figure 17.   
It was unknown whether TP was going to use an IPD or a DB (NS8407) contract. Which project 











April 2021:  
Start-up 
demolotion, 





Figure 18: Timeline showing future milestones and project deliveries (Tønsbergprosjektet, 2016, p. 29) 
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several who opposed using the IPD, as it was considered an unknown model. It was only accepted 
by the controlling committee at the very last minute to proceed with using an IPD model. The 
process towards deciding on an IPD as a deliver model started when considering collaboration 
under the 6th building phase. Karl Oscar Sandvik (consultant) came to talk about quality assurance 
in June 2015, where he introduced the topic of an IPD thinking.  
Procurement process occurred in accordance with public procurement legislation. During the 
prequalification and assessment phase, participants were requested to send in information 
regarding their intensions to solve the problem as well as how they would carry out a project using 
an IPD. Measurable and evaluation criteria was set up to measure the actors experience with Lean, 
TVD and BIM tools, IPD, past projects, right mindset, ability to collaborate (weighted heavily) 
based on prior projects, background checks and interviews. 
There were ten offers in the consultant group including some of the largest Norwegian firms, in 
addition to German, Spanish and Chilean firms. For the contractors there were three companies 
competing against each other: Skanska AS, Hent AS and MT Hagar AS. A Danish company had 
to pull out of the process when they heard about the shared responsibility, because they did not 
have support from Copenhagen. In this group, Hent was the most positive towards working with 
an IPD. 
When evaluating the different companies’ measurable criteria, they weighted 20% on price, 40% 
on task understanding and how they intended to conduct an IPD and the last 40% were on 
competence. The consultant had an hourly price, while the contractor had a square meter price and 
a mark-up. Both groups were given a task to examine a BIM model, and then give a price.  
Selection of consultant and contractor occurred, after the owner’s representative was in place, in 
June 2016, yet there was no official IPD contract, instead they were given a letter of intent on 
behalf of the owner and a NS8401 (standard contract between owner and consultants/architect) 
and NS8407 (DB contract for contractor). This letter was a promise to enter, in conjunction with 
both parties, into an IPD contract. The contracting process consisted of CURA, Skanska and SiV 
in addition to their respective lawyers, where they started a process of adaption to contracting rules 
for the IPD. SiV has not removed anything other than medical-technical equipment and some ICT. 
Risk-reward members, Bravida, Haaland and Assemblin, have mirrored IPD contracts to the 
primary IPD contract. 
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In April 2016, they got Howard Ashcraft in for a conference/seminar. All those in the contract 
negotiations and the tender team (who helped write the tender) were involved. There was a 
mismatch in some areas when starting up, where key persons were not involved enough in the 
tender teams. Documenting the contracting relationship took time, which lasted around seven 
months, from August 2016 to March 2017. There was also a three-month strike in this period. 
With the contractor, they had to differentiate between two offers and give them feedback on topics 
they could improve. However, they were not able to see whether it was better or not than the others. 
All offers were very similar, however, there were small differences, like individuals’ competence. 
Skanska had good details about IPD, initiation and completion, so did the consultants who had 
good competence and experience. Hent, were good at Lean development and gave good 
information. From the contracting process, there was one access request from the company rated 
second best among the consultants. 
 
  
   
87 
7. Discussion 
The following chapter discusses the empirical findings in relation to the theoretical framework, 
consisting of the applicable literature and theories, presented earlier in the thesis. The discussion 
aims to explain the results, examine their significance the theoretical importance in relation to the 
findings and outline and identify any new research questions or areas for future research that could 
be suggested.  
7.1. Proposition 1 
When addressing proposition one: IPD provides less scope for sub-optimisation and opportunistic 
behaviour between companies in the value chain.  
However, one representative for the owner (SiV) states that opportunism occurs because: 
“the users are in one way trying to maximise their part and the contractors are trying to 
minimise it” 
Representatives for the contractor also reveals that there are two sets of users, the service and 
clinicians. Her it is the service department that is the dominant factor. A good example from 
another representative for the contractor explains the problem as: 
“The customer wants something evaluated and then you spend two days, then you show 
him, and he says; its good but it’s too expensive, I don’t  want it! Now you have lost two 
days considering alternative plans, scenarios and materials. You can claim compensation 
but it’s difficult, while in a DB you would demand payment before taking this type of job.”  
They further blame the designer’s involvement as they have: 
“set up a bad precedence in terms of consulting with the owner. The owner has a different 
agenda from what the project has, even though they have their own representatives. It 
doesn’t stop them from asking for more.”  
These views were corroborated by the representatives for the owner and technical consultants. The 
findings also show that all participants interviewed, bar one, had expressed no opportunistic 
behaviour in the setting up of the contract. One informant, emphasised that some element of 
opportunistic behaviour could be attributed to the contractor who priced up the project and “held 
costs internally”. However, through triangulation, this statement was found to be contextual, as 
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the project was first priced up first as a DB and then changed to a IPD project. These aspects will 
be discussed later in a section on contextual factors.  
Other findings from individual participants expressed that: “some people were not doing their job” 
and claimed that they had to intervene in a process to give advice and opinion which allowed his 
company to make “changes and reduce the cost. 
The picture painted by both the representatives for the contractor, express opportunistic behaviour 
outside the IPD. They state that: 
“sub- optimization, from DB, is it all gone when it comes to IPD. However, there is 
opportunism from the guys who get paid a fixed price (per item) for their work. They are 
good at negotiating money and demands, proper business people. Otherwise, in the rest of 
the project, it would be visible and there is no room for it in this project. The IPD comes 
into force and we work closely together.”  
“The problem also lies by them sticking in variation messages” 
A point that did emerge from the findings was that there might be some elements of sub-
optimisation and opportunistic behaviour between companies in the value chain based on past 
behaviour that is inherent in traditional contracts, such as DB.  
 
According to the consultant’s informant: 
 
“It takes time and cannot occur overnight because of the more silo thinking, at least on the 
design side. Designers think more about own work; structural and electro think instead of 
doing their work. Instead of thinking about the entirety and looking at the interfaces and 
solving them for the next man tasks.”  
Yet according to the representative for the owner: 
 
“People are still affected by their past experience. Whenever someone recognizes a similar 
situation to what they have dealt with before, it is easy to suggest the same method to solve 
the issue”  
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Whereas all representatives for the contractor argued that some of the reasons for the siloed 
mentality is due to “not everyone understands what it means to work in a IPD” that it depends on 
the people.  
One representative said even though “all conditions are right here for people to work together and 
there is no definitive answer to that…….” He further adds that “situations are handled differently 
because it has to do with people. Unwanted situations can be handled if you're a bit open, you'll 
find a solution,” yet he reflects that “this is not perfect in other projects either.”  
Another suggested that: 
 
“IPD works best with those who have less experience of alternative delivery models as 
they don’t have egos that make them feel that they are the most important person on the 
project.” Another added that “people like to revert back to what they know” 
Whereas one representative for the owner’s states that  
“IPD boils down to people and not everyone can work in the environment. You need people 
who are flexible, who want to cooperate but also want to cooperate to make it work.”  
In addition, the representatives for both the owner and contractor expressed awareness of the past 
behaviours of the consultants. Both suggested that blame could be pointed to the consultants 
because some of them were so used to working in a DB environment and its  
 




“It’s the way we are organized that people still think this part is just mine and everything 
else is on the periphery. This is not our goal.” “Often parties do not want to build 
something that is not a part of their budget. They think they should get additional money 
for that. They then have to be reminded that their budget is not the contract, here it is the 
function”  
 
However, some suggest that: 
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“Consultants have a different focus, because they work in a completely different market on 
a daily basis.” “In a DB, consultants are used to creating more work for themselves based 
on volume of hours. In the IPD the consultants get a fixed price to get the job done, not per 
hour, which means they will have an incentive to deliver in less hours to earn more money.” 
The reason for this type of behaviour could be linked to individual bonuses that would be linked 
up to the volume of hours generated during a project, so it depends on what drives a person. 
However, one informant for the owners, said that: 
“I think it’s the IPD model that benefits the owners, however I hope the consultants find it 
easier to earn money in this model than in a fixed price (traditional) model”. 
According to one of the informants the architects are not aligned with the goals of the project 
because they have an agenda.  
“they will leave in the summer and all they think about is their portfolio, they are not 
aligned. Individually there are too many agendas”  
This was verified by the representative for the consultants who said that 
“the architect would rather choose a solution that they think looks good and maybe is a 
bit more expensive.”  
This was also verified by a representative for the contractor who stated that  
“Decision making and how decisions are brought to the table is a challenge. Lean 
management techniques do not work for designers. Designers don’t like to be pigeonholed, 
it’s a different style of management and you disturb peoples remit which is really 
confusing.”  
This together would imply that some of the architects have an incentive to be very creative and 
put in the most aesthetically pleasing features into the build in order to enhance their reputation. 
However, this statement must be seen in relation to the differences of interest, in other words the 
motives in the project. The differences could be seen between the consultants and contractors in 
the project. Representatives for the contractors suggests that: 
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“When we are working together, we think differently in different phases of project. We 
have different goals in implementation than in the pre-project phase.” “There is a disparity 
between the two cultures, one in the project team and one in design.” 
“We are not so much opposites as we are relatively united.” “The designers are not sat in 
parity with us, because we don’t have the same agenda. Constructors are used to working 
with compliance, costs and time whereas designers are not used to thinking so much about 
that we have to point it out”  
However, they also argued that the reason for this was perhaps because: 
“The designers, because of familiarity, still think they need to consult with the hospital”  
And  
“collaboration between the constructor and those in the project team vary slightly from 
person to person”  
 
It was pointed out that the causes for these differences is the principle of joint decision making 
which creates the flat management structure. As a result, a hidden effect in IPD is the change of 
power and game rules in the project. As representatives for the contractor point out:  
“In a DB as a contractor, we would have greater ability or impact in safeguarding our 
interests and also claim additional payment for waiting and delays” in addition “We would 
always be looking for whose fault it was and then try and notify the architect or the advisory 
builder.” 
“In a DB it’s easier to be less flexible in the contract, because in a IPD you solve conflicts 
as you go, and you don’t position yourself with emails and letters towards the end of the 
build and then have lawyers arguing for months.”  
Another point that emerges is that: 
“IPD is different it allows for equal partners, its fast to lose respect for one another, 
control people and have power in a DB”, “you don't own the designers anymore” “where 
you would control the engineering and designers”, “so you can't influence them in quite 
the same way” “Now it feels like we are all betting on the same horse……. we are two 




However, one representative for the contractors was critical to having a democracy and stated that 
in a traditional project “I would have been the planning specialist here”. and that the power should 
be allowed to return to “the building contractors who are good at finding solutions at the right 
price”. However, a consultant expressed the feeling that in the democracy  
“There are different views, many more parties, many people, many who have opinions. It’s 
a flat organization where the strongest party wins here, and everyone has their good 
arguments.” 
However, in reflection he states that there are “Improvements in the process.” 
While most participant expressed that there has been an issue with decision making and unclear 
roles when there has been a flat management team. Comments such as: 
“we have this IPD contract and we should have a democracy…… I think that one must 
keep some areas of responsibility….and we have let it flow a bit ……and this has been a 
challenge”  
However, these comments were considered contextual due to the forming of a new IPD contract 
in Norway and the abrupt nature of events which caused a number of knock on effects that 
purported the participants views on decision making in the project and will be discussed later in 
subsection, contextual factors. 
Yet some citations were undetermined, as to their contextual or part of nature of IPD, for example 
the production department felt that: 
“internally the production meetings have become design meetings” and the challenges in 
the IPD were in “planning the day and making decisions about what to do”. 
Another undetermined comment expressed by the representative for the technical consultants was: 
“normally we go through several rounds to get to the solution with the builder but once we 
get the nod, then it’s okay. But here there will be a new round afterwards. It's the biggest 
challenge here I've seen”.  
The data reveals that there is less opportunistic behaviour in the project the majority of 
interviewees felt that the primary and supporting key members are aligned in the IPD. Examples 
suggest that:  
   
93 
“Nobody tried to sub-optimize.” “Compared to traditional projects, all the way from the 
start, the parties involved have played less games, especially the ones who were involved 
in creating the contract”  
In addition, the majority of the respondents point out that one of the reasons is due to the shared 
risk and reward because it: 
“removes conflict so that you have a common goal which means everyone has a win, win 
situation and there is “less opportunity, because it affects peoples profits.” Furthermore, 
“there is transparency” 
Whereas representatives for the owner states that: 
“IPD requires trust” and if the “contractor lost rights to be compensated for errors in 
design, all bear the extra cost” in addition there is “Low risk as all can lose profit but it 
never goes less than in zero, so you are assured your costs regardless”  
However, co-location was not mentioned as a theme to hinder opportunism but rather as a benefit 
to resolve or discuss issues instantly, which could be seen as a mechanism for hindering sub-
opportunistic behaviour. 
Sub-optimisation and opportunistic behaviour is inherent when two or more parties enter into a 
contract. When looking at the findings it is important to identify if less of this behaviour is 
apparent.  
The findings show, from those interviewed, that opportunistic behaviour was not evident in the 
project. The disposition of the contract on risk from Jon Gresseth (2016) a lawyer who assessed 
the differences between the IPD and DB contract also contributes evidence to this statement. 
However, his assessment does shed light on how the owner takes on more risk in being liable for 
all costs in the project after the profit pot is used up and also shifts the responsibility for delays 
over to the contractor.  
At its roots, Principal Agent (PA) theory by Eisenhardt Eisenhardt (1989) is somewhat consistent 
with proposition one. The contract with reduced liability, shared risk and reward and joint project 
control and decision-making, limit the problems that normally would arise through risk aversion, 
opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry between the parties. In IPD, the owner’s 
involvement and shared risk and reward helps to guard against moral hazard, and also relationships 
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between companies in the value chain are in held in balance through transparency, thus reducing 
opportunistic behaviour, such as adverse selection which is consistent with the theory. However, 
this is under the condition that all of those in the value chain are inside the IPD framework.  
On the other hand, hold-up problems described by the theory from Schieg (2008) are a topic for 
discussion. On one hand hold up can be solved with a very well detailed contract. As the details 
of the IPD contract are not fully known, it is unknown if the IPD contract could be renegotiated 
once signed. On the other hand, in this project an option contract was used, so the problem of hold-
ups would not happen between the owner and those in the IPD, however this does not account for 
contracts between IPD members and outside subcontractors.  
The empirical findings are also broadly consistent with transaction cost theory by Williamson 
(1979).  Evidence shows that trust is a feature that arises when companies collaborate within the 
IPD, this concurs with the theory based on Schieg (2008) and Lloyd-Walker and Walker (2015). 
However, trust can indirectly affect the transaction costs because of the need or lack of information 
needed as a result of the element of trust between the parties. Thus, because of the existence of 
trust, there is less need for verification of their behaviour, and the searching, monitoring and of 
information exchange is reduced, leading to lower transaction costs. 
The findings are also consistent with game theory as they show that participants in the case study 
choose to cooperate as they understand the costs and benefits of cooperating rather than competing.  
When we examine the incentives of those in the value chain, we see that the owner (SiV) has the 
incentive to make the project a success by adding value and optimising the building process, in 
other words is incentivised to get best value for the money. The contractors, engineers and architect 
all have the incentive to work together from the shared risk and reward. Their incentive to work 
together is also increased from the opportunity to gain more profit, through the shared pot, from 
finding better solutions that increase value and lower costs and through executing the building 
project ahead of schedule.  
All are incentivised under shared risk and reward for the build to be a success. It is the incentives 
for the people to work together and the attributes of the IPD that interact to bring about an outcome 
(the build). 
In critical realist terms, the incentives are the mechanisms which could be seen as the micro-macro 
mechanisms.  
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Yet macro-micro mechanisms can be attributed to IPD, lean philosophy and lean tools. Again, it 
is a matter for debate, the effect of these mechanisms as they are often unseen and hidden. Another 
point for debate is the measure of the effects that monetary and non-monetary incentives have in 
making the individuals in the project less likely to be suboptimal. These non-monetary incentives 
are things unseen like trust, praise, reputation, opportunity to use your skills, ect, however these 
might be seen as minor as all individuals need to make money in the project. In order to identify 
elements of the effective organisation of work, relational coordination theory was applied by Mary 
parker Follett. 
Relational coordination 
In terms of relational coordination the emperical results were collected, from a combination of 
eleven participant asked in the interview plus fourteen of those asked in the surveyand combined 
to make a total of 25 respondants. The individual results from relation coordination theory showed, 
that in all the seven areas sixty percent of particpants were either in agreement or total agreement 
with the teams performance, see appendix 13.  
Figure 19 shows that the results reveal a high degree of mutual respect among members in the IPD 
environment. Even when IPD members did not agree on a problem or solution, they still felt 
respected and able to express different viewpoints regardless of their role.  
Figure 19 Relational Coordination (RC), total results from interviews and surveys 
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A much greater challenge was communication between the participants, in its timing, accuracy 
and its ability to solve problems. In addition, relationships were somewhat fragmented through the 
sharing of a common goals. However less problematic was the frequency of the information and 
sharing of knowledge.  
When examining the results in relation to collaboration theory by Lloyd-Walker and Walker 
(2015) suggests that alignment of objectives in a project can be measured through three levels: 
cooperation (low to medium goal alignment), collaboration (medium to high goal alignment) and 
coalescing (high to very high goal alignment).  
The scale used in relational coordination (-2 to +2) combined with the theory on coordination from 
Lloyd-Walker and Walker (2015), mentioned above, a scale was created, see Figure 20. The survey 
scale was also attached to these levels in order to express a numerical format. 
The results from relational coordination showed a rating of 0.5 on the level of goal alignment in 
the project. When applied, using the scale, the participants in the IPD are co-operating. This 
however depends where one places the level between cooperation, collaboration and coalescing. 
On the hand one could argue that goal alignment is not the best measure of team-work in a project 
because you can have goal misalignment and still collaborate in a project. If one takes the results 
based on the relationships in the project, that is the (shared goals, shared knowledge and mutual 
respect), then a different picture emerges. Shared knowledge and trust are both quite high at 1 and 
1.5 and one could argue that a high level of trust shows that high level of collaboration is occurring 
in the project.  
In addition, the results are deeply affected by the contextual problems in the project. Furthermore, 
a total of twenty-five respondents participated which is perhaps not completely representative of 
all the primary and supporting members in the IPD.  
Figure 20  Cooperation, collaboration and coalescing scale, adapted from Lloyd-Walker and Walker (2015) 
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The results from the interviews discussed each participants project goal . From the 13 participants 
interviewed, 10 of the interviewees addressed a project goals. 5 out of the 10 talked about customer 
value and 6 out of the 10 talked about collaboration as the two most commonly highlighted project 
goals. When it came to the projects documented goals 7 mentioned zero injuries, building cheaper 
and faster than similar projects. In addition, some mention their own goals for their area and, 
building without paper, prefabrication and using tools.  The results also reflect well in what people 
were saying in the survey.  
The theoretical works by Mary Parker Follett on relational coordination theory (Gittell, 2011) can 
be used to identify elements of “effective work organisations” is somewhat shown in the empirical 
results.  
The results from both the interview and survey results highlight some problem with goal 
alignment. Here we see the effects of suppressing opportunism, which seems to mask itself in other 
forms, shown by the participants in the project. Both Williamson (1979) and Eisenhardt (1989) 
talk about opportunism and it is here that we see its accompanying frailties in motive and reason.  
Opportunism in a way boils down to motive or intent, which the respondents have exhibited 
through old style behaviour of being wary of one another and from old habits of self-interest for 
example the behaviour of stating this is just my work and this is your work, which has created a 
certain degree of distrust between the participants. This is consistent with Lewicki et al. (2006), 
who defines distrust as “confident negative expectation regarding another’s conduct” and stated in 
the literature by Lloyd-Walker and Walker (2015) as integrity (matching rhetoric with actions) and 
the trustworthiness of the other party.  
The benefits of relational coordination are perhaps unique to this case study and its participants 
for greater reflection on group effectivity but also as a tool to improve performance. The data 
collected is an indication of the dynamic and the effectivity, in a point of time and thus should be 




The data gathered suggested that no opportunistic behaviour occurred during the setting up of the 
contract, however not all details of the contract are known.  
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Some form of opportunistic behaviour was mentioned concerning the users in the project however 
no data was available from the users, in other words the clinicians and the service department 
which is a weakness in this study. However nearly all participants suggest that some type of 
opportunistic behaviour, in the form of regressed, inherited siloed mentality or differences of 
interest in the project. The hidden or unseen reasons for these behaviours were suggested were due 
to a flatter structure because power shifted, and game rules changed. The participants have had to 
change their roles and responsibilities towards a more democratic structure whereby shared risk 
and reward and transparency are named as having the largest influences on hindering opportunistic 
and sub-opportunistic behaviour in the value chain. The results also show that there is less 
opportunistic behaviour between the primary and key supporting players in the IPD model, 
however it requires the right people in order for this model to work fully. In addition, there are 
several contextual factors that have occurred as a result of the creation of the IPD contract in 
Norway, which have affected how interviewees responded.  
The results from relational coordination, show that on all seven aspects of coordination they had 
between 0.5 to 1.5 in value. The areas with low values were in the area of communication in 
accuracy, timeliness and problem solving. The other area affected was relationships of shared 
goals. The scale used in relational coordination (-2 to +2) combined with the theory on 
coordination from Lloyd-Walker and Walker (2015), that a scale could be created. The results, 
from the survey and the interviews showed that based on this scale the participants in the project 
were in fact cooperating. In was in line with the results from the interviews where there was not 
consensus in the projects goal.  
However, the data gathered shows that as only 14 participants responded to the survey which 
makes it a weakness of the study.  
In relation to critical realism the mechanisms here for less opportunistic behaviour in the project 
is linked to the underlying incentives that lie in swapping solutions, finishing the project ahead of 
schedule and the common profit pot. It is these mechanisms that align the interests of those in the 
project with the projects goals. There is less incentive to optimise on behalf of one’s own interest. 
In addition, other minor mechanisms play a part, which are the people in the project who are open 
to change, that leads to them accept to work in this project, coupled with the lean philosophy the 
lean tools and IPD other principals all help to that aligns the participants interests It is this 
combination of these factors that creates less scope for sub-optimising and opportunistic behaviour 
in the value chain. In conclusion proposition 1 has been somewhat verified. 
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7.2. Proposition 2 
The second proposition argues that: IPD provides better conditions for unified solutions 
(swapping) than traditional contracts. 
 
IPD encourage parties to agree on unified solutions to find the best (and cheapest) solution for the 
project as a whole. Through reduction in project costs, all parties increase their profit. In order to 
find these solutions one party must increase their costs for another party to save (more) money for 
the project. Collaboration is important, to achieve unified solutions, and parties need to be aware 
of the self-interest it entails. Representatives for the technical consultants describe this along with 
one of the dilemmas of working towards a unified solution:  
 
“The biggest dilemma I experience is, on the consultant’s side we are being given extra 
work to make it all better. If we spend 40 hours to change a solution, then it may save, let's 
say it costs 40,000 to change the design, so the project saves 100,000. Is it smart? Yes, 
although I have spent 40 hours over budget. Those who save 100,000 at the other end are 
bragging because they have saved so much money, however we share the winnings with 
those who save. So, economically we have a self-interest in it. It works, but it leads to quite 
a big overrun on engineering.”  
 
Here, the dilemma is having one party spend more money in one area in order to save money for 
another party, in doing so saving money for the project as a whole, thus providing a larger profit 
for everyone. Another point that emerges is that unified solutions does work in this project, 
however, should not necessarily be used in all circumstances: 
 
“Is it correct to use 20,000 to save 40,000? Mostly always. Is it correct to use 19,000 to 
save 21,000? No. We have done many such exercises; we would never have done it in 
another form of contract. So it works.” 
 
The findings also show that collaboration as a vital part of unified solutions. They argue that this 




“Now in an IPD we sit down with the contractor and choose a solution that provides 
rational operation whereas in a DB we design the tender but may not continue in the 
implementation phase. This is up to the total contractor to decide.”  
 
The findings show that representatives for the technical contractor described a situation where two 
sub-contractors agree on a solution that is more expensive for one party in order to save money for 
the other party thus confirming that unified solutions occur in this project when stating: “One party 
transferred money to another for additional cost of purchase”. A representative for the contractor 
confirms this statement and highlights the shared profit (for the whole project) in an example where 
two parties have agreed on a solution: 
 
“It is not only that the technical trades are saving money while the contractors are losing 
money, but it’s a shared thing.”  
 
The picture painted by representatives for the owner confirms that the parties involved in the IPD 
are working together towards finding unified solutions for the project:   
 
“We need to think about what saves money especially in design (subcontract vs 
consultants). For example, we sat together and talked about technique regarding the 
windows, where we now are at detail-level and can most likely stop the design and the 
supplier can do the rest. If this had been a traditional model, the consultant would not stop 
and give away hours (especially if they would have had an hour based contract)” 
 
They further highlight the openness that exist between the parties, while adding to the statement 
that they all come together to find good solutions instead of addressing the fault to a single party:   
 
“Whenever we discover deviations after checking the quality of what has been done, we all 
come together to work towards finding the best possible solutions for these deviations. This 
openness makes sure no one is playing any games, trying to hide anything or point fingers 
at others to figure out who is at fault.” 
 
However, they also argue that finding unified solutions may not be that straight forward:  
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“It’s not just if A increases costs at a lower amount than B reduces costs, that will save 
money for the project, because the you have to look at the whole picture. Administration 
costs, for example, varies between companies and have to be taken into consideration when 
calculating profitability”  
 
Whatever deals parties within the IPD makes to save money, the benefits from this cost reduction 
has to be shared with the others, to increase the overall profit:  
“If players can make savings through subcontracts, e.g. buying parts cheaper so it benefits 
the IPD because of transparency. E.g., some have 10% saving below budget, which they 
believe they could keep. However, it is not like this here.” 
Another representative talks about the challenge the project faces through different mindsets for 
different parties. Their incentives are not the same and sometimes conflicting. When discussing 
opportunism and incentives he states that the owner wants to include everything in the project 
while the others want lower cost (to increase their profit). 
 
Unified solutions are supported by colocation. The picture painted by representatives for the 
technical consultants consists of certain features like colocation, has worked well to strengthen the 
relationship between the trades:  
 
“As now we have laid a completely flat structure, here all are in the same room, everyone 
can talk to everyone and there are shortcuts, no form of formalism and full transparency 
however in doing so we are a little vulnerable, in showing our weaknesses as we cannot 
hide.”   
 
The findings also show that “remote designing has its weaknesses, while sitting co-localized makes 
the most of change regime”. They further state that this provides “a shorter way to unified 
solution”. 
 
However, representatives for the contractor, suggest that colocation only works if people are not 
too busy with all the other things, for example if you “ask the architect, he is so involved in other 




According to representatives for the owner, colocation is crucial in an IPD and suggest that there 
is room for improvement on this issue when stating: 
 
“It is impossible to carry out an IPD without a shared location and it is important to 
consider the structure of the shared location. This could be improved in this project (or 
improved for the next one). 
 
Details were provided of a different working environment that through colocation “Bad news come 
up early because we are so close to each other and no one will get told off. People forget what 
company they are working for”. This shows that the company gets more holistic because they often 
forget who they work for and begin to see one organization. This is also in line with Koskela who 
states that several organizations need to break down barriers between organizations involved in 
the build. 
 
It emerges from the interviews that it is “most rewarding by sitting close”. While adding that, the 
benefit of sitting close is that issues are resolved faster and without unnecessary misunderstandings 
or hidden agendas: 
 
“It is a lot easier to go and talk to someone about a problem than to send an email about 
the issue. Emails can be misunderstood and issues gets resolved a lot quicker when you 
bring them up and discuss them in person. That does not mean that we are being naïve and 
think that being friends solves problems, we are in a contract that needs respect and 
discussions about the case. There is no hidden agenda”.  
 
The findings also show that IPD-methodology (of principals) support unified solutions. Through 
interviews with representatives for the owner, one participant argues that this project is doing very 
well because of the IPD methodology when expressing that:  
 
“The project is economically very good and the IPD method is a lot of the reason, and 
reducing the interfaces between the players”. 
 
Another point that emerges is that the IPD method forces people to change their behaviour in order 
to benefit the project:  
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“This is a cooperation project with an IPD agreement and one has to act differently, we 
try and give and take to oil the process. For example we have change messages, which is 
the same on other projects […] if we disagree then it is sent up, we try and be flexible 
because it has a mirroring effect”. 
 
Representatives for the contractor highlights having the same goal for all parties involved. They 
argue that everyone needs to understand the IPD methodology in order to work together to find 
unified solutions: 
 
“You need to have everyone on board otherwise people will constantly be referring to the 
contract which will disconnect from the whole purpose. People need to understand that the 
benefit of using the money and at the same time finding solutions”. 
 
Findings also show that many argue that shared risk and rewards support unified solutions. This 
has already been discussed in proposition one, and will not be further addressed in this proposition.  
The empirical findings are consistent with transaction cost theory by Williamson (1979). 
According to the evidence gathered there are transaction costs that occur by IPD party members 
coming together to generate value through swapping solutions. The parties need to be in agreement 
in order to create the swap. Yet, before the parties can negotiate about how to swap, one party must 
incur transaction costs, in other words the cost of changing and decision making about a solution.  
These transaction costs cause a severe problem if a mismatch occurs between the parties’ budgets 
and the magnitude of the transaction costs. In particular, if one party has low transaction costs yet 
has contributed to lowering the total project cost they feel that their actions are rewarded unfairly 
in relation to the other party who incurred higher transaction costs and still gets a share of the total 
profit. Yet the empirical finding show that opportunistic behaviour is reduced by the sharing of 
risk and reward which transfers these costs to all participants in the project. IPD is a game changer 
as there is less incentives for the actors in the project to be opportunistic. 
In terms of critical realism, the proposition has structures such as: the IPD and meeting 
participants. The specific condition is that a decision needs to be made while considering 
alternative solutions. The mechanism is new opportunities are only discovered when an 
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understanding of the project has matured enough through working with the details and when there 
are no structural restrictions. This leads to the event which is the swapping of solutions. 
In alternative contracts the mechanism for getting a solution is often not apparent as the design is 
not allowed to mature. In addition, IPD incentivises the participants through shared goals, shared 
reward etc. 
Conclusion: 
The data gathered regarding unified solutions shows that agreements occur on swapping solutions, 
but there is some question about when a swap of a solution is worthwhile. This is explained as not 
appropriate if the costs of swapping do not result in savings for the project. A solution is only 
swapped when the transaction cost of swapping the solution is lower than the cost of entering into 
the transaction. The transaction cost is described as the cost of searching and decision making. 
This cost results in one party carrying the cost from their budgeted cost, in other words someone 
has to give up earnings to reduce project costs. Even though this cost is borne by the whole project 
the party with the highest transaction cost will still feel the cost of less profit.  
The incentive for the participants to reach a solution is again driven from the desire to increase 
their profits, through the shared pot, by finding better solutions that increase value and lower costs. 
Whenever the project increases its profit, all IPD parties achieve a higher profit. Redesigning of 
solutions occurs through colocation which empowers the participants and shortens the way to 
unified solutions. IPD is a game changer as there is less incentives for the actors in the project to 
be opportunistic. 
In terms of critical realism, the mechanism here is that new opportunities are discovered only when 
an understanding of the project has matured enough through working with the details and when 
there are no structural restrictions. Proposition two has been verified. 
 
7.3. Proposition 3 
Proposition three proposes that: IPD safeguards quality and customer value in a better way than 
alternative implementation models while maintaining constructability 
As already mentioned in proposition one, joint decision-making leads to a flatter structure, which 
promote democracy. However, some could argue that this is causing waste. As one representative 
for the consultants describes a challenge connected to decision making in the project:  
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“We have unclear lines as to who is making decisions, therefore we can we spend a lot of 
time discussing solutions, then someone else will say, no” 
Representatives for the technical consultants describe another issue connected to democracy, 
where they state that there are “too many participants in the project meeting to handle details”. In 
addition, they also give an example of waste in the process: “a decision is made orally, however it 
is difficult to follow up because of an unclear organizational structure”. They carry on with a good 
example:  
 
“Normally we go through several rounds to get to the solution with the builder but once 
we get the nod, then it’s okay. But here there will be a new round afterwards. It's the biggest 
challenge here I've seen. For example: the architect did not like a solution and suggested 
that pipes should be put on the outside of a wall instead of inbuilt into the wall, but now 
they have dropped their solution because of noise requirements.”  
 
However, representatives for the consultant felt that iterations were “a part of the process in design 
with ideas” and “we spend most time on administrating our hours”. Another reason that might 
hinder quality is contextual problems. The findings also show that trying out too many new 
systems had a negative effect because of accustomization problems: 
 
“here we are not prepared, there is a lot of things to get used to, no time to think, there is 
pressure to go onto the next task and we don’t even understand the task”  
 
The statement about time pressure in decision-making is also supported by representatives for the 
technical consultants, where it is stated “deadlines are so short that we cannot use a standard 
procedure and know you build a basis for making a decision”. While a representative for the 
contractor emphasise the challenge of working with uncertainties in the project:  
 
“The difference between an IPD and DB is the scope, delivery and quality because it is 
often very clear what to deliver, either function or half described product. Here it is 
challenging, you don’t know where that list is.” 
 
Nevertheless, these comments were considered contextual as the project was first priced up as a 
DB and inherited a sketch design before becoming an IPD. In addition, the forming of a new IPD 
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contract incorporated a lot of new systems and processes that the project was obliged to use. This 
has had a number of knock on effects that purported the participants’ views on working in the 
project and will be discussed later in subsection, contextual factors. 
The data gathered also shows that there were several examples of how IPD safeguards quality and 
maintain constructability. Representatives for the contractor argue that decreased risk for the 
parties involved in an IPD safeguards value for the customer:  
 
“Here the owner can offload risk. The contractor has less risk, so you might get better 
value as there is no chance of losing money and the owner gets a greater chance to 
influence the design with his lump of money.” 
 
The findings also show that a traditional method does not safeguard quality and customer value in 
the same way as an IPD: 
 
“The building itself is tricky and is more complicated than one thinks, because you need to 
account for people who might be out of control so you need something special, it is these 
details that can be underestimated.” 
 
While representatives for the technical contractors supports that argument and adds that 
collaboration with the owner safeguards quality: 
 
“We still choose the cheapest components because of the budget. We talk about higher 
quality with the owner which we wouldn't do in another type of contract”  
 
The picture painted by these informants is confirmed by representatives for the owner. They add 
that customer value is assured through incentives where choosing an expensive option would 
directly affect the parties’ profit:   
 
“In design we give alternatives to the owner, show the offers, it’s what you do in a design 
process before procurement. There must be a good reason to choose an expensive option. 
We could end up paying the difference in cost. It is a requirement for the hospital to be fast 
in making a decision as they have other projects ongoing where you are number two.”  
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Another point that emerges is that an IPD contract is an  
“Advantage for the owner, because the contractor help consultants stop overdesigning. 
When handing the design over to the contractor at an early stage, they can discover errors 
early”.  
One informant add that quality was better as  
 
“Projects are risks, from the early plan, which you learn from as you go along. The project 
could be delayed by three months, but there would be no penalties. This contract allows 
you room to manoeuvre; owner risk is only on ground conditions. E.g. we started digging 
four months early to search for cables; if we would have waited then it would have cost a 
fortune for the customer”. 
 
This is due to, as suggested in the proposition, arguments that there is a shift from self-interest to 
group interest, related to shared risk and reward.  
 
When answering questions about customer value, some participants mentioned colocation as an 
important reason. Colocation creates and safeguards quality, where the owner’s presence 
throughout the whole process enforces this.. See section on colocation in proposition 2.  
 
Another point that emerges is that participants from different parties seem to agree that customer 
value is an essential part of the project goal. A representative from the contractor, when asked 
about the project goal, states, “The customer value is in the centre”. This statement is confirmed 
by a representative for the owner when stating that the “goal of IPD is to spend more time on what 
creates value”. He further adds that this time cannot be spent “on emails or defending ourselves 
by pushing responsibility to others, like traditional conflicts”. 
  
Yet others believe that it is tailoring to the users that safeguards quality. A representative for the 
contractor states  
“Everything is tailored, adapted, with large impact from the users. Perhaps this gives the 
most value for the hospital’s money. Which is a bit contrary to the goal of the project.” 
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The data gathered demonstrates that the contract is another reason that secures quality. A statement 
from representatives for the consultant was that they choose the cheapest product that satisfies all 
requirements from the contract when stating: 
“The quality is not clearly defined but we pick the cheapest product that satisfies all the 
requirements, but if owner wants a specific product, then he pays for its, but the users 
(service division) believe they can get what they want. It has been resource demanding. We 
have fixed it now and have decided to not ask them all the time what they think just as far 
as it is within the parameters of the contract” 
The findings also confirm the proposition in regards to maintaining constructability is an important 
aspect in cooperation and IPD. While this is an important aspect, participants for the contractor 
describe the challenges of getting constructability into solutions when stating:  
“In a DB, we control the design. There is a challenge, because as you want to get 
buildability into those solutions, the cooperation about what we are going to build, training 
is needed to get it done properly in how we will work together and know what to draw. Yes, 
we have a drawn pre-project however there is a lot that needs to be solved, for example 
deciding whether to use cheap vs expensive solutions and when you are new to each other”  
Further findings confirm that the contract is an important aspect of safeguarding quality. It emerges 
that this is done through choosing products based on Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) values:  
“Quality for owner lies within products’ LLC values. You strive to select products and 
equipment that result in the lowest possible LCC for the hospital, for a duration of 50 years. 
However there is a discussion: E.g. if a product satisfies requirements, is compliant, and 
the second product satisfies requirements but has better LCC values and is more expensive. 
Is that a change if you are told that you must use this product? Or is that something you 
should expect?”  
According to representatives for the owner, the product is clearly specified, however,  coming to 
a solution on quality specifications can prove difficult because the client want as much as possible 
from the project. They also adds that LCC calculations stated in the contract help decision-making: 
“The basic product, in my opinion, is clearly specified and described in a good way. Now 
we have our design, in our B4 rapport, detailing what we should build. The quality 
specification is questionable because we have setup procurement packages, which the 
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hospital might object. They have to do LCC calculations. If these values are within 
contract, we have a right to deliver. The hospital (service division) can say that they want 
something else and they can pay the additional cost”. 
 
Another reason is when people focus on demanding payment in alternative implementation models 
then they are not focused on quality, solutions or adding value. According to a representative for 
the contractor, they find project solutions together. Although, whenever the owner require 
something outside of the contract or the contract does not specify what the owner wants, they have 
to pay for this solution: 
“In addition, we go to the owner and demand payment when it is not clear or claim for 
additional extras. Here we defined it together in the pre-project phase, but sometimes DB 
projects can work in a smooth way”. 
One of the ways parties share risk, while giving up the right to be compensated in this project was 
described by a representative for the owner when stating that the “Contractor lost rights to be 
compensated for errors in design, all bear the extra cost”. Another point that emerges is the 
difference in behaviour within traditional and IPD projects when dealing with quality issues: “In 
a DB the contractor gets blame for squeezing quality, here they are conscious to not put in the 
absolute minimum”. In a traditional project, it is natural for the contractor to deliver at a minimum 
when it comes to quality, to save money. While here, the contractor focus on delivering a good 
product.   
However, a representative for the technical consultants state that the owner is not very involved in 
decision making for the design:  
“Have not experienced that the owner is involved in choosing a solution. Owner gets 
drawings for review. However, they do not put their approval stamp on the drawings. 
Owner is very clear on functional requirements”  
This is in line with theory that the owner is very much involved in the early stages. Findings also 
show that they spend less time on discussing whether they have delivered enough. Representatives 
for the owner state: 
 110 
 
“Contradictory to a traditional fixed price contract, they would have spent more time and 
have larger incentives to challenge the contractor and owner to say that they have 
delivered enough”. 
The empirical findings show that waste is an issue in the project. This perhaps occurs because IPD 
is new to Norway, it might be that the root cause of the attitudes displayed by some in the case 
study which could be based on the contextual problems and in addition because of the participants 
have encountered a different delivery type. Table 3 shows how IPD has a unique and radical 
approach compared to traditional construction delivery methods. The project was perceived by 
some as wasteful and not as smooth as Design Build. The purpose of IPD, being based on lean, is 
to eliminate waste, not make more waste (American Institute of Architects, 2007a, 2014; Martin 
Fischer et al., 2014). Traditional methods have been criticised for a long time because of excessive 
waste (Egan, 1998). On the topic of applying lean to construction, the elimination of waste was 
emphasised by (Diekmann et al., 2004). The AIA working definition (2014) comprised of five 
principles aimed at reducing waste and optimising efficiency. Thus, literature seems to point to the 
opposite conclusion to the negative opinions of the participants (as mentioned above). IPD reduces 
waste rather than causing waste. 
IPD allows for design changes mid-process in order to add value while keeping within budget. 
However, it seems some would prefer to revert back to a fixed and very detailed design, sugges ting 
rounds of discussion and time spent on evaluation as being wasteful. Again, these observations 
run contrary to the literature. (Martin Fischer et al., 2014) sees IPD as providing value, not just for 
the user, but also environmental value and social value. The works by (M. Fischer et al., 2017) et 
on Target Value Design, say that the use of TVD in IPD helps to reduce costs whilst keeping in 
line with the project's values and without scope reduction. In the 2014 AIA working definition, the 
five principles are based on trust and collaboration. This is in line with the lean philosophy of 
continuous improvement through participation, learning and aligned goals to achieve greater 
efficiency incrementally. 
According to Ballard (2009), the effort put into dealing with problems and providing value within 
budget does not constitute waste. Taiichi Ohno of Toyota Production Systems said, “you have to 
lower the river to reveal the rocks”. Motor manufacturing and construction project delivery are 
very different, but the same principle holds true. In both the application of lean philosophy leads 
to revealing problems in order to solve them. The result is efficiency and success which has been 
shown to be successful in the US. 
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The Principal Agent (PA) theory by Eisenhardt (1989) is somewhat consistent with the empirical 
findings. The incentive for the participants in the project is to safeguard quality lies in the contracts 
which co-align the interests of the agents and the principal, in that all key-players are bound 
through shared risk and reward and thereby the opportunistic behaviour between the parties is 
reduced. It is this that results in the owner in principal becomes an agent and the agents become 
principals. A shift occurs from individual self-interest to group interest. This lead to the principals 
and agent focusing on safeguarding the owners goal of value and quality in the build. Now both 
principal and agents are interested in ensuring and maintaining constructability. Quality is 
prioritized in all phases of the construction and focus switches to the capability of a design being 
constructed. The findings also show that the process, expressed as source of waste arises from 
redesigning for quality and value for the customer. This also in line with the American Institute of 
Architect organisation (2007a, 2014) which states that people incentives change from 
individualistic to doing what is best for the project.  
Furthermore, PA theory also suggests that moral hazard can occur since the principal does not 
know what the agent is doing. The results also show that colocation, has unified the participants 
towards reaching a solution, seen in proposition 2. One could argue that the agent will realise that 
deceiving the principal will only reduce their share of the profits. In addition, since the owner is 
involved in the IPD process, during the design and construction, he is also able to safeguard his 
interests by focusing his efforts to safeguard a combination of cost, quality and sustainability.  
The findings also show that quality is safeguarded through the interlocking IPD contracts through 
shared risk and reward. This makes all actors inherently responsible for the design, whereby key 
and supporting players of IPD including the owner, come together to determine through their 
collective knowledge and experience how to maximise efficiency, minimise waste, and complete 
the construction project on or ahead of schedule using tools such as target value design, early 
involvement, co-location, etc. The project’s key players can suggest changes that can be used to 
speed up construction, which would not normally occur in a DB model.  In addition, the findings 
also show that Life-cycle cost (LCC) term implied by statute in the contracts is an instrument that 
can be used to manipulate the participants in order to focus on the LCC costs. 
The empirical results are also consistent with the findings that projects utilize tools and methods 
in order to minimise waste and optimisation the efficient operation of the project (American 
Institute of Architects, 2014). Despite these benefits, having too many tools and methods can have 
a counterproductive impact in a project. The data supports H. W. Ashcraft (2014) who states that, 
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one requires deep collaboration and integration of tools in a project. However, the use of early 
involvement stated by American Institute of Architects (2007a) and H. W. Ashcraft (2014), which 
has the ability to potentially impact costs, as shown in the Macleamy Curve, cannot be 
unproductive but does require deep collaboration. This use of early involvement can be seen in the 
findings from the “sprint 300” activity to redesign and reduce costs in the project by 300 million.  
In critical realist terms, the structures involved here are the customer, participants, the construction 
project and the IPD principles. There is interaction between the structures by means of 
mechanisms, which come from the owner’s involvement in safeguarding his interests, the 
customer wanting value by aligning the goals of the participants to the goals of the project, through 
the incentives of collaboration and shared reward.  
In addition, the attributes of IPD is a mechanism that helps to influence the participants to work 
together and solve problems, reducing cost and adding value. As goals align it results in a mutually 
dependent interaction between participants and the project, each influencing the other. The 
outcome is progress as seen in this case study and success in other empirical studies. 
This is different to alternative implementation models whereby time is spend focusing on self-
interest, which manifests itself by looking to serve the interests of the individual. Attention is 
focused on finding fault and documenting blame, sub-optimising and risk aversion. Detailed 
contracts, whereby changes are chargeable does little to put focus on value and redesign of the 
original design. The parties often overlook buildability because it is often fuel for finding fault and 




The data gathered shows that IPD safeguards quality in a way better than alternative models. This 
is shown through not only the IPD principals but also through shared risk and reward, colocation, 
the owners involvement, Life Cycle Costs (LCC) and through goal alignment that ensure quality 
and value for the owner. In addition, constructability is safeguarded sufficiently well through goal 
alignment and focus on the projects goal which aligns with the owner’s interests. This alignment 
rarely occurs in a DB as the contract gives fuel for finding fault and charging for change. Waste 
can be seen as a by-product of continuous improvement, but it is through redesigning of the design 
that waste is minimized.  According to literature, IPD should create value and reduce waste. This 
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includes allowing changes along the way to add value. Some of the problems mentioned that hinder 
quality, like short deadlines, are contextual. Negative attitudes might come from working on a new 
delivery method, where IPD is radically different from more familiar (traditional) methods.  
In critical realist terms, the mechanisms, come from the owner’s involvement in safeguarding his 
interests, the customer wanting value by aligning the goals of the participants to the goals of the 
project, through the incentives of collaboration and shared reward. As goals align it results in a 
mutually dependent interaction between participants and the project, each influencing the other . 
In addition, the attributes of IPD help to influence the participants to work together and solve 
problems, reducing cost and adding value. 
Proposition three is verified. 
 
7.4. Proposition 4 
Proposition four: IPD, in combination with TVD, provides better framework conditions for 
continuous improvement and innovation compared to a Design Build model (DB).  
Earlier in pro 1,2 and 3 we have discussed the features of IPD mentioned in the case study, like 
joint decision making, colocation, shared risk and reward, the LCC in the contract and the owners 
involvement. A closer look at the main aspects within the case study isolated the management 
practice of TVD in driving the design process. Thus, it is necessary to look at TVD as an 
encouragement for better value, innovation and continuous improvement. 
The findings show that TVD was used in combination with IPD to set high goals in order to create 
value in design. The owner’s representative explains that:   
“We have Target Value Design (TVD). This means that we need that value bit in here, 
which means that we all agree is within the scope. And then we’re not looking at cost, but 
we make a solution within the level of quality, which is under budget and is a part of the 
mechanism. This is something we are supposed to get out of our process to get more value 
for the hospital and for the money.” 
 
He further states that “We don’t use Target Cost Design (TCD)” 
This was further reiterated by another representative for the owners who add further that: 
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“If you don’t have Lean, BIM and TVD as tools in an IPD, you have not used any tools 
that can exploit those possibilities that arise which the IPD is dependent on. If we cannot 
find any possibilities to do this in a better way, then there will not be surplus to share, and 
the participants’ incentives goes away.”  
However, not all comments were favourable, many couldn’t understand TVD, while some wanted 
to revert to old behaviour of using Target Cost Design (TCD) where you design and then set the 
costs and then build. Nevertheless, these comments were seen as linked to the contextual problems 
in the project, these will be discussed later in the section contextual problems.  
The TVD process of setting target costs together with setting target value has a purpose of setting 
high goals in order to innovate. 
Innovation is designing and redesigning ways of doing things better. Examples of which could be 
seen in scope swapping mentioned earlier and through the consideration of prefabricated units, on 
and off site. Other ways that were mentioned of being innovative were through suggestions of 
tools and methods that could improve the process from individuals in the project. For example, the 
representative for the owner stated that they were using a “Suspension system and a hole-drilling 
robot.” These suggestions came as a result of the IPD features and the TVD process.  
While innovation was successful to some degree, some suggested that restrictions in the build 
limited innovation. For example, the representative for the owner suggest that less innovation was 
not possible due to the:  
“lack of freedom, less space because we are building next to another building for example the 
ceilings are smaller” while others suggested that innovation would have been greater if the build 
was not so challenging and tailored. Comments such as 
This was verified by the representative for the contractor who stated that  
“This project has not been innovative, we have considered some solutions, but they are not feasible 
because of the bespoke nature of the build. Innovation needs time and money, that’s the creator of 
innovation.” 
Yet another representative for the contractor suggested that one of the problems lay in the people 
and the shared risk and reward: 
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“A limitation in innovation is the risk of trying something untested especially when it is, now your 
own money.” 
Other comments on the lack of innovation also came from the owner’s representative who states 
that “we have suggestions but don’t have administrative capacity” 
However, the representative for the technical consultant’s stated that:  
 
“IPD promotes a very constructive willingness to fulfil contract in new ways but the 
contract does not promote innovation. NO, it is additional requirements from owner who 
we keen on prefabrication and industrial solutions and several concepts were tested, but 
most were not used because they did not meet constructability. If I have a choice between 
3-4 solutions, we take the one who fulfils the contract. The industry, however, is not 
innovative in particular & we are stuck with some old-fashioned attitudes.” 
This is also reflected in what one of the representatives for the owner states 
“IPD combined with TVD there is always customer value however when you ask the 
contractor they think TCD because they are bringing down the costs. In this way you get 
two contradictory factors (customer value vs contractor costs).” 
Yet the process of designing and redesigning, coupled the features mentioned earlier creates a 
continuous learning process, which seems to be unseen by the participants.  
The criticisms of IPD, are somewhat consistent with the findings, as Cleves & Dalgallo point out 
that IPD is not right for everyone, as not all are wired to collaborate. It is also clear from the 
findings that a number of participants would like to revert to a simple way of doing things, such 
as a DB. This is consistent with Illeris (2004) learning theory who points out, as occurring in the 
workplace environment, where workplace practice relates to working identity. When a crisis 
situation occurs reverting back to the familiar is a trait that would be employed to modify the 
learning arena before trying to work for a different employer according to Kalsaas (2012). 
Zimina et al. (2012) highlights that through greater use of TVD, reworking the design to its desired 
maturity allow for better choices. However, in alternative development models, the design would 
either be fixed and connected to the contract whereby changes would proceed to lawsuits and 
claims, resulting in the making of “narrow choices” or the design would be redesigned only as a 
firefighting measure when problems are identified during the build. However, the findings from 
the results show that participants feel that they have spent more time than they should have, which 
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is perhaps a requirement that TVD and IPD require a high level of commitment from all team 
members, which requires an investing in learning, which needs to be accounted for.  
In addition, after the contractor and consultant had been contracted, they established a cost estimate 
which was 300 millions NOK over the project cost frame. In order to reduce the estimate, they 
conducted, what was internally called, Sprint 300. Here they used TVD in order to find ways of 
reducing cost while securing customer value.      
Furthermore it would be favourable for the project to earn money by having enough work for 
trades on the construction site, (where they get payed per unit) and not outsource work. When 
keeping labour in-house they are able to remove obstacles and make sure everything flows, which 
is in line with Lean 
The empirical findings are somewhat consistent with the available l iterature on the effects of IPD, 
for example the effects of IPD such as the owner getting more involved, reducing barriers, less 
arguments between actors in the value chain, creating direct relationships, increasing collaboration 
and coordination, adding value, learning can be seen in the empirical findings (American Institute 
of Architects, 2014; H. Ashcraft, 2013; Martin Fischer et al., 2014; Ghassemi & Becerik-Gerber, 
2011; Koskela, 1992; Suttie, 2013).  
In terms of innovation it is somewhat verified in proposition 4 because there are two arguments 
that are equally important. First the owner puts incentives and new tools and process that will help 
optimise the project which encourages innovation. In addition, innovation is increased through the 
use of joint decision making, colocation and the process of TVD where one redesigns and finds 
good solutions to problems. Secondly, the counter argument is that shared risk and reward hinders 
the actors from taking chances on new and innovative solutions because they feel that their profit 
is at risk. Some might argue that risk and reward will actually encourage the actors to take larger 
risks for higher rewards, however when you look at game theory individuals will always revert 
back to self-interest. Furthermore because of the democracy that occurs, it is difficult to get all 
actors to agree to take unnecessary risks. In addition, it has been suggested that a lack of innovative 
ability lies in the complexity of the build, which has required far too many tailored solutions. This 
is also evidence that supports process innovation in tackling and solving the problems in the build. 
However, IPD is important for Innovation but it requires time and a tolerance for failure. The 
results also show that the project has been hampered by contextual problems which have 
snowballed throughout the project. 
   
117 
The data gathered shows in relation to Illeris, (2004) learning theory that people often find it hard 
to change perhaps because as they get older, they get used to specific ways of working. The actors 
in the project are used to temporary working environments, often with people that they are not 
familiar with or with those new to the whole building process, yet one could argue that this is the  
same in a DB environment and learning will occur over time. However, it is the silo thinking that 
people often revert back to which can hinder learning from taking place. If the learners focus is on 
finding fault and blame then less emphasis is placed on design and redesign, which is a part of the 
continuous improvement process. It is this process that helps learning in the workplace to occur. 
In addition, individual learning occurs easier if the learner is enthusiastic, competent in their work, 
open and willing to adapt to change, and not stressed. The empirical results showed that many 
participants, made claims of stress from too much to do in a short space of time and the number of 
new tools/processes. This in relation to learning theory does not give conditions for an individual’s 
work identity or to reinforce working practice. However, these complaints perhaps come as a result 
of the contextual problems found in this project that are outside IPD. 
Within IPD framework there is extensive involvement and cooperation between trades and across 
company boundaries which is a result of joint decision making, the owners involvement 
throughout the process, sharing risk and reward and through interlocking agreements. This 
represents a considerable change in terms of learning in the workplace based the learning theory 
by Illeris (2004). The technical organisation learning environment is where large opportunities 
exist for learning, as most decisions which normally would have been taken place in a DB by the 
main contractor, are now transferred to the interlocked actors in the project. It is here that many 
people are exposed to new experiences, which allows them to utilise the six characteristics in this 
dimension by increasing their opportunity for learning. The findings also show that collaborating 
on solutions with different trades and disciplines also gives many people a chance to be exposed 
to new experiences and learn about the different disciplines. Collaboration with trades, on an 
individual level will depend on the learner’s competence and their motivation to learn.  The finding 
are also consistent with the theory that the shared knowledge, that develops within the 
relationships, provide “favourable settings for learning” (Welch & Wilkinson, 2002). 
In terms of critical realism, the mechanism here can only occur as new possibilities are discovered 
when the costs are used as a driver for design instead of treating cost as an outcome of wasteful 
redesign iterations.  
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The empirical findings are also largely supportive of a transcendent learning process occurring 
based on Illeris learning theory. However, there is a debate as to whether this is caused by the 
temporary transient environment in other words the fact that the project will come to an end, the 
crisis situation IPD creates in reference to the burning platform, or the overload of contextual 
factors in the project. Nevertheless, the empirical findings are somewhat consistent with 
accommodative learning where the learner has to adapt their current understanding, in this case of 
what they know, to accommodate new information which can often be demanding on the learner, 
as joint decision making, and mutual adjustment is a process that provides a basis for new 
information.  
Furthermore, the owner has used new technology and processes such as colocation which creates 
a common learning arena. The use of co-location, whereby the actors are constantly learning about 
solving problems and through instant feedback can solutions be remodified or solved. This coupled 
with the number of new ways of optimising the project through a variety of solution options and 
learning about other trades increases knowledge development of the project. 
The theoretical and empirical findings are consistent with AARI scheme of analysis (Welch & 
Wilkinson, 2002). When we examine the business relationships in the IPD, through the bonds 
between the network of actors and each participant’s perception of one another, there is a 
development of mutual trust and understanding. There is a lack of evidence that mistrust and 
cultural misunderstandings had separated the actors. In fact, the actors seemed bonded by the 
shared risk and reward and through the number of activities of joint decision making in meetings. 
The relationships are also connected through the sharing of information and the swapping of work.  
The empirical results are somewhat inconsistent in relation to the schema configuration of ideas. 
There is evidence of the internal and external interactions, in other words the inter-organisational 
relationships from activity links, resources ties and bonds formed between actors however there is 
a lack of evidence on how participants perceived their adaption in other company’s belief systems 
and values. The theory suggests that as the couplings occur the organisations become more 
interrelated and adapt to each other over time. The results show that a number of interviewees 
expressed resistance to the concept of IPD, perhaps also due to the number of contextual factors.  
This resistance would affect whether people adopt each other’s beliefs systems and values or 
whether they stick to their own organisational objectives, values, missions and plans.  
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Conclusion: 
The results show that through the Target Value Design (TVD) process, and innovation occurs. 
This is where the process is improved by solving problems, viewing things differently, improving 
efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, this leads to better choices becoming available than that 
would present themselves in a DB. In addition, after the contractor and consultant had been 
contracted, they established a cost estimate which was 300 millions NOK over the project cost 
frame. In order to reduce the estimate, they conducted, what was internally called, Sprint 300. Here 
they used TVD in order to find ways of reducing cost while securing customer value.  
Learning coupled with reflection allows for continuous improvement. It is learning and knowledge 
development that are essential to fuel innovation. However, IPD is important for Innovation but it 
requires time and a tolerance for failure. 
It would be favourable for the project to earn money by having enough work for trades on the 
construction site, (where they get payed per unit) and not outsource work. When keeping labour 
in-house they are able to remove obstacles and make sure everything flows, which is in line with 
Lean.   
IPD also has other good conditions that help facilitate the process, through the use of joint decision 
making, colocation and through shared risk and reward are the actors encouraged to continuously 
improve and innovate. The technical organisation learning environment conferred through 
learning theory by Illerus is where large opportunities exist for learning, as decisions making, and 
involvement in the continuous improvement process is now transferred and implemented by the 
actors in the project.  
In addition, Illeris points out that stress and workload on an employee can hinder learning, which 
is largely consistent with the empirical findings. The findings also show that there is some 
resistance in the process which is consistent with the individuals learning dimension. When we 
examine the business relationships in the IPD based on the AARI scheme of analysis (Welch & 
Wilkinson, 2002) theory, Actor, Activities and Resources have formed whereby Ideas should 
occur however the results are somewhat inclusive. This could be based on the number of contextual 
problems in the project. In terms of critical realism, the mechanism here can only occur as new 
possibilities are discovered when the costs are used as a driver for design instead of treating cost 
as an outcome of wasteful redesign iterations. Proposition 4 is verified. 
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7.5. Contextual factors 
The section explains the way the Tønsberg project was set-up, which had some influence on the 
respondents’ answers to the questions in the interviews. The situation is explained from the 
contextualised explanations, which were described by the participants. Their influence was 
considered contextual in the case study. 
  
Inherited a sketch of the design from another company 
The results showed that the project had inherited a sketch design from another company, which 
was introduced in the early stages of setting up the project. An architectural firm created the design 
in the Design Build (DB) phase of the project. Because of the introduction of the IPD contract, 
another architectural company was appointed within the consulting group and as a result inherited 
the design. The results also show that the design was also used by the builder in the DB process to 
give a quotation for the price of the project, and as one participant states “it was not buildable”. 
When the project decided to go over to a IPD the quotation and the design had been calculated 
using a DB and were thus used as the basis for the project. In addition, this affected the early 
involvement process. Because of an inherited quotation and design, Target Value Design (TVD) 
was used to reduce the costs of the project down 300 million. The design was used in the project 
and may revealed, “Many didn’t understand it”  
Negotiation of a new type of contract: IPD contract 
The data gathered demonstrates that negotiation of a new type of contract (IPD contract) has been 
an issue. One participant states that this created a time pressure on the original timeline due to “a 
new form of contract, which had a legal part that was not fully clarified”. One of the challenges 
and disagreements among the parties the adaption of an American contract into a Norwegian 
setting and getting the right price. Whereas another participant argues that a “DB is better than 
IPD because you have experience” and that “setup gave a steep learning curve”. The findings also 
show that one participant state that the contract has a weakness in its interpretation and “ambiguity 
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The owner wanted to try out many new tools and processes 
The results also showed that the owner upon creating the contract had insisted on adding in number 
of processes, methods and tools that were required in the build. Examples were given of how it 
affected the process:  
   
“BH has had very high ambitions, a little over-ambitious, in this project both in relation 
to the IPD model, but also the technological way of working, processes, how things are 
going to happen.”  
 
Another representative felt that the trying out too many new systems had a negative effect because 
of accustomization problems such as, “here we are not prepared, it’s a lot of things to get used to, 
no time to think, pressure to go onto next task and don’t even understand the task”. They further 
state that “process is more complex […] and trying out too many new systems” which had a 
negative effect because “It was a long time before people got used to it, some don’t understand it 
[…] some are enthusiastic and it’s an advantage”. 
 
The data gathered further show that if they were “Doing it again I would invest a lot of time in 
educating them in what the contract entails and how to work, in addition to the systems and 
software.”. 
 
One could debate whether the lack of time is caused by contextual problems. However, it is hard 
to say whether this comment, made by a representative for the technical consultant, is an IPD issue 
or due to the late start-up of the project: “there is the lack of ability in organizing meetings and to 
clarify issues because we are pressed for time. Have a feeling that there are many parallel 
processes.” This is further supported by one participant from the contractor who suggest that co-
location only works if people are not too busy with all the other things for example if you “ask the 
architect, he is so involved in other things that he cannot give those answer”. If it is an issue then 
this is part of the accustomization process in an IPD. 
 
Another representative state that:  
“IPD is new to the industry and there has been a lot of pain in its introduction. There is 
the contract and a bunch of idealisms around new methods that have disturbed it like 
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LEAN, LP, Pull-planning, co-location, paperless (i-pad) & BIM. We have Norway’s record 
for trying new methods at once. The majority of these methods didn’t give us the success 
we had hoped for. It is not too many changes at once but it’s the introduction of these 
methods. We have given up LP, it was poorly used plus perhaps because we are in the final 
phase, but LP could have been good there as well.”  
 
Decision to start and deliver project earlier than necessary (as part of project goal) 
The results showed that the owner had decided, at the start of the project, an end of project 
milestone date. This date as the respondents expressed was not adjusted to take into consideration 
of the delays in setting up the IPD contract. Furthermore concedes that “This project is special, 
halfway due to IPD, but a lot due to short deadlines […] it's such a short timeframe from you 
adopting, projecting and then it's built”. However, one can debate whether the short time frame is 
a contextual issue or a result of IPD. 
  
Deciding to build even though the design had not reached an appropriate maturity level 
Another example of contextual problems was stated as “normally we go through several rounds 
to get to the solution with the builder but once we get the nod, then it’s okay. But here there will 
be a new round afterwards. It's the biggest challenge here I've seen”. This might be a result of late 
design. 
 
The data further show that one participant state that the  
 
“Difference between an IPD and DB is the scope, delivery and quality because it is often 
very clear what to deliver either function or half described product while here it’s 
challenging you don’t know where that list is.”  
 
This is also an example one might debate whether is contextual or a result of a complex project. 
Other participants state that “Owner’s decision is not a problem, but delayed design is”, which is 
confirm by another informant who states that they “got the drawings the same day as they build” 
and referred to it as a Just-in-Time principle. The findings also show that some participants state 
that no one knows who is in charge or what their mandate is.  
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The data gathered show that a representative state, “There is more clarity in a DB than in a IPD, 
you have the details of how things will be built” which is confirmed by another representative’s 
statement “In a DB you have more detailed drawings and clearer specifications earlier”.  
However, another representative argue that this is a contextual factor because if the “basic design 
is done well it will be good, like it would in any other project.”  While another informant state that 
the “Challenge is clarity in what prices the contractor has given & what is needed to fulfil the 
functional requirements”. 
Snowball effect 
The results also showed instances whereby participants blamed the earlier contextual factors, 
mentioned above, as having an effect in the project. Examples of which were referenced to as 
having a challenge due to delays due to the decision-making process. Other examples corroborated 
the contextual problems mentioned earlier as “we have less than 5 days to make all of those 
decisions”. While one participant stated that co-location only works if people are not too busy with 
all the other things for example if you  
“Ask the architect, he is so involved in other things that he cannot give you those answers” 
 
While other remarked that  
“There is the lack of ability in organizing meetings and to clarify issues because we pressed 
for time. Have a feeling that there are many parallel processes.”   
 
Other contextual factors 
The results revealed other factors that were emphasised during the interviews in the case study that 
were deemed contextual in nature, because all projects would be subject to these factors. The 
participants indicated that the cultural differences between Skanska UK and Skanska Norway, 
listing English as a cause for misunderstandings. Other cultural differences mention concerned the 
designers and the contractors. Those with not a “good command of English so its uncomfortable 
to give their opinion or give comments, in that they might feel intimidated” yet while some were 
very positive and stated that “it’s good to have people from another culture with other points of 
view”.  Other results indicated that the weather was mentioned as a problem which again was listed 
as a contextual factor. As one example states the “weather problems which are always going to 
have an impact but are maybe more detrimental in combination with other things”   
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8. Future work  
This section states the future work that was proposed from the discussion of results from the 
propositions. It should be noted that due to the large amount of data capture in combination with 
the time restrictions placed on the thesis there was not enough time to treat the data. This is one of 
the main recommendations for future work in this thesis. 
Proposition 1 
In conducting this research and analysing principal agent, game theory and transaction cost theory, 
it has come to light that further research is needed in measuring opportunistic behaviour in the 
value chain when and if mutual cooperation ends as a result of the removal of the shared risk and 
reward through overspend of the profits. Theory suggest that if there is no more shared profit, 
people will revert to self-interest and they will no longer cooperate, but instead try to compete with 
one another and find ways to be opportunistic in their work. 
Further work needs to identify if this is the result of suppressing opportunism. Also, what are the 
repercussions if problems are missed or misconstrued and opportunism is ignored or suppressed. 
Strategic behaviour has now been engaged. In addition, non-monetary perks, such as praise and 
feeling valued associated with power should also be investigated. 
In addition, future work should test out the general mechanisms in other empirical studies for 
example using shared risk and rewards and its effects on the value chain. Do you get full alignment 
of the projects goal or will it cause an underling behaviour to occur without the remaining IPD 
framework? In addition, the survey results should be used for future research. 
Further examination should be done to fully examine the extent the power and game rules change 
by comparing the case study to a DB which has just risk and rewards to see whether the same 
results will be reflected.  
Documentation of additional cases is needed to assure that this case study can be compared in 
relation to the results. In addition, the proposed future strategies need to be tested and improved. 
Relational coordination 
In terms of relational coordination future work should focus on measuring the participants views 
over time. It is without doubt that, as the project goes through the next upcoming phases and 
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participants learn more about how to work with one other within this new concept of IPD another 
picture will emerge. It is here that relational coordination should be measured.  
The findings should also be used for further research to compare with similar projects, using IPD 
and alternative project delivery models, at a similar stage in a projects life cycle. A point of 
weakness of RC is it measures subjective experiences and perhaps this should be further 
investigated in the future. 
It is important to explore cases of IPD in Norway which can be used as a comparison for future 
research. In addition, research should be conducted on measuring relational Coordination in 
alternative implementation models for comparability. Furthermore, the results from the survey can 
also be used for further research.  
Proposition 2 
Research is needed in measuring when it is worthwhile for a solution swap to occur. because 
participants indicated that there were hidden costs, such as administrative costs. 
 
Proposition 3 
It is important here to examine how does an IPD guarantee quality and ensure constructability, 
without incentives and here it is also important to investigate how much influence the owner has 
and an investigate owner’s experiences, using IPD, in safeguarding quality. This should then be 
compared with other implementation models? 
In addition, future work should try and measure the effects the collocation in relation to Principal 
agent theory and its sustained effects in reducing opportunism in terms of moral hazard and thus 
safeguarding quality in the build. 
Proposition 4 
People who are resistant do they learn to collaborate! How does behaviour change over time in 
IPD projects, do they reject IPD fully or adopt some aspects of it? This can be linked to Illeris, 
(2004) learning theory whereby learning can be used to compare behavioural change in alignment 
with the theory. In addition, future work should try to focus on measuring learning in Design-Build 
compared to IPD. 
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In addition, when you examine the schema configuration of ideas, theory suggests that as the 
couplings occur the organisations become more interrelated and adapt to other company’s belief 
systems and values over time. Through the lack of consensus of the main goals in the project, 
which might be due to the contextual problems in the project. As a result the schema configuration 
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9. Conclusion 
This thesis examines Integrated project delivery (IPD) in Norwegian construction projects by 
examining the sharing of risk and opportunities aimed at better collaboration and project 
achievement. It studies used critical realism to not only analyse the context but examine the causal 
explanations that can affect the events present in the case study, the Tønsberg Project. Four 
propositions were resolved based on the events that transpired and through abstraction of the 
theory. The results showed that in almost all cases the propositions were verified, and the 
mechanisms identified such as new opportunities are discovered only when understanding of the 
project matures through working through the details. 
Proposition one states that IPD provides less scope for sub-optimisation and opportunistic 
behaviour between companies in the value chain. The findings are inconclusive in suggesting if 
there was opportunistic behaviour or sub-optimisation. However, there was found to be some lack 
of understanding of IPD and some resistance to change. In relation to critical realism the 
mechanisms here for less opportunistic behaviour in the project is linked to the underlying 
incentives that lie in swapping solutions, finishing the project ahead of schedule and the common 
profit pot. 
Proposition two states that IPD provides better conditions for unified solutions (swapping) than 
traditional contracts. The findings were that unified solutions (swapping) were taking place as a 
result of the fact that the clauses of the IPD contract made it a better option to collaborate and 
cooperate to find unified solutions, and swap job tasks and costs if necessary, than proceed with 
an unsatisfactory solution, and IPD is a game changer as there is less incentives for the actors in 
the project to be opportunistic. The mechanism is new opportunities are only discovered when an 
understanding of the project has matured enough through working with the details and when there 
are no structural restrictions. This leads to the event which is the swapping of solutions. 
Proposition three states that IPD safeguards quality and customer value in a better way than 
alternative implementation models while maintaining constructability. The findings showed that 
constructability was safeguarded sufficiently well because of the goal alignment of the 
participants’ goal with the owner’s interests. In addition, the attributes of IPD is a mechanism that 
helps influence the participants to work together and solve problems, thus reducing cost and adding 
value for the customer. The data gathered showed that IPD does, in fact, safeguard quality and 
customer value in a better way than alternative implementation models. In critical realist terms, 
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the mechanisms, come from the owner’s involvement in safeguarding his interests, the customer 
wanting value by aligning the goals of the participants to the goals of the project, through the 
incentives of collaboration and shared reward. As goals align it results in a mutually dependent 
interaction between participants and the project, each influencing the other. 
Proposition four states that IPD, in combination with TVD, provides better framework conditions 
for continuous improvement and innovation compared to a Design Build model. The findings 
showed that innovation took place, both in process innovation and also in tools and materials 
innovation. Also continuous improvement in design occurred, and this was aided by TVD. In 
addition, after the contractor and consultant had been contracted, they established a cost estimate 
which was 300 millions NOK over the project cost frame. In order to reduce the estimate, they 
conducted, what was internally called, Sprint 300. Here they used TVD in order to find ways of 
reducing cost while securing customer value.      
It would be favourable for the project to earn money by having enough work for trades on the 
construction site, (where they get payed per unit) and not outsource work. When keeping labour 
in-house they are able to remove obstacles and make sure everything flows, which is in line with 
Lean.   
Not only did innovation and continuous improvement take place, but more so than in Design Build 
where detailed contracts make changes chargeable. IPD is important for Innovation but it requires 
time and a tolerance for failure. In terms of critical realism, the mechanism here can only occur as 
new possibilities are discovered when the costs are used as a driver for design instead of treating 
cost as an outcome of wasteful redesign iterations.  
Finally, the critical realist analysis of the four propositions found IPD to be a complex with many 
interesting structures which has many interactions with other structures by means of generative 
mechanisms, resulting in a quality and efficient build with elimination of much waste through lean 
processes. 
The findings are valuable to both academics and companies. Our findings also suggest future areas 
of research that need to be taken into consideration. Our study lays a foundation for further in-
depth research in IPD and its effects on suppressing opportunism which can be of benefit to various 
organizations and companies. Therefore, there is a real need for further studies in this area given 
the emergence of IPD and the challenges in the construction industry. 
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Reflection on the propositions 
The propositions suit this case study and can be used in other case studies concerning IPD, however 
dealing with the contextual issues, affects the balance between what is part of the IPD and what is 
contextual. This project has and is plagued by contextual problems which convolutes the whole 
process of analysing the project.  
Reflections on the methodology 
Using an approach that explores the case study has the potential to not just generalise the findings 
but to search for the structure and mechanisms which spurs creative thinking. The theoretical 
reflection allows for abstraction and creative thinking in combining theoretical perspectives with 
empirical findings. However, there are some limitations with this approach. The mechanisms can 
be too generic as a result one can fail to find the underlying or hidden explanation for the event. 
While on the other hand the mechanism can be too specific and can only arise from only one event. 
It requires training and learning in finding this delicate balance.  
The thesis provides researchers with an overview of critical realism and applies it to show how 
causal explanations in IPD research can be identified. It is useful to analyse, in organisational 
settings where complex interactions occur the mechanisms which are often hard to perceive. The 
paper makes a contribution by showing how critical realism can be used within a pre-existing case 
study to better explain the nature of causation in complex social interactions and identifies 
mechanisms which are often hidden.  
This critical realism aspect of this thesis should be of interest to PhD students examining IPD, 
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Appendix 3: General Information Guide  
Purpose of the Interview 
This is a master thesis project conducted at the University of Agder and our purpose her today, is 
to explore and examine the efficiency of production in the Architecture, Engineering and 
Construction industry (AEC) using and applying IPD.  
We intend to look the possibilities and limitations in the use of IPD to help understand our 
preliminary research question: what affects does an IPD model have on collaboration quality in 
the supply chain within a projects lifecycle. 
Our focus areas will be early involvement in the recruitment, the preliminary project and the design 
process, with the construction phase being examined for the quality in information sharing and 
decision making. The Tønsberg project is not due to reach the handover phase and as a result will  
be excluded.  
Our research has numerous contributions not just to the owners but to the primary and key 
participants within the supply chain. It will serve not just to inform how well participant feel IPD 
work contrary to other PD models but can be used as a tool to innovate better ways of working. 
Nye Veier has expressed interest in the use of IPD and the master thesis will as a result be 
beneficial in understanding how IPD’s work but their contribution in improving efficiency. It 
addition it will also benefit other business owners thinking of introducing IPD.  
Our plan today is to conduct a series of interviews and perhaps observe, if possible, during some 
meetings. 
Information about the Interviews 
This interview is designed to last no longer than (1-1.5 hours). This interview guide will be used 
to help the participants and main themes or topics will be used for discussion.  
This interview is going to be recorded, and all conversations conducted between the participants 
and interviewees will be confidential. Recorded interviews will be deleted after processing and 
any sensitive information, will only by published by agreement with the informant as soon as 
possible after the interview (max 5 days).  
All information gathered will be anonymous and data collected will be presented in such a way 
that it will not be traceable back to any respondents. As a result, only participant numbers will be 
used in the master thesis. 
A report will be sent to the respondent for quality assurance and follow-up questions might be 





Appendix 4: Example of an interview guide 
19 -04 -2018 / Bo Terje Kalsaas, University of Agder 
Project Implementation Models (2017-2020) . A research collaboration between Nye Veier road 
project and the University of Agder . 
Tønsberg project , IPD project 
Intervjuguide . Project Manager General 
Contractor. Confidential 
Place, date , duration : ...................... ; 
Respondent ( Code for Key Info, Name and Function / Role / Position - Handling of Personal 
Information ) : ............... .. 
The project : 
1. How do you see your role in the project? 
2. What are your biggest professional challenges? 
3. What are the main goals for the project, broken down to your tasks and what  
do these goals mean when it comes to your work? 
4. How would you describe the clarity in goals, needs and requirements 
(scale from 1-5). 
5. How do you rate the complexity of the challenges in the project  
6. (also in regards to unknown methods and/or solutions) (scale 1-5) ? 
If you were involved in the contracting and transformation process to 
the IPD contract: 
6. How was you involved? 
7. How was the process of establishing the IPD contract (with budget) viewed 
from your perspective? Risk and reward? 
8. What do you consider to be the most important in the IPD ? 
9. Do you have experience with IPD or similar contracts from the 
UK? Differences?  
 
Implementation phase : 
1. What can you say about the "lesson learned" so far regarding the use of the 
IPD in the Tonsberg project? 
2. IPD is described as a game changer. How does the collaboration work in 
regards to the owner and the project team? (Constructionability - Time - Flow / 
Productivity - Customer Value / Quality?) 
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3. We have heard that the design has been delivered late to the production  
department when it comes to construction of the psychiatry building. Comments? 
4. How do you follow up in the project? 
5. Until now has there been any delays due to late decision-making from the 
owner?  
6. How is the contract applied or used in the project? 
7. How are unpredictable situations/discrepancies/and differences of opinion  
handled? 
8. What are the biggest challenges in terms of time, cost and quality based on 
your perspective? 
9. Do you have experience using a design build project delivery model?  
If yes, how would you compare it to a IPD? What are you doing differently? How 
do your thoughts? What are the advantages / disadvantages in your opinion? 
10. Do you optimize resources between, those in the value chain (all those 
involved in the Tønsberg project), to increase value? 
11. Have you come up with suggestions for improvements (innovation) in the 
implementation phase ( can you possibly mention how many with some 
examples) ? 
12. In your opinion would you say sub-optimization removed or do you see it as a 
challenge in the IPD? 
13. In your opinion would you say that you have had fewer change messages 
generated from the designers? 
14. Is there new competence in the project? 
15. In your opinion would you say IPD’s promote innovation? Examples. 
16. How does the BiM system works in relation to the contractor's needs? 
Interaction Quality & Communication (Relational Coordination) : 
17. Do you experience cultural differences between Skanska UK and Skanska 
Norway? 





Appendix 5: Overview of schedule at Tønsberg project 
 
Meeting Date  Duration Type 
1.  24.01.18 2 hours 30 min Interview  
2.  12.02.18 2 hours 30 min Interview  
3.  21.03.18 1 hours 30 min Interview 
4.  21.03.18 3 hours  Observation- Design meeting 
5.  22.03.18 1 hours  Interview  
6.  22.03.18 3 hours Observation- Operational meeting 
7.  22.03.18 2 hours Interview 
8.  22.03.18 45 min Interview 
9.  03.04.18 1 hour Interview 
10.  26.04.18 1 hour Interview 
11.  26.04.18 1 hour Interview 
12.  26.04.18 1 hour Interview 
13.  26.04.18 1 hour Interview 
14.  26.04.18 1 hour Interview 
15.  26.04.18 1 hour Interview 
16.  04.05.18 - Survey approved and distributed 
 
An overview of the participation schedule for Nye Veier workshops 
Meeting Date  Duration Type 
A 17.01.18 3 hours  Workshop  
B 06.02.18 3 hours Workshop  
C 14.03.18 3 hours Workshop  
D 26.03.18 3 hours Meeting  
E 11.04.18 3 hours Workshop  
E 15.05.18 3 hours Workshop  
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Appendix 6: Lawyer interpretation of the risks in IPD vs DB 
MEMO 
To:  The hospital in Vestfold HF v / Jostein Todal           Trondheim, December 23, 2016 
From: Arntzen de Besche Advokatfirma v / Jon Gresseth   Responsible lawyer: Jon Gresseth 
and Erlend Solberg                Our ref: TKL / tkl. 
Copy: Tønsberg project by Tom Einertsen 
OVERVIEW COMPARISON OF RISK - IPD AND NS 8405 
The hospital in Vestfold ("SiV") has asked Arntzen de Besche Law Firm Trondheim AS ("AdeB") 
to prepare an overall comparison of the most important risk factors associated with the negotiated 
draft Integrated Project Delivery Agreement ("IPD Agreement") and NS 8405. 
The IPD agreement has not yet been negotiated, so the comparison below is based on the draft in 
the state that was available on December 12, 2016 after the review as IPD-Principals ("IPD-P"). 
There are still some points, of which the insurance solution is probably the most important.  
However, we have reached a point in the negotiations where we have a sufficiently good picture 
of how the contract will appear to point to the main differences regarding risk. 
In order to better understand our description of the IPD agreement, here we will give a brief 
presentation of some particular characteristics of the IPD agreement, and how this agreement 
model differs from those most other contract models. There are several variations within IPD 
agreements, so our description is attached to the specific negotiated agreement. 
The IPD agreement is a three-party agreement where both the builder (SiV), the contractor 
(Skanska) and the consultant (Cura) unanimously lead. The parties will undertake a comprehensive 
phase of cooperation, where they they will sit together before they start the build. The basic idea 
is that they in this way, can find the best and most cost-effective solutions, and that though through 
planning will avoid time-playing and delays in the construction phase. To give entrepreneur and 
adviser a financial incentive, their profits are separated from their costs and predetermined to a 
given amount, so that profits are not affected by how much work or how much materials that are 
added to the project (see the remuneration model in the table below). 
Responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the project has been added to the body IPD-P, where 
all decisions must be unanimously led. Over IPD-P we have a Project Steering Committee ("PSC") 
that takes responsibility for the questions IPD-P cannot agree on and where decisions are made 
through the majority vote. All the details of the project will be designed by Core, Cluster and 
Consultant Groups ("CCCs") under management of IPD-P. PSC and IPD-P will both consist of 
three members, one from the builder, one from advisory group and one from the entrepreneur. The 
composition of CCCs will vary according to the specific tasks they are set to solve, but will mostly 
be interdisciplinary. 
Comparing the risk of the two models is somewhat challenging. Risk in a project is  
much more than the provisions on risk contained in the contractual provisions. Organization of the 
project, the key personnel expertise, the market, how early advisors and contractors are  involved 
etc. will affect the builder's risk. A project carried out after an NS 8405 contract, can of course 
also be organized in many ways - something that obviously will affect the risk for the builder. In 
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the following, we have nevertheless tried to compare the risk regulation in the two agreements,  
quite independently of how the projects are organized. This is to get a pure comparison of the 
agreement terms as possible. But for the sake of completeness it is important to note that in most 
projects that use through the use of utførelsesentrepriser, a lot of changes will be made to the 
provisions of NS 8405. 
In this context it is also very important to make sure that the entire IPD agreement's idea is based 
the assumption that close cooperation and the parties' common economic interest will lead them 
to the following provisions on risk allocation should not arise. The numbers that the TP have 
received, presented from 110 IPD projects in the United States, seems to support this starting point.  
In the continuation we will first briefly describe how the two models regulate the different themes,  







Compensation IPD agreements, sections 7, 8 and 9 NS8405 point 27, cf. section 2.8 
 Early in the design those involved (the 
parties) agree on a Target Cost that 
should contain all projected costs in the 
project, but without any profit to the 
contractor and adviser. In addition, the 
parties agree on one amount as profit that 
the contractor and adviser should have 
for the project. 
 
When the project is completed the costs 
must be collate (Chargeable Costs) and 
compared against Target Cost. If 
Chargeable Cost is higher than Target 
Cost, the profit, for the Entrepreneur and 
adviser should be reduced Kr for Kr. If 
the difference is greater than the profits 
the entrepreneur and adviser will not 
make a profit. The BH musts always 
cover the cost (containing no profit). If 
Chargeable Cost is lower than Target 
Cost, the savings will be distributed 
50/50 between 
builder and adviser/contractor. 
NS 8405 does not specify a clear starting 
point for which compensation format is 
required. The contract thus opens to that 
workers can be paid at a fixed price with 
fixed amount (fixed price), or fixed price 
per unit (unit prices), or after receipts. 
 
In construction contracts, where the 
building largely will be designed and 
specified before pricing, the compensation 
will often be a fixed price with fixed 
amounts. 
 
NS 8405 still assumes the quantities first 
will be locked until the contractor has 
conducted a quantity control, to a 
subsequent deadline to be within the 
demands of regulatory amounts.  
Only after a quantity control, will the 
contractor be liable for the quantities. From 
NS 8405 paragraph 27.2. 
Risk Comparison: 
The IPD puts the risk of exceeding the contracted amount ("owners cost") on the BH, 
in that costs beyond "owners cost" are always covered. There are thus theoretically no 
limitations in the BH duty to pay the adviser's and contractor costs. At the same time, 
the contractor and adviser in an IPD agreement must give up all of their profit before 
the BH will cover additional costs. 
In an NS 8405, the entrepreneurs will initially have the risk of exceeding the contract 
amount ("Fixed rate"). However, in an NS 8405 contract, the price is not that fixed as 
the contractor can demand additional payment for a number of events. For example, 
the contractor will have the opportunity to claim addition payment for changes and 
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additional costs for production-related conditions ("Plunder and staple") Therefore, the 




IPD agreements, item 11 NS 8405, Item 22 
Legal changes to an IPD agreement are 
in essentially: 
- Changes in the performance BH 
decides along the way 
- Unforeseen ground conditions. 
- Changes to laws and regulations as 
the parties could not predict. 
- Changes through a so-called 
«Client's Directive», see below. 
Changes in the project will initially take 
place, through decisions making in the 
IPD-P, possibly PSC if IPD-P is not in 
agreement. 
If one of the other parties in the PSC is in 
agreement with the BH assessment that a 
condition, that is not a change, is the 
question decided. 
If the BH is voted against in PSC he can 
nevertheless always instructs the parties 
through a Client's Directive. 
Changes adopted will normally affect the 
target cost but will usually not  increase 
or reduce profits. The last point is 
however, not finally clarified in the 
negotiations, as Skanska and Cure 
demand that profit be automatically 
changed with changes in the project like 
it is in the NS system. 
There are no limitations in the BH right 
to demand changes, but it must probably 
be interpreted as a limitation that neither 
the advisors nor the contractor can be 
ordered to perform work that is of a 
completely different kind. 
 
 
The developer has the right to make 
changes in form of addition, deduction and 
altered execution. 
A change may also be imposed on the 
delay and change of implementation in the 
project, cf. 22.2, as long as this can be done 
within a reasonable framework. 
BH is not entitled to impose changes 
resulting in additions to the contract sum of 
more than 15%. A change must 
nevertheless be connected with what the 
contract includes, and not be substantially 
different from the original agreed work. 
If the reduction of the contractor's total 
remuneration after the contract is 15% or 
more of the contract sum, this should be 
regarded as cancellation that triggers a 
cancellation allowance, cf. section 38. 
Changes are honoured by compensation 
adjustment according to the rules in 
paragraph 25, which also includes profit 
for the contractor. 
Change work must be imposed by formal 
change order, cf. section 22.3 
There are separate rules for so-called 
"irregular changes" in section 23. These 
deal with situations where the BH orders 
execution of further work, which the 
contractor believes is a change. 
The contractor will after the rules in 
section 25 could claim compensation for 
additional costs to the execution of the 
build, those that come from consequence 
of changes, delay/failure in BH delivery 
and other obstacles that the BH carries the 
risk for. 
Such compensation adjustment includes, 
among other things, compensation, loss in 
productivity, rig and operational 
maintenance, etc. 
Compensation adjustment must also 
include profit for the contractor, and is thus 
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not limited to just pure replacement for 
applied costs 
Risk Comparison: 
The IPD model aims to reduce the focus on changes that you normally have in an NS- 
contract, in that the contractor and the consultant always get their costs covered and 
not automatically claim additional profits on changes. 
Furthermore, in an IPD agreement, there are less room for demanding changes 
In an NS 8405 contract, there will largely be opportunities for the contractor to claim 
payment for changes to all conditions that differ from the terms and conditions of the 
contract, including missing and incorrect design, lack of co-operation and deliverance 
from the BH etc. 
Probably the risk associated with changes will be somewhat less in an IPD agreement 
than in an NS 8405-contract 
Cancellation IPD-agreement section. 17 NS 8405 section. 38.1 
In general, the builder can always cancel 
and pay for all work done (including a 
proportionate share of profit) and cover a 
given percentage of the value of 
remaining work (3% for Skanska, 0% for 
Cura) to cover lost profits. This is one 
point where the parties are not yet totally 
in agreement. 
Furthermore, it is agreed separate 
cancellation rights where advisers and 
contractor are not entitled to future lost 
profit. Access is fully open until B4 but 
can also be made in B5 if certain 
additional conditions are met, that the 
project is not finally approved by BH. 
 
BH has the right to cancel work. If the 
reduction in the contractor's total 
compensation is less than 15% of the 
contract amount, the reduction will always 
treated according to the rules of change. 
If the reduction is 15% or more, the 
contractor can claim for cancellation 
reimbursement for the financial loss he 
suffers as a result of the cancellation, ie the 
positive contract interest. Such losses 
include EBITDA and fixed costs, 
cancellation reimbursement costs that the 
contractor has for the subcontractors, etc. 
However, the contractor will have a loss 
obligation, including the released of his 
resources to take on other income-
generating assignments. 
Risk Comparison: 
The IPD agreement gives greater rights to cancellation than a standard NS 8405, unless  
similar specific deviations are also agreed under an NS. 
Risk of design 
errors 
 
IPD Agreements, Item 12 NS 8405, points 1, 13.1 and 19.2 
The advisors have in principle 
responsible for design errors in the IPD 
agreement. After delivery the 
responsibility will be as in a traditional 
enterprise agreement. 
Before delivery, all costs will be (though 
not profits) for additional work due to 
design errors always covered by the BH. 
It appears from NS 8405, paragraph 1, that 
the standard is intended to be used where 
most of the design must be delivered by the 
BH. 
The BH will in line with the function 
distribution carry the risk of errors in his 
own design, cf. section 19.2. 
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If this is the result that Chargeable Cost 
exceeds Target Cost, then this this will 
be taken from the profits of both the 
adviser and entrepreneur. 
 
Thus, it will be the BH that carries the main 
design risk in NS 8405 contracts. 
If the contractor is doing the design, 
something that is normally done at one or 
another level, he still carries the risk of this 
line with the function distribution, cf. NS 
8405 section 13.1. 
Risk Comparison: 
Prior to handover, the risk of design errors in an IPD agreement is both less and larger 
than in NS 8405.  
Less additional costs will be covered by the contractor and the advisor's profits, but if 
the costs are so large that they exceed the whole profits the BH has to cover it 
(excluding profit). We have understood that it would be possible to insure design errors 
that manifest themselves before handover. 
After delivery, the risk will in practice, correspond to NS 8405. 
Overall, therefore, the risk associated with design errors can be said to be somewhat 
greater in an IPD- agreement than in an NS 8405 contract. However If supplementary 
insurance is taken the difference in risk will be equalized. 
The risk of 
deficiencies in 
design 
IPD agreements, item 12 cf. item 15 NS 8405, item 36 
The entrepreneur is in principle 
responsible for missing contracted work 
in the IPD agreement. 
After delivery, the responsibility will be 
as in a traditional contract. 
Before delivery, all costs will be (though 
not profits) for additional work due to 
deficiencies in the contracted work are 
always covered by the BH. If this results 
in Chargeable Cost exceeding Target 
Cost this will be taken out of profits of 
both the contractor and adviser. 
The entrepreneur is at risk of deficiencies 
in the contracted work and is obliged to 
rectify, or to give a discount, and respond 




Prior to handover, the risk of shortcomings in the contracted work in the IPD agreement 
is both smaller and larger than in NS 8405.  
Less additional costs will be covered by the contractor and the adviser profit, but if the 
costs are so large that they exceed the entire profit, the BH still covers costs (excluding 
profits). 
After delivery, the risk will in practice correspond to NS 8405.  
Overall, the risk associated with deficiencies is claimed to be somewhat greater in an 
IPD agreement than in an NS 8405 contract. 
IPD Agreement Section 6.1, cf. Section 
12 






BH has the risk for ground conditions, if 
these deviate from what the adviser and 
Entrepreneur have used when they 
entered into the agreement, and after 
investigating the construction site and 
other available information 
 
BH has the risk for ground conditions, if 
they differ from what the contractor had 
used in the contract, the nature of the 
assignment and other circumstances in 
general. 
The risk distribution will thus depend on 
which information the contractor had about 
ground conditions at upon entering the 
contract in this case. 
In a project like TP, where the work is too 
a great degree designed and specified in 
charge of the BH prior to entering into the 
contract with the contractor, will the 
contractor normally receive geotechnical 
reports prepared by the BH. BH will bear 
the risk if the ground conditions differ from 
that which is described in the rapports. 
Risk Comparison: 
BH runs the risk for ground conditions and is for all practical purposes similar to the 




IPD Agreements Section 11.2 NS 8405, points 24 and 25 
The IPD Agreement does not contain 
provisions about daily fines by delays, 
but based on an assumption that delays 
will cause increased costs in the project 
and that the contractor will try to avoid 
delays because of an increase in costs 
reduces his profits. 
BH may require a delay in the progress, 
but if this entails increases the costs will 
both the entrepreneur and adviser request 
an increase in Target Cost so that this 
does not reduce their originally agreed 
profit 
If the work gets delayed and this is due to 
the circumstances the contractor has the 
risk for, it will basically be answered by a  
daily fine after the rules in paragraph 34. 
If progress is hindered by conditions the 
BH has the risk for the contractor hs the 
right to an extension of time. This apply for 
example to changes, delay or failure of the 
BH to deliver and other obstacles the BH 
carries the risk of. 
Similarly, the BH is also entitled to an 
extension to his own deadlines, if he is 
prevented as a result of circumstances the 
contractor is responsible for. 
Like we have mentioned above, will 
nevertheless the BH could impose on the 
contractor travel delay for a change even if 
this is due to circumstances he himself 
carries the risk of. 
Risk Comparison: 
If there are delays due to conditions on the part of the contractor, the IPD agreement 
will carry a greater risk than NS 8405 because the builder cannot demand daily fines 
and also must cover the cost (without profit). But if delays are due to conditions 
on behalf of the contractor, the risk in the IPD agreement will be less because the 
contractor will only claim for costs and no increased profits. 









IPD Agreements, Item 16 NS 8405 has consistently strict 
notification deadlines. 
The IPD agreements have to a limited 
extent pre-exclusive deadline, which is 
related to the purpose which is to limit 
the number processes around changes. 
However, the BH loses the right to claim 
if conditions that should have been 
discovered by handover. For conditions 
detected later it must be claimed within a 
reasonable time and no later than 3 years 
for claims against the advisors and 5 
years for claims against the contractor. 
There is no agreement on legal action 
deadlines.  
Especially relevant are these in connection 
with irregular changes (item 23), 
requirement for deadline extension (item 
24) and requirement for remuneration 
adjustment (item 25). 
The deadlines are short and notice is due 
consistently given "without undue delay" 
after the party has become aware of the 
conditions that trigger the notification. 
The consequence for late notification isn 
basically, the party loses that right the 
notification contains (preclusion). 
It follows from NS 8405, paragraph 8, third 
paragraph that the party who invokes 
preclusion as a result of late notice, must 
do this without undue delay after receiving 
notification. If the party does not do this,  
he loses the preclusion objection. 
This also applies for the BH to provide his 
objections to the contractor's final 
settlement within 2 months from receipt of 
the final settlement. Objections and 
counterclaims that are not included within 
the deadline will as a rule, be lost. This 
follows from NS 8405, item 33.2. 
In cases of contested claims for change,  
extension of time or compensation 
adjustment in final settlement, the 
contractor must within 8 months from the 
takeover start a lawsuit for his demands. If 
the contractor does not do this, he loses. 
claims against the BH. This is according to 
NS 8405 Section 26.3. 
Risk Comparison: 
The IPD agreement entails a certain increased risk that claims may be promoted at a 
later date than in NS 8405. At the same time, there are other elements of the IPD 
agreement that attempts to curb the number of conflicts and disputes. To the extent that 
they function according to their purpose under Norwegian conditions this may cause 
the number of disputes under IPD agreements to be less than under traditional NS- 
contracts. 
On the other hand, neither the BH of an IPD agreement will lose his right to come 
objections to, for example, change requirements and so on 
Summary To the best of our knowledge, there has never been an IPD project in Norway after that 
model that is being used by the TP. Neither the BH, advisory group nor entrepreneur 
has had any involvement with such agreements. Our company has not previously 
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assisted in designing such contracts. In this, of course, there is a risk that the parties 
involved have less experience with the IPD agreement. 
On the other hand, it has been shown to have very good experiences with hospital 
building using the IPD model from USA. Many in TP, both from the BH side, as well 
as advisors and contractors, have received knowledge of these projects through 
presentations in the US, exploration of IPD projects, talks with IPD players in the USA 
and through multiple talks and work meetings with lawyer Howard Ashcraft junior, 
who was here in Norway in the last year. We have no basis to assume that the positive 
experiences with IPD in hospital projects made in the USA are not transferable to 
Norway. 
As we see it, IPD agreements are in many ways a further development of cooperation 
agreements such as has been used in large projects recently, for example, the 
development of New St. Olavs Hospital in Trondheim. Using this background, there 
are many elements both in the process and in provisions in the agreement document 
that should be known in the Norwegian, land-based enterprise environment. 
The overall risk picture between an NS 8405 contract and an IPD agreement is not 
really very much different. Therefore, we cannot see that using an IPD agreement - on 
a general basis – should cause greater risk of exceedances than using an NS 8405 
contract. The risk of overruns will, in our experience, be linked to other and more 
project-specific conditions.  
We repeat some of the above-mentioned points associated with risk:  
- If we look at the BH risk of covering the advisor and the contractor's costs 
exceed the agreed contract amount, so the two models look basically quite 
different.  
In an IPD agreement, there exists no limitation of the BH obligation to cover 
contract parties’ costs, even if these exceed both Target Cost and Owners Cost. 
In an NS 8405 contract, often the contract amount is a fixed price. 
However, the price is no more fixed than that the contractor may claim additional 
compensation due to a series of events for example of omissions or changes to the 
design material, imposed changes, delayed decisions and deliveries from the BH 
or the BH advisers, delays or errors with sub-contractors, etc. 
 
- Regarding the risks associated with changes, the differences in the contracts are 
not special big. As we see it, there is probably less room for requesting changes 
in an IPD agreement than an NS 8405 contract.  
 
- Risks related to deficiencies, ground conditions and design errors are essentially 
similar in the two contract models.  
 
- The risk associated with delays to the contractor can be said to be somewhat 
larger in one IPD agreement, as there are no daily fines. On the other hand, the 
financial consequences of the BH own delay is less in an IPD- agreement than in 
an NS contract.  
 
- Regarding the differences in the notification rules, we do not consider this to be 
any difference in risk associated with possible overruns of the contract sum. 
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0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
1  Completely disagree
3 Neutral
5 Completely agree
In the project I experience: - 1. Those I collaborate 
with have the same goals as me (we are pulling in the 
same direction) Percentages
1  Completely disagree 2 Partially diasgree







0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%





In the project I experience: - 2. There is often 
communication around the goals of my tasks
1  Completely disagree 2 Partially diasgree







0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%





In the project I experience: - 3. that others request 
my competence and contribution at the right time
1  Completely disagree 2 Partially diasgree
3 Neutral 4 Partially agree
5 Completely agree








0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
1  Completely disagree
3 Neutral
5 Completely agree
In the project i experience: - 4. communication 
regarding my taks is sufficiently accurate
1  Completely disagree 2 Partially diasgree







0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
1  Completely disagree
3 Neutral
5 Completely agree
In the project I experience: - 5. communication 
regrading my tasks is problem-solving
1  Completely disagree 2 Partially diasgree







0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
1  Completely disagree
3 Neutral
5 Completely agree
In the project I experience: - 6. that the others I 
collaborate with understands my knowledge and 
taks
1  Completely disagree 2 Partially diasgree







0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%





In the project I experience: - 7. respect for my work
1  Completely disagree 2 Partially diasgree
3 Neutral 4 Partially agree
5 Completely agree
